




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


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
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INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

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
By M. HIRIYANNA
POPULAR ESSAYS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
THE QUEST AFTER PERFECTION
SANSKRIT STUDIES
ART EXPERIENCE



Indian Philosophical Studies

1

By
M. HIRIYANNA



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PUBLISHERS' NOTE

This is the fifth collection of essays of the late Prof. M. Hiriyanna. The last three papers of this volume, namely, *Dṛk-dṛśya-viveka*, *Abhāva* and '*The Paradox of Negative Judgment*' are being published here for the first time and the rest of them have appeared in various journals and publications.

Advantage has been taken, in the editing of these essays, of the corrections made by the author in his own copies; and the marginal notes left by him have been, as far as possible, added as footnotes. 'Extra Notes' or 'Additional Notes', found along with his papers, have been reproduced here, in most cases, verbatim.

We are grateful to Prof. Hiriyanna's daughter for her continued co-operation in the publication of these essays. Our thanks are due to Prof. N. Sivarama Sastry of the University of Mysore, for his valuable suggestions in the editing of the volume.

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I am grateful to Messrs. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., for their courtesy in allowing me to include in this volume my late father Prof. Hiriyanna's article *The Problem of Truth* appearing in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, Ed. by S. Radhakrishnan. My thanks are also due to the Secretaries of the Indian Philosophical Congress and the Editors of the various journals and other publications who readily permitted me to include in the present collection essays which were first published by them.

M.R.

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- The Problem of Truth: *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*.
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- The Nyāya Conception of Truth and Error: *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, Vol. 1, No. 2.
- The Sāṃkhya View of Error: *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, 1929.
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- Bhāskara's View of Error: *Journal of the Jha Memorial Research Institute*, November, 1943.
- The Place of Reason in Advaita: *Review of Philosophy and Religion*, January-April, 1943.
- Rāmānuja's Theory of Knowledge: *First Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1925.
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- The Philosophy of Bhedābheda: Foreward to *The Philosophy of Bhedābheda* by Prof. P. N. Srinivasachari, 1934.
- Definition of Brahman: *Journal of the Jha Institute*, August, 1945.
- The Advaitic Conception of Time: *Poona Orientalist*, 1939.
- What is Samavāya? *Third Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1927.
- An Indian View of 'Present Time': *Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society*, April, 1924.
- Indian Philosophy and Hedonism: *Indian Historical Quarterly*, December, 1946.

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ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Br. Up.</i>	<i>Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.</i>
<i>Śvet. Up.</i>	<i>Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad.</i>
<i>Taitt. Up.</i>	<i>Taittirīya Upaniṣad</i>
<i>Ch. Up.</i>	<i>Chāndogya Upaniṣad.</i>
<i>BE.</i>	<i>Bosanquet's Essentials.</i>
<i>BL.</i>	<i>Bosanquet's Logic (Vol. 1).</i>
<i>ERE.</i>	<i>Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.</i>
<i>Mbh.</i>	<i>Mahābhārata.</i>
<i>VP.</i>	<i>Vedānta-paribhāṣā.</i>
<i>VS.</i>	<i>Vedānta-sūtras.</i>
<i>N.-V.</i>	<i>Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.</i>

ERRATA

Page 28 Footnote 2, last line: *Read* Nirn. Sag.

Page 118 Note 15, last line: *Read* Das Gupta, *Indian Philosophy*, p. 263 n.

Page 128 Footnote 5: *Read* the stanza as follows:

Yadeva rocate mahyam tadeva kurute priyā |
iti vetti na jānāti tat priyam yat karoti sā ||

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH

The logical aspect of knowledge is now commonly discussed with exclusive reference to the nature of ultimate truth. There is no doubt that this is the question with which epistemology is finally concerned, but it may be asked whether we cannot advantageously begin by having before us a less ambitious aim. Irrespective of the final solution we may arrive at about the nature of truth, there is knowledge which is distinguished as either true or false from the common-sense point of view; and we may start by asking what this distinction means. Our answer to this question may not satisfy the ultimate epistemological test, but we need not occupy ourselves with that consideration from the beginning. 'Confusion often results', it has been said, 'from proceeding at once to large and complex cases'. If we thus restrict the scope of the enquiry, we shall be simplifying the problem to be solved; and its solution, though it may not furnish the complete explanation of the nature of ultimate truth, may be expected to throw considerable light upon it. We propose to adopt this plan of treatment in the sequel.

Let us begin by analysing an act of perception. When a person opens his eyes (say) and sees a table before him, there are, as ordinarily supposed, three elements that can be distinguished in the situation: First, the percipient who sees; secondly the object, viz., the table; and lastly the sense-data or *sensa*, as they are described—a certain shape, colour, etc., which he associates with the table and regards as its actual characteristics. These *sensa* he takes as revealing the nature of the table partly, for, while he may be seeing only its shape and colour, he believes that it has also other qualities like hardness and weight. It may appear that the common man does not distinguish between the last two of the three elements just referred to; the fact however, is that he only does not attend to the distinction between them particularly but passes over swiftly from the *sensa* to the object which is what practically interests him. The process has been compared to our overlooking the peculiarities of the print in reading, because

it is the meaning of what is printed that interests us¹. This is the popular notion of the perceptual situation; and it implies belief in (1) the presence of the self, (2) the givenness and the direct apprehension of the object and (3) the partial revelation of its character by the *sensa*, which are likewise given and directly known. Of these, the ultimate nature of the self or the knowing subject is not relevant to our present purpose. It is a problem for metaphysics. All that we have to remember is that it is a factor which enters into the cognitive situation. The same observation holds true in the case of the final nature of the object also. The points that chiefly matter for us now are the nature of sense-data, their relation to the object and the manner in which they both, viz., the sense-data and the object, come to be known.

I

According to the above analysis, the *sensa* are actually features or 'literal aspects' of objects; and they both are directly apprehended by the self. We should now ask to what extent this analysis stands the test of reflection. If it be correct, it should apply to all perceptual knowledge; but it seems that, though it may be right as an analysis of perception that is true, it does not apply to illusion and error² where we apprehend an object or some aspect of it which is not there. Without prejudging the question, however, we shall try to find out whether errors can be at all explained by assuming that even they do not involve a reference to anything that is not actually given. Such a view was maintained not only in respect of perception but also all knowledge (excepting only memory) by certain thinkers in India³, and it will serve as a convenient starting point for our enquiry. The illustrations usually given in explaining their theory are those of a white crystal which is mistaken for red when placed by the side of a red flower, and of a conch which is seen yellow by a jaundiced person. We shall select the latter for consideration, but with a slight alteration. We shall suppose that the conch is seen through a sheet of yellow

¹ *Mind* (1921), p. 389.

² We shall, in what follows, overlook the distinction between the errors of perception and illusions, as the only difference between them is that while the judgment is explicit in the former, it is implicit in the latter. Illusions have been described as 'errors in the germ'.

³ *Prābhākaras*.

glass instead of by the jaundiced eye, and that the fact of the existence of the glass is for some reason or other lost sight of. Here we have, according to this theory, the perception of the conch *minus* its true colour, viz., white, and the sensation of the yellowness alone of the glass. They are two acts of knowing, but they quickly succeed each other; and we therefore miss the fact that they are two. Each of them is valid so far as it goes, for neither the yellowness nor the conch as such is negated afterwards when we discover the error. But we overlook at first that they stand apart; and it is only this deficiency in our knowledge that is made good later when we find out our mistake. Thus discovery of error only means a further step in advancing knowledge. It confirms the previous knowledge and does not cancel any part of it as false, so that to talk of 'rectification' with reference to error is a misnomer. In admitting that error is incomplete knowledge which needs to be supplemented, the theory grants that ignorance is involved in it; but the ignorance, it maintains, is purely of a negative character and does not import into erroneous knowledge any element which is positively wrong. In other words, it holds that the mind may fail to apprehend one or more aspects of what is presented, but that it never *misapprehends* it and that all errors are therefore only errors of omission.

There is no need, on this view, to verify any knowledge. All knowledge is true in the sense that no portion of what it reveals is contradicted afterwards; and to question whether it agrees with reality in any particular instance is therefore to question its very nature. But truth being commonly distinguished from error, it is necessary to give some explanation of the distinction. The so-called error may be partial knowledge; but we cannot characterize it as such, for human knowledge is always partial in one sense or another. So another explanation is given, and it is indirect. Though all knowledge is alike incomplete, error is more so than truth. It is *relatively* incomplete, and its relative incompleteness is determined by reference to an extrinsic standard, viz., a pragmatic one. All knowledge, according to this school, leads to action; and the success or failure of the activity prompted by any particular knowledge is regarded as constituting its truth or error. In other words, that knowledge is true which works; and that which does not, is erroneous. Though this school upholds a pragmatic view of truth, it should be noticed that it is essentially

unlike modern Pragmatism. Epistemologically speaking, the latter amounts to a sceptical attitude, for it teaches that absolute truth in any matter is unattainable because it does not exist. Every truth is provisional—true only so long as it furthers human purposes. But here knowledge is admitted to have a logical, apart from a practical or guiding, value. Though it may be false on its purposive side, it is theoretically quite true and never fails to agree with the outside reality which it reveals. If we still speak of knowledge as sometimes false, we mean that it is not useful—thus transferring to it a feature which is significant only in reference to the practical consequences that follow from it. All knowledge in itself being thus regarded as true, we may say that while current Pragmatism denies truth in the sense in which it is ordinarily understood, the present theory denies error.

This theory merits commendation for its simplicity as well as for its complete consistency in explaining the logical character of knowledge. It may be said to represent the extreme form of realism, for it not only upholds that external objects are independent of the knowing mind and are directly apprehended; it even denies error. But it is far from convincing. The indirect manner, for instance, in which it explains the familiar terms 'true' and 'false' is hardly satisfactory. But even waiving this consideration, it must be said that a purely negative explanation cannot account for error which, as a judgment, presents the two elements in it as synthesized though they may be actually unrelated. Its distinction from 'doubt', which lacks such synthesis as shown by its alternative suppositions, and is not a judgment but a suspension of it, points to the same fact. In our illustration, the knowledge of the conch cannot accordingly be assumed to arise separately from that of yellowness; there is only a single psychical process, and the resulting knowledge includes a reference to a positive element which is false. Error is therefore misapprehension and not mere lack of apprehension. Such a view, we may add, is implied even in the explanation given by the school of thinkers mentioned above. It will be remembered that, according to that explanation, discovery of error means only an advance from less complete to more complete knowledge. But there may be incomplete knowledge which we do or do not know to be so at the time; and it is only the latter that can be regarded as an error, for surely nobody that *knows* that his knowledge is incomplete can be

said to make a mistake when that knowledge, so far as it goes, is admitted to be right. It will be wrong only when there is an implicit, if not an explicit, identification of it with truth or adequate knowledge. That is, if our knowledge is to be viewed as erroneous it is not enough for us to be merely unaware of one or more aspects of the presented object; we should also take the knowledge as complete or adequate. And in so far as what is incomplete is taken for the complete or the less adequate for the more adequate, there is misapprehension. Thus the mind may not only misapprehend presented objects, but it invariably does so in error; and all errors are, therefore, errors of commission. Errors of *mere* omission in the sphere of knowledge are strictly not errors at all. There is, however, this much of truth in the previous view when it insists on the validity of all knowledge, that, so far as its perceptual form at least is concerned (to which we are now confining our attention), it always points to some reality or other, and there can, therefore, be no complete error. That is, though a part of the content of knowledge may be false, the whole of it can never be so.

The outcome of the above reasoning is that there is always in error some element which needs to be recanted later, although it may be only the element of relation as in the above example; and, so far, the contention that no portion of what knowledge reveals is ever negated afterwards has to be given up. Before we enquire into the precise status of this element, it will be desirable to consider another type of error. We have hitherto spoken of errors in which, even after they are detected, the two elements involved, taken separately—or, to state the same in a different manner, the subject and the predicate of the propositions expressing the corresponding judgments—continue to be presented as before. Even the false localisation of the predicate ('yellow') persists, though it no longer misleads the person who has seen through the error. But there are other instances in which the predicate is contradicted—and necessarily the relation also along with it—the moment the error is discovered. This happens, for example, when we find out that we mistook a block of crystal for ice on seeing at some distance a certain shape and colour which are common to both.¹ The difference between the two cases is that

¹ The Prābhākara school, mentioned above, explained this class of errors also on the same principle, the two consecutive mental acts here being the perception of the subject and the recollection of the predicate.

in the one the predicative element ('yellow') is actually within the field of visual sensation, while in the other it ('ice') is not so. What we come to know as false in the latter case, when we fail to find that the given object is neither cool nor moist (say) as we expected, is not, therefore, merely the element of relation but also the predicate. Our perception of 'ice' here, as if it were bodily present, when it does not form part of the given situation needs a satisfactory explanation. All that we know for certain is that there is *something* given, and that the *sensa* actually apprehended—a certain shape and colour as we have assumed—are of that something¹, and not of the object to which they seem to pertain. Two explanations of this 'presence in absence' are possible:

(1) It may be argued that the object in question, though not present in the given situation, is still to be reckoned as a physical existent because it is found elsewhere and should have been actually experienced at some other time. While the force of this argument may be admitted so far as it means that only things resembling those experienced before can be seen in such errors, it has to be observed that the question here is not merely about the *being* of the object but also about its presence at a particular place and at a particular time. In error, it is experienced as here and now; and the experience in this determinate form is contradicted later. The reality of the object *in itself* may be conceded, but it has no bearing upon this fact; and the contradiction, therefore, remains wholly unexplained by it. It may be said that what is meant by the above contention is not that the object is merely external and real but also that it somehow comes to be actually presented, though remote in time and place.² That would be to credit physical objects with what has been described as 'a somewhat surprising mobility'. But even granting the supposition, there is the difficulty of explaining how, if the object be given, its givenness comes to be negated later. The other element, for instance, in the error, viz., the one represented by the subjected ('this')³ in the

¹ This statement requires modification as, for example, in the case of the moon which looks vastly smaller than it actually is. But it will be better to postpone the consideration of this point for the present.

² As is maintained, for example, in the Indian Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system and, in a somewhat different form, by Prof. Alexander (see *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii. p. 254).

³ As we have already seen, the 'this' in such cases signifies not merely present time and proximate place, but also some *sensa* like shape and colour.

judgment—'This is ice'—is also given, but it is not contradicted later. Its presence, on the other hand, at the place where it appears is reaffirmed when we replace the wrong judgment by the correct one—'*This is a crystal*'. The distinction in the way in which the correcting judgment affects the two elements indicates that, although what is predicated may be taken as out there, it cannot be regarded as real *in the same sense* in which the subject is. The fact is that those who give such explanations confound likeness with identity. They forget that, while the erroneous object may be similar to what has once been experienced, it need not be the same. They are right in urging that knowledge is self-transcendent and always implies a content that is known—something beyond or other than itself, and that error forms no exception to this rule. But if the reasoning should be free from all prepossession, the only conclusion we can draw from it is that that content here is a mere presentation, and not that it is also physically real.

(2) If the erroneous content is merely a presentation and not a physical reality, it may be thought that it is either a memory-image or an ideal construction. But this conclusion again clashes with experience. If it were a memory-image, it would involve a reference to past time and to a distant place, and would not, therefore, be apprehended as immediately given. In other words, if the presentation were an ideal revival, one would realise it as such at the time. There being no such realisation here, it cannot be explained as a memory-image. It is not denied, we should add, that the false 'ice' would not have been presented at all, had not real ice been experienced before. The mental disposition left behind by past experience is, indeed, an indispensable condition of the occurrence of such errors; but it only helps to determine the nature of the presentation, and does not, for the reason just stated, make it a memory-image. A similar kind of reasoning applies to the second alternative of an ideal construction. The 'ice' in that case would be experienced as related to the future, or it would appear without any special reference to time at all. In either case, the apprehension of it as a *present* existence would be inexplicable. The mental attitude, besides, would then be one of supposal and not of belief, as it is here.

The considerations which singly or in combination prevent us from accepting the above explanations in regard to the status of the object in error are its felt immediacy, its determinate position.

in the objective sphere, and its later sublation. Both the explanations possible being thus ruled out, we are obliged to regard it as a presentation which is quite unique. Its uniqueness consists in this, viz., that its nature cannot be fully expressed in terms known to logic or to psychology. A necessary condition of its emergence is that a real object should be apprehended, but only in its general aspects, and that the percipient, while being ignorant of its specific features, should be unaware of his ignorance. A sense of ignorance would perforce prevent the occurrence of error. In the case of 'doubt', for instance, only the general features of the object presented are grasped; and yet there is no error, for one is *conscious* at the time that one does not know its distinctive features, as is clear from the wavering of the mind between two alternative possibilities. It is this dependence of the wrong object for its appearance upon a defect characterizing an individual percipient¹ that explains why it is private to him and is not public or open to the view of others. Similarly, it is the position in the outside world of the thing mistaken, or the source from which the sensory stimulus comes, that determines the position of the wrong presentation there. The 'ice' appears where the crystal is; and a change in the location of the thing mistaken would, other conditions remaining the same, result in a corresponding change in the external location of the wrong object. Ignorance, however, is not by itself sufficient to account for error; and it is always found associated in producing it with some fortuitous circumstance or other like the flash of similarity between the given thing and another. But it is difficult to detail these circumstances, for they vary so much from one instance to another. We can only characterize them generally by saying that, in the matter of giving rise to error, they are altogether subsidiary to ignorance and that their nature is such that the removal of the latter simultaneously renders them inoperative. Thus in the present case, the resemblance between the crystal and the ice is a necessary factor in producing the error; but the removal of ignorance, which means a knowledge of the specific features of the crystal, at once makes it ineffective. The resemblance, of course, continues thereafter, and may remind one of real ice; but it cannot aid the false presentation of it as before.

¹ Ignorance also might be general or common to all; but the resulting misapprehension would not, in that case, be ordinarily recognized as an error by any one.

It means that ignorance, as characterized above, is what sustains error; and we shall refer to it alone hereafter, disregarding additional causes like the one just mentioned.

Thus in all errors of the kind we are now considering, the subject ('this') and some of the *sensa* that characterize it are actually given; but the predicate ('ice') and the relation between it and the subject are unique presentations. The content of erroneous knowledge is, therefore, a medley of the true and the false. According to the principle on which we have explained the wrong presentation here, the element of relation in the case of the 'yellow conch' also should be reckoned as unique. It is experienced immediately and as actually obtaining between two external objects; it is also later discovered to be false. Thus in both classes of error there is complete correspondence between knowledge and content. This does not imply the acceptance of the view that knowing involves a psychic medium which is *like* its object. Knowledge, on the other hand, reveals reality directly; and by its correspondence with content, we here mean that no part of what it reveals is ever sheer non-being. There may be disparity in the nature of the elements included within its content, for, while some of them are real, others may be unique in the sense explained above. But the latter, though not physically real, are felt as confronting the mind and cannot therefore be absolute nothing. There is resemblance between the two kinds of error¹ in other respects also. Both are forms of misapprehension traceable to ignorance of the actual character of the given objects, and both are private to the erring observer. To an important difference which they exhibit, we have already had occasion to allude. In the case of the crystal mistaken for 'ice', the discovery of error or the knowledge that the given reality is not ice, means the total disappearance of the wrong presentation². The presentation is due to ignorance and the removal of the cause removes the effect. But in the other case, the knowledge that the conch is not yellow has no such effect, and the relation *appears* to persist even after it is contradicted. This appearance should consequently be traced to a circumstance other than ignorance which is the source

¹ Other forms of error, like dreams and hallucinations, fall under one or other of these two; or they partake of the character of both.

² The 'ice' may appear there again, but it only shows that a man may fall twice into the same error.

of the error, viz., a particular disposition of the conch and the yellow glass relative to the point of space occupied by the observer. It is a conclusion which is corroborated by the fact that the apparent relation vanishes as soon as the disposition of the objects in question is changed.

II

True knowledge, by contrast, is that whose content is free from such unique presentations. Here also we may, and ordinarily do, go beyond the given as in error; but, on account of the apprehension of the *sensa* constituting the specific features of the object presented and not its general ones only, our knowledge does not become erroneous. Since *sensa*, according to what we have stated, are the very basis of our knowledge of the external world, they should be regarded as directly known; and it seems to follow from this that the object, of which they are the actual aspects, is also known directly. But this latter point cannot be properly argued without reference to the question of the ultimate nature of objects, which we are not considering here.

According to the description just given, knowledge is true when no part of its content has to be discarded as false. That is, it does not come in conflict with the rest of our experience, but harmonises with it¹. This signifies that it is coherence with other experience, and not correspondence with reality, that makes it true. The rejection of the correspondence hypothesis does not mean the denial of the self-transcendent character of knowledge. It only means that since *all* knowledge, as we have pointed out, equally satisfies the condition of agreement with an objective counter-part, correspondence cannot be regarded as a distinguishing feature of truth. The conclusion that truth is coherence may be reached somewhat differently by considering the manner in which error comes to be known. Error, as we have seen, is a judgment that is self-discrepant; but its self-discrepancy remains unknown until it is revealed by another judgment which contradicts it. Now while one judgment may confirm or supplement another, it is difficult to see how it can correct or annul it, for there is no reason to prefer either of them to the other. The only circumstance in which it may do so is when it forms part of a body of

¹ Old truths may need to be modified in the light of new experience. But we are not taking such details into consideration here.

knowledge which, as a whole, is, for some reason or other, regarded as well established. That is, a judgment can correct another or claim to be true, not by itself, but as belonging to or as implicated in a system of judgments. Since without the evidence of such a system, no one can know reality from unique presentations, we may say that error also, like a judgment which is true, becomes intelligible only in connection with a body of coherent knowledge which is taken as the standard of reference. The standard is ordinarily furnished in the case of each individual by the totality of his experience. When, however, any doubt arises and the individual's experience, even at its widest, is inadequate for settling it, an appeal to the experience of others becomes necessary. It is this collective experience or the common sense of mankind that, in the end, serves as the standard. That knowledge is true which fits into it perfectly; and that which does not, is false. Herein consists the social or general character of truth, as distinguished from error. We share truth with others; and it is therefore public, while error is private. The elements constituting the content of a true judgment are mutually compatible, since all of them are alike public. Error differs from truth in this respect, for it involves a reference not only to an object of common experience but also to unique presentations which are private and are not therefore endorsed by that experience.

We have so far assumed that all *sensa* correctly reveal the character of the object given, if only partially, and are never false. But it does not seem to be always so, for we know from experience that the precise form in which they appear depends, for instance, upon the point of space occupied by the percipient with reference to the object in question. It shows that *sensa* are not only partial in their bearing upon the nature of the object given, but that they may also vary though the object remains the same. A coin, for example, presents a round or an oval shape according to the position from which it is viewed. Similarly, a change in the position of an object may affect the *sensa*. A ship, which is seen as but a speck on the horizon, seems to increase in size as it approaches the shore, although there may be no change in the standpoint of the observer or in the objective situation as a whole. It may therefore appear that *sensa* also, like objects and relations, may be false. These altered *sensa*, it should be admitted, are not verifiable. A coin, to take one of our examples, cannot be

both oval and round. But yet such appearances are not to be regarded as false; for, unlike erroneous presentations, they can be deduced from the actual sensa according to well-known physical laws. These secondary or derivative phenomena, as we may call them, may not literally qualify the object; but, owing to the fact that their altered form is determined by strict laws, they indicate correctly, though only indirectly, the nature of the object to which they refer. It is in this indirect, and not in a literal, sense that we characterize the data in such cases as true. The fact is that they are the result solely of the physical conditions under which normal human perception takes place, and do not in any manner depend upon the idiosyncracies of the percipient mind to make them erroneous. Hence we should place these presentations on a footing which is quite different from those in error. Seeing a tree stump, which is at a distance, to be smaller than it actually is, is very much different from taking it to be something else (say), a human being. Besides, these phenomena do not commonly deceive us like erroneous presentations. A ship is not understood to undergo actual increase of bulk as it approaches the shore from a point on the horizon. All of them, no doubt, contain the seeds of error, and may therefore prove deceptive. A child may believe that the moon is really only as small as it appears, or that railway tracks actually converge towards a point in the distance. But then the essential condition of error, viz., ignorance of the true character of the objects in question, is also present; and its removal, though it shows the beliefs to be erroneous, does not lead to the removal of the presentations. In other words, they disappear as errors but persist as appearances of the real. These appearances may not, in themselves, be real; yet they are not false in the sense in which erroneous presentations, like the 'ice' in our former example, are. For the same reason, the *apparent* relation also, noticed before in connection with errors of the first type like the 'yellow conch', is not to be regarded as false.

We may designate these secondary phenomena as 'perspectives of the real' or, briefly, 'perspectives'¹. The distinction between them and erroneous presentations, as already indicated, is that the

¹ This term, which is used by more than one modern philosopher (e.g., Prof. Alexander), is intended here to stand, though not in every detail, for the phenomena underlying what is described as *sopādhikabhrama* in the philosophy of Śaṅkara.

latter are rooted in ignorance which is a defect of the knowing subject, while the former are purely the result of certain physical conditions under which an object happens to be apprehended. The term 'perspective', no doubt, implies relation to the standpoint of a particular observer; and, so far, the presentations are personal. The point here, however, is not that the phenomena in question are unrelated to the individual, but that they are in no way due to his oddities. In this latter respect, they are like *sensa* proper; but, unlike them, they do not directly belong to the objects to which they seem to belong. Hence in determining the true character of any perceived object or objects from such phenomena, we should apply a suitable correction taking into account the nature of the physical context in which they appear. In simple cases we make such corrections ourselves, as, for instance, when we see a coin as oval but interpret it as circular; in more intricate ones, however, the aid of science is necessary as in ascertaining the true magnitude of the moon from its apparent size. The truths so determined are impersonal because they reveal objects as they are in themselves, not as they appear, and are therefore independent of the point of view of the person or persons asserting them. While a part of empirical knowledge may be impersonal, the whole of science is so, for the one aim of the scientist is to find out the actual features or normal aspects of things. The extent to which this difference affects the correctness of common knowledge, where the phenomena concerned are of a complicated nature, may be very great; and what are only 'perspectives' and, as such, are not literally true, may often be mistaken by us for *sensa* or actual features of the external world. Hence empirical knowledge, as a whole, stands for lower, in point of accuracy, than the scientific. Its primary function is to subserve the purposes of everyday life, and it does not therefore ordinarily aim at greater accuracy than is needed for their fulfilment. Its value lies in its practical utility, not in its theoretical certainty; and the saying that 'thought is the slave of life' is therefore essentially true here.

III

The conclusion thus far reached is that the common-sense analysis of knowledge, with which we started, requires to be modified in two important respects. There are some instances, viz., 'perspectives' which only indirectly disclose the character of

external objects; and there are others, viz., errors which, while they may reveal reality, also include presentations that are not genuine parts or aspects of it at all. Objects and relations may thus be erroneously presented, but never *sensa*. It may seem that, if proper allowance be made for these two kinds of discrepancies, the system of common knowledge, taken as a whole, will give us the final or absolute truth sought after in epistemology; but it does not, because it has other limitations. In the first place, it obviously refers only to a small portion of the whole of reality, and is therefore fragmentary. In the second place, it leaves out even from this portion a great deal as not relevant to the carrying out of common human purposes which is its pre-eminent function. Scientific knowledge is without this latter limitation, since it aims at expounding phenomena in terms of the non-human; but even that cannot be regarded as giving us the final epistemological solution, for it also is selective, though in a different way. No science treats of the whole of reality, but each is concerned only with particular aspects of it; and, since it studies these aspects apart from their concrete accompaniments, it may be said to deal more with abstractions than with reality. Moreover science, in spite of the indefinite expansion possible for it, will never arrive at an exhaustive knowledge of reality because its selective method will always leave for it a field which is still to be explored. Although the view of truth formulated above cannot therefore be regarded as final, it will yield the solution which epistemology seeks when its implications are fully worked out. We shall now point out how it does so; but, within the limits of this paper, we can do so very briefly.

The possibility of its furnishing the final solution is contained in the conception of knowledge as a system, and of truth as coherence with it. A strict adherence to this view may seem to lead one to the conclusion that truth is relative. For there may be two or more coherent systems of knowledge which are at variance with one another, and what is true from one standpoint may not be so from another. All our so-called truths may thus turn out to be equally false relatively, not excluding the results of scientific investigation. We have explained the common notions of truth and error, it will be remembered, by reference to the body of knowledge that bears the stamp of social sanction. But it is really only one of the standards by which truth may be distinguished.

from error; and we should take into account the possibility of there being also other types or systems of knowledge, relatively to each of which a similar distinction can be made. These systems may be many; and every one of them, according to the view taken of knowledge here, corresponds to a self-consistent whole of objective existence—the sphere of reference, which is common to all the judgments making up that system. Hence it is not only the world in the ordinary sense that exists; there may be others also, so long as they are systematic or are wholes constituted of inter-related parts, making it possible to distinguish the true from the false in statements relating to them. The world of Shakespeare's *Othello*, for example, is such a system, since it admits of right as well as wrong statements being made about it. It would be false, for instance, to represent Desdemona in it as in love with Cassio. As a consequence of such an enlarged view of objective existence, there will be not one type of truth only, but several—each order of existence, constituting the basis for a distinct type of it. 'Our beds are not stained,' it has been said, 'by the wounds of dream scimitars'; but our dream beds may well be.

It may, on such considerations, be held that there is no absolute truth at all and that we may regard any truth as relatively false, if we choose to do so. But it appears that the very notion of *relative* truth suggests the recognition of an absolute standard by which all knowledge is judged; and we have to accept such a standard, giving up 'relativist epistemology', if we are to avoid universal scepticism. Only it is necessary to further define truth, if it should be absolute. This can be done by bringing in the idea of comprehensiveness, when the systematic coherence which is our definition of truth will be perfect. The fulfilment of this new condition means the possibility of conceiving absolute truth as the expansion or development of one of the above truths such that it will, in some sense or other, include within its sphere of reference the whole of existence—not merely objective worlds but also conscious subjects. To leave out any portion of it would be to admit two or more truths, none of which, on account of their mutual exclusion, can be taken as absolute. But it may appear that there is no means of determining which of the relative truths is to be elevated to this rank. If, however, the sceptical position is to be avoided, a choice has to be made; and there is every consideration, short of logical certitude, to recommend

common truth for the purpose. We may now divide all the subsidiary truths into two groups—one consisting of those that relate to the everyday world, though they may not refer necessarily to the same aspects of it; and the other consisting of the rest which relate to the world of fiction or even to the region of dreams and illusions, so far as they are self-consistent. Of these, the former may be viewed as lying on the way to absolute truth; and since they may approximate to it more or less, we may speak of them as representing degrees of truth, a higher degree of it meaning greater completeness in the view it gives of reality. The truth of science as well as that of empirical life is of this kind. They mark relatively higher and lower stages on the path leading to ultimate truth. All such truths are integrated in the absolute one which is self-complete. The others cannot thus be integrated, owing to the divergence in their objective reference. But when we remember that, whether they refer to ideal constructions or to unique presentations, they are dependent for their subject-matter upon the reality which forms the content of the first group of truths, we find that they have their ultimate explanation, through them, in the absolute truth, even though they cannot be said to actually endure in it. They may be described as lower kinds of truth to distinguish them from the degrees of it already referred to. These two groups or classes of truth correspond to two orders of existence, one less real than the other. The world of morals implied by ethical truth, for example, belongs to the common order of existence, because of its direct bearing on actual life. But the world of art, though the truth at which it finally aims may be the very highest, stands lower than that. This is evident, for instance from the fact that, as observed by A. C. Bradley¹, 'we dismiss the agony of Lear in a moment if the kitten goes and burns his nose'².

It is this absolute truth that is the goal of epistemology; and it yields a unified view of the whole of reality. All the elements of the universe—whether they be knowable objects or knowing subjects—appear in it as internally related; and each of them reveals itself there as occupying the place that rightly belongs to it

¹ *The Uses of Poetry*, p. 12.

² This preference, however, implies that we realise at the time the relative status of the two realities. There is such realization generally in the case of art, but not in illusions.

within the whole. That is, the ultimate truth is entirely impersonal. Further, these elements are seen in it not merely as they are at any particular moment, but in the perspective of their entire history—as what they were in the past and as what they will be in the future. Or rather there can be no distinctions of time in it—‘no future rushing to the past’, but one eternal now. A temporal world when viewed in its wholeness, it has been remarked, must be an eternal one. In this concreteness and completeness it differs from scientific truth, though impersonal like it. It also differs from truth as commonly understood by us which is neither comprehensive nor wholly impersonal. There is one important point to which it is necessary to draw attention before we conclude. If the absolute truth should really comprehend all, it cannot exclude the self of the person that contemplates it. It will not therefore do if he stands apart, regarding himself as a mere knower and therefore distinct from what it points to. He should, on the other hand, view himself as inseparably one with it. The subject and the object would still be distinguished in his view, but there would not be that opposition or discord which we commonly feel between them. It means a profound transformation in the ordinary conception of the knowing self and of the objects known. Here naturally arises the question of the precise nature of the transformation in each case; but, as our present concern is with truth rather than with reality, we shall not attempt to discuss the possible answers to it. We shall only make one observation: though we left undetermined at the start the ultimate character of the self and of the object, we assumed that they were distinct. This initial dualism has to be abandoned now, for, according to the final conception of truth at which we have arrived, the knower and the known, though distinguishable, are not separable. Knowledge begins by assuming that they are different, but it culminates in the discovery of a latent harmony between them in which the difference is resolved. It is not merely the notions of the subject and object that are thus transmuted; the knowledge also which relates them must be of a higher order than any we are familiar with—whether perceptual or conceptual. But this higher experience, which may be described as insight or intuition, is not altogether alien to us, for we get a glimpse of it whenever for any reason we rise above the distractions of personal living. Only it is too faint and fitful to enable us to understand

what the exact character of the experience will be when the absolute truth is realised. All that we can say is that for one who attains to such experience, through a proper development of this intuitive power, there will be nothing that is not immediately known and that no part of what is so known will appear as external. What the means of developing intuition are, and whether the ideal of absolute truth can be completely realised, are questions whose consideration lies outside the scope of the present paper.

THE NYĀYA CONCEPTION OF TRUTH AND ERROR

Psychology in India never succeeded in getting itself separated from philosophy. Accordingly each system has its own view of *jñāna* or knowledge which is coloured by its metaphysics. The Nyāya believes in a permanent self and makes consciousness, which it describes as the basis of all life's activity¹, one of its special attributes (*viśeṣa-guṇa*). The self has other attributes also of the same kind, but we are not at present concerned with them. *Jñāna* is here divided, as in the other systems, into two kinds, viz., mediate and immediate². The latter, termed *pratyakṣa*, may roughly be taken as equivalent to perception; and the former, termed *parokṣa*, is such knowledge as is derived through inference or verbal testimony. The definition of *pratyakṣa* as knowledge which does not presuppose other knowledge³ shows its primary character. When we for instance infer that there is 'fire' on the 'hill' we should previously have observed 'smoke' there, not to mention the need for recollecting the inductive relation between 'smoke' and 'fire'. But when we see a 'jar', no such preliminary *jñāna* is necessary. It will suffice to consider the question of truth and error in reference to *pratyakṣa*, for the validity or invalidity of other forms of knowledge which are all derivative is eventually traceable to it or is dependent upon processes whose direct bearing is psychological rather than logical⁴. There are two points, however, about *pratyakṣa* as conceived here which it is necessary to know before we can treat of its validity. They are:

(1) All perceptual knowledge, according to the system, is expressible in the form of a judgment—a subject together with something predicated of it. Even what appears as an isolated percept really stands for a judgment. 'A horse' for example is equivalent to 'an object possessing the characteristic of horse-ness'. In other words *pratyakṣa*, as familiarly known to us, is

¹ *Tarka-saṁgraha*, p. 21 (Bombay Sanskrit Series).

² We are overlooking here the more fundamental distinction of *jñāna* into *anubhava* and *smṛti*. See *ibid.* pp. 21-2.

³ *Jñānākaraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam*. (*Siddhānta-muktāvalī*: Nirm. Sag. Ed. 1916, p. 237).

⁴ Cf. *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, pp. 131-2. (Chowkhamba Series).

complex in its character. It is therefore described as *savikalpaka* or 'determinate'. Now according to the atomistic view adopted in the system, all complex things are explained as the result of a putting together of the simples constituting them. The complex of *savikalpaka* also is brought under this rule and it is assumed that it is built out of simple or *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*, which presents the isolated object altogether uncharacterized.¹ Thus if at any time we cognize that a cow is white, we must, it is stated, necessarily have perceived previously a cow by itself, the whiteness by itself and the relation between them also by itself. Perception is thus conceived as a process of 'compounding units distinctly given' and not one of 'discrimination within a mass'². This preliminary cognition however, it is admitted, is not a matter of which we become directly aware³; it is inarticulate⁴ (*avyapadeśya*) and is only the result of a logical deduction based upon a fundamental postulate of the system. In other words, it is only the *savikalpaka* that is an actual fact of observation; the *nirvikalpaka* is a mere hypothesis to account for it. We become aware of the *savikalpaka*, not as it arises, but later in a second knowledge termed *anuvyavasāya* ('after-knowledge'). We first know the object; and then, if we choose, we may become conscious of this fact, i.e., of the self as characterized by the *jñāna* in question. It is inner perception or introspection (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*). That is, knowledge is primarily directed to the object, and it is after reflection that the self as well as the fact of its having got the knowledge in question is known. No such introspection is at all possible in the case of the *nirvikalpaka*.

(2) In addition to the ordinary or normal kind of *pratyakṣa*, termed *laukika*, the system recognizes another, *alaukika*—which has been rendered as 'transcendental'⁵ but which it would perhaps be better to call 'implicit', *pratyakṣa*. It is of three kinds, but it will be sufficient for our purpose to refer to only one of them.

¹ *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, p. 255.

² In current expositions of the doctrine, the preliminary knowledge, it is stated, need only refer to the *viśeṣaṇa*: *viśiṣṭa-jñānam viśeṣaṇa-jñāna-janyam* (*Dīpikā*, p. 30. Bombay Sanskrit Series.). Compare *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, p. 253. But a knowledge of the other constituents also seems once to have been thought necessary. Compare *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 93 and 96.

³ *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, pp. 253-5. (Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series).

⁴ This is according to the *Dinakarīya*. See p. 236 (Nirn. Sag. Ed.).

⁵ See Keith: *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 81.

When we see a rose at a distance we apprehend its redness, form etc., directly. We may also become conscious then of its fragrance by virtue of the impression left on our mind by a past experience of that quality in the rose,¹ but, the flower being by supposition too far from us, we cannot ascribe it to normal perception. This is regarded as a case of *alaukika-pratyakṣa*. The psychological truth involved here is the familiar one that all percepts are partly presentative and partly representative. But the representation, it must be noted, falls short of memory or more correctly gets ahead of it since it appears as the predicate of what is the object of normal perception.² When we become aware of fragrance in the example given, we relate it to the rose which is in contact with a sense-organ. Though dependent upon past experience, the idea is thus sense-bound³ and that is the justification for bringing it under *pratyakṣa*.⁴

One of the distinguishing features of the doctrine is its belief that all knowledge points to an object outside it which is necessarily real and independent of it. External objects exist in their own right. They can be known by themselves and knowing makes no difference whatsoever to them. The scope of this realistic postulate however is restricted to the *nirvikalpaka* which merely tells us that things are—whether substances or attributes or relations. Its data can never be false for we are then in direct contact with reality and get an immediate knowledge of it.⁵ An erroneous *nirvikalpaka* is thus a contradiction in terms. Error may however creep in when we relate two or more objects given in it, for though all the things we are thinking of may be severally there, the content of

¹ See *SM.*, p. 275: *Smaraṇādyātmaka (Rāmarudrīya)*.

² This is not memory, for there would then be *anubhavatva* and *smṛtitva* in a single *jñāna* and therefore *jāti-sāṅkhyā*.

³ It may be noted that *dravyas* also may be directly perceived according to this doctrine. (*Kārikāvalī*, st. 54 ff).

⁴ We see from this in what wide sense *pratyakṣa* is to be understood here. It includes on the one hand sensation or mere presentation and, on the other, what is described by modern psychologists as 'complication' which takes place during the evolution of a percept.

⁵ The *Sapta-padārthī* (Vizianagaram Sans. Series) includes it in *pramā* (p. 25) while later writers like Viśvanātha place it quite outside the range of Logic calling it neither true nor erroneous (*Kārikāvalī*, st. 135). The first of these views shows kinship so far with Buddhistic realism which also regards *nirvikalpaka* as valid.

our knowledge as a complex may be false. In other words it is the judgment with its synthetic character or the *savikalpaka* that is alone the subject of Logic. If the complex content of our knowledge has a complex corresponding to it in the objective world, we have truth; otherwise, error.¹ Thus when one sees the conch to be yellow (*pīta-saṅkha*) owing to one's jaundiced eye, the conch, the yellow colour and the relation of *samavāya* are all facts of the objective world and are given at the *nirvikalpaka* level. But while the yellowness is not related to the conch there by *samavāya*, it appears so in knowledge. It is accordingly erroneous knowledge. In our example of a red rose when it is cognized as such, the two schemes—the mental and the actual—agree and we have therefore truth. While the three elements involved in judgment do not constitute in error a single complex whole in the objective world, they are thus perceived by us. In truth, on the other hand, they are not only thus perceived but are actually so. This explanation of error will have to be altered in a matter of detail when we take other examples. In the case of the yellow conch or the white crystal appearing red when placed in the vicinity of a red flower, the several elements constituting them are presented to the mind in the ordinary or *laukika* sense; but there are cases of error in which it is not so. Thus in the stock example of 'shell-silver' (*śukti-rajata*), the silver cannot be said to be so presented. Here also the system maintains that not only the subject but also the predicative element is 'presented', but the presentation is of the *alaukika* kind—that variety of it to which we have already alluded, where the impression of a former experience serves as the means of representing it to our mind. The silver is not here but elsewhere. It is *āpaṇa-stha* ('in the shop') as it is put. Thus even here error is due to a wrong synthesis of presented objects only.

The aim of these explanations, it is clear, is to show that, like truth, error also has an objective basis. It is neither a thinking of nothing (*asat-khyāti*), nor not thinking (*akhyāti*), but wrong thinking (*anyathā-khyāti*). This view by the way is in harmony with the Nyāya conception of *abhāva* which does not stand for nothing but only for negation, i.e., the negation of something (*pratīyogin*) in something else (*anuyogin*)—an absence in presence, if we may so express it. Neither a true negative nor

¹ *Tadvoti tat-prakāraṇaṁ jñānaṁ pramā; tadabhāvavoti tat-prakāraṇaṁ jñānaṁ bhramaḥ*. Cf. *Tarka-saṁgraha*, p. 23 and *Kārikāvalī*, st. 135.

a false affirmative proposition accordingly points to absolute nothing or is a mere gap in knowledge. But what, it may be asked, is the distinctive object of an erroneous judgment? It cannot be the thing that stands as the subject in the judgment, considered as a mere 'that', for that, according to the Nyāya hypothesis, is apprehended in the *nirvikalpaka*. Nor can it be that thing as characterized by the 'what' in question, for that would make the judgment true and not false. The object, as required by the classification of error as a form of the *savikalpaka*, is not simple but complex. It has a 'determinate' feature; only the feature is not the one we are thinking of at the time but something else. This is clearly indicated by the expression *tadabhāvavati* occurring in the description of error¹ which signifies a complex something as also by the well-known Nyāya maxim² *Sarvaṃ jñānaṃ dharmaṇyabhrāntaṃ; prakāre tu viparyayaḥ*, which restricts error to the predicative element.

Such is the Nyāya view of truth and error. We may now briefly examine how far it is satisfactory. We need not enter into a discussion of the postulates on which it is based. Granting their validity we may inquire whether the explanation given is consistent with them. For this, it will be useful to find out how the correspondence with reality which is said to constitute truth is to be known. There can obviously be no direct testing of correspondence, for we cannot get outside of our knowledge. Hence the Nyāya proposes an indirect test, through putting the knowledge in question to practice. This is according to its belief in *parataḥ-prāmānya*. If we doubt whether a thing we cognize as fire is really fire or not, we have to see whether it burns; if it is water whether it will quench our thirst. The proof of the pudding is in the eating of it. This is what is known as *saṃvādi-pravṛtti* or 'fruitful activity'.³ The verification is thus pragmatic. The definition of truth, it is necessary to remember, is not so. Truth is not what 'works', but what conforms to reality. Knowledge, according to the system, is for its own sake. Its

¹ See extract quoted above in Note 1, p. 22.

² Cited e.g., in the Com. on the *Sapta-padārthī*, p. 25. This is the reason why this view of error is called *anyathā-khyāti*, *anyathā* meaning *prakāra*.

³ There may be other means of testing also, e.g., through corroboration by different channels of knowledge or by different persons; but nowhere is the means of testing knowledge other than knowledge.

value is cognitive.¹ In this discrepancy between the nature of truth as understood in the Nyāya and the manner of its verification proposed by it, we discover the essential weakness of the doctrine. Thus truth is stated to be correspondence with reality but the test does not, indeed cannot, ascertain that correspondence. What serves as the test is another experience—that of thirst being quenched, to take only one of the examples given above. Now this second experience cannot validate the first without itself being similarly validated, and setting about verifying it would only lead to infinite regress. Even supposing that this second experience needs no verification, it cannot vouch for the presence of a corresponding reality outside knowledge. A person may dream of water and also of quenching his thirst by drinking it. There is 'fruitful activity' there, but no objective counterpart to what is experienced. What the test actually finds out is only whether two experiences *cohere*. That is virtually to give up the realistic position, for the supposed correspondence with reality is left wholly unverified. Thus we see that though the Nyāya starts as realism, it finds it hard to maintain its position in the solution of what is one of the crucial problems of philosophy—that of truth and error. The fact is that a realistic doctrine cannot adhere to the *parataḥ-prāmāṇya* view. Here we discover the reason why the Mīmāṃsakas who are equally upholders of realism advocate the opposite view of *svataḥ-prāmāṇya* which, by presuming all knowledge to be valid, normally dispenses with the need for testing it. Whether that is a satisfactory mode of establishing an outside reality independent of the perceiving mind is, however, a different matter.

¹ Our perceptions no doubt suggest and lead to action but that is a *further* aim, which, according to the Nyāya psychology, is dependent upon desire and interest over and above knowledge. *Artha-prakāśanam eva ca pramāṇa-kāryam, pravṛttyādeḥ puruṣecchā-mibandhanatvāt.* (Nyāya-mañjarī, p. 161).

THE SĀMĀKHYA VIEW OF ERROR

A characteristic feature of the view taken of knowledge in this system is that it arises through a psychic medium, known as *buddhi-vṛtti*. Such a view may easily lead to subjective idealism as it does in the Yogācāra school; but the Sāmkhya, being realistic, lays down a postulate at the very outset that all knowledge necessarily points to some object outside it. Belief in the plurality of selves, which is an essential part of the doctrine furnishes a support for the postulate, since the agreement between what different people experience may be taken to vouch for the existence of a common basis for it all¹. The psychic factor is accordingly to be viewed here as but a connecting link between the knower and the known and does not do away with the latter. A natural corollary to this view is the correspondence theory of truth. That knowledge is true in which the form assumed by the *buddhi* rightly represents the object perceived.² This is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view as well, but only so far as correspondence is the criterion of truth; for that system does not recognise the doctrine of *vṛttis*. A more important difference between the two is that whereas in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which makes *manas* merely the pathway³ of knowledge, knowledge ordinarily shows objects as *they are*, there is here no guarantee that it does so. While there, the relation between the knower and the known is supposed to be directly established, here it is regarded as taking place indirectly by means of a psychic sign, which though largely determined by the object presented, is also dependent upon the *buddhi* of which it is a mode. The *buddhi*, which so far as our present purpose is concerned may be taken as the equivalent of the *manas* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika⁴, is conceived here not as passive but as endowed with a certain degree of self-activity, and as the abode of numberless impressions

¹ This is the significance of the words *viśaya* and *sāmānya* used in *Sāmkhya-kārikā*, st. 11, where the being of the *Prakṛti* is deduced. Compare also *Yoga-sūtra*, iv. 15.

² [There is] no *bhrama* at all according to early Sāmkhya.

³ [*Manas* is the] *sādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*, i.e., its co-operation [is a] necessary condition [of all knowledge].

⁴ Strictly it is the *antaḥ-kāraṇa* of which *buddhi* is only one element that corresponds to the *manas* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

acquired through experience during a beginningless past. Owing to this circumstance, every *buddhi* has its own special bent and different persons may not therefore be impressed in the same manner by the same object. Though one, the object becomes 'severalized', as it were, in the act of being apprehended on account of the bias of individual percipients. These two factors, viz., the object and the particular bent of the *buddhi*, co-operate in all knowledge and the resulting image may not be, and generally is not, a complete copy of the former. It is this power of meddling with the object which the *buddhi* possesses that leads to the so-called error. But the power, it is essential to note, only emphasizes in a greater or less degree what is given and does not add any new feature to it. In other words, the activity which the *buddhi* exercises is selective, the theory being that only so much of the nature of an object is known as is in kinship with the perceiver's mood at the time. Like only appeals to like¹. This alters very much the complexion of the resulting error. It is one of omission rather than of commission. It is right so far as it goes; only it does not go sufficiently far. To get at the true nature of the object, we have accordingly to supplement our personal view by taking into consideration all other possible views of it. The doctrine admits that such complete knowledge² is possible, when the *buddhi* is purified by a long process of self-discipline; but though possible, it is not easily attained so that commonly speaking what we perceive is only partially true.

Incompleteness is thus a common deficiency of knowledge as known to us and much of the evil in life is to be traced to viewing it as complete. Two people may disagree about an object though both may be right in part, because each is obsessed by the idea that he is in possession of the whole truth about it. There is also another deficiency characterizing all knowledge excepting only that of a 'freed man' or *jīvan-mukta*. According to this system neither the *buddhi* by itself, nor the *Puruṣa* by himself can be the conscious subject. The former is by nature insentient (*jaḍa*), being derived from *Prakṛti* and experience cannot therefore be thought of as belonging to it. Nor

¹ Compare the illustration of one and the same damsel appearing differently to different persons, given in the *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kaumudī*, on st. 13.

² See *Sāṅkhya-tattva-kamudī* on st. 4, where such knowledge is described as *ārṣaṁ jñānam*. Compare *Yoga-sūtra*, i. 48.

can the Puruṣa be the subject for, as conceived here, he is changeless and remains really unaffected by what happens in the outside world or the realm of Prakṛti. Neither satisfying the requirements of a subject, we have to seek for it in the two together; and no experience is possible until we mistake them for one, or, to be more correct, we fail to notice that there are two factors constituting it for, as in the previous case, the conception of error here also is negative. This failure which is a precondition of experience is termed *aviveka* or *non-discrimination*¹. It leads to a fatal confusion between the Puruṣa and the *buddhi* in which the characteristics of each are ascribed to the other and we talk of *buddhi* as knowing or of Puruṣa as acting. It is the removal of this error through discrimination between the two factors constituting the empirical self that, according to the Sāṃkhya is the chief aim of life.

Error is thus of two kinds: (i) where only one object is involved, it is mistaking a part for the whole, (ii) where two objects are involved, it is overlooking the distinction between them and so practically identifying them with each other. The two kinds can, however, be reduced to the same form, for the second may be looked upon as a particular case of the first. Not knowing the Puruṣa or the *buddhi* completely we confound the one with the other; and when complete knowledge of them is attained the mistake will of itself disappear², so that it also, like the first, may be said to result from incomplete knowledge³. These two together may be described as 'metaphysical error'. They are what vitiate experience at its very root. All knowledge is erroneous in this sense and there is no escape from it until *jīvan-mukti* is achieved.

But apart from this general error of which man is not commonly aware, there is another which we familiarly recognize. Thus we find a white crystal appear as red when it is placed by the side of a red flower. We see something like silver when closer scrutiny discovers it to be only shell. What is the explanation of such error occurring in the sphere of everyday thought? A direct answer

¹ For the use of this term or its equivalents, see *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* on st. 2, 21, 66 etc.

² See *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, st. 2.

³ It seems that similarly we may represent the first kind of error as due to the failure to distinguish between two objects—the object as it is and the same as it is seen by the perceiver.

to this question does not seem to be contained in Sāṅkhyā works. Instances like the 'red crystal' and the 'glowing iron-ball', appear as illustrations in explaining the other type of error, but there is no explicit treatment of them, the reason obviously being that the doctrine is primarily concerned with the 'saving knowledge' and not with questions of logic as such¹. It is clear however that their explanation is similar. In the case of the first of the two illusions above cited, the red flower as well as the white crystal is given and it is because we lose sight of the fact that they are two, we mistake the crystal to be red. It is *aviveka*, as in the case of *Puruṣa* and *buddhi*, the confusion between which is stated to be the cause of empirical life. The moment we realise that there is the flower *in addition to* the crystal, the error disappears. In the case of the second illusion, viz., 'shell-silver', only one object is presented and its appearance as another is owing to our stopping short at grasping its features which are common to both. That is, it is incomplete knowledge that gives rise to error here, as in the case of the first variety of what we have termed 'metaphysical error'.

Though thus the two forms of common illusion correspond to the two forms of the other, there is an important difference between them. In the latter, truth stands for *complete* knowledge; in the former complete knowledge is neither attainable, nor necessary, so that truth signifies such knowledge as does not leave out of account that feature of the given object which is *relevant* from the standpoint of the other object with which it is confounded. To take as an instance the second of the two illusions we are considering, the relevant feature is the lightness of the 'shell' as compared with the heaviness of 'silver'². Because we overlook the fact that the object before us is too light to be silver, we fall

¹ Compare *Sāṅkhyā-pravacana-bhāṣya*, iii. 37 and *Tattva-vaiśārādī*, on *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya*, ii. 5. Vijiñāna-bhikṣu treats of such cases directly (Cf. e.g., *Sāṅkhyā-pravacana-bhāṣya*, v. 56) but his account, as we shall see, is different and not altogether satisfactory. But even there, it may be added, the explanation is parallel in the two sets of cases.

² From this standpoint it is possible to describe the second variety of illusion also in terms of *aviveka* or *bhedāgraha*, as it is sometimes put. (See e.g., *Muktāvalī* on *kārikā*, 48). The notion of 'silver' where 'shell' is presented is due to the failure to perceive *bheda*, if by that term we understand, not 'distinction', but 'distinctive feature' or *Vailakṣaṇya*, viz., the lightness of the shell. See e.g., *Śāstra-dīpikā*, p. 113 (Nirṇa. sai. Ed.), for this use of the word.

into the 'error'; and the moment we discover that feature, the 'error' ceases to be.

Though the explanations of the several kinds of error thus differ, their underlying principle is the same. Error is lack of knowledge, not wrong knowledge. In *all* cases of illusion alike, it is partial knowledge of the thing or things in question which leads to a misconception about them. And the way to escape from the misconception is to acquire more, if not complete, knowledge. The most important point in this explanation is that when the error is discovered, nothing of what was cognized before is sublated (*bādhita*). What is given in knowledge is always and necessarily a fact; only it may not be the whole of the fact. In other words, there is no subjective element in error.

This view is what is generally found expressed in early Sāṃkhya-Yoga works.¹ Vijñāna-bhikṣu who is regarded as the chief exponent of the later Sāṃkhya also seems to agree with it². But strangely enough he modifies this view in a later part of his *bhāṣya* on the *Sāṃkhya-sūtras* and admits a subjective element in error³. Thus he describes the second kind of error as involving a positive relation between the Puruṣa and the *buddhi*—a relation which is not given, but is fancied so that, though the relata as such are real, the relation between them is not so. In regard to the first kind of error also where we are concerned with only a single thing and its varying phases, he admits a subjective element by bringing it under the same head as the previous one, viz., *sadasat-khyāti*⁴. In explaining the illusions of everyday life again he assumes an ideal element. The case of the 'red crystal' is on a par with confounding the *buddhi* with Puruṣa and requires no special mention. The explanation of the 'shell-silver' is interesting for, according to Vijñāna-bhikṣu, it is not the 'shell' alone that is given but the 'silver' also is, in a sense: viz., as a mode of the *buddhi* through the revival of an old impression caused by the perception of the lustre.

¹ See references given in foot-note on page 27 as well as *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya*, ii. 26, and *Bhoja-vṛtti on Yoga-sūtra*, iv. 33.

² *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, i. 55, ii. 33. He holds that the *Yoga* view of error is different. See *Yoga-vārttika*, i. 8, ii. 5.

³ See *ibid.*, v. 26 and 56.

⁴ This explanation, it should be added, has the support of the *Sūtra* (v. 56), in which the expression *sadasat-khyāti* occurs.

The confusion is thus between the shell which is actually given and 'silver' which is given in the form of a *buddhi-vṛtti* or, as we might put it, between what is presented and what is represented. In other words, all erroneous knowledge is partially invalid and presents not merely what *is* but also what *is not*, which appears to be a somewhat startling conclusion for the Sāṃkhya to reach. We may add in conclusion that this later Sāṃkhya view of error is remarkably like that of Kumārila (*viparīta-khyāti*) while the previous one resembles that of Prabhākara (*akhyāti*)¹.

¹ See *Proceedings of the Second Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, pp. 109-116.

THE MĪMĀMSĀ VIEW OF ERROR¹

It is well known that there are two schools of *Mīmāṃsā*—the *Bhāṭṭa* and the *Prābhākara*—which, though agreeing in several respects, differ from each other in some essential points. We propose to treat of one such difference here, viz., that relating to the conception of Error. As a preliminary to this treatment, it is necessary to state that both the schools are realistic and believe in a plurality of ultimate entities. The view taken of knowledge, which brings the *ātman* into relation with these entities, is somewhat different in the two schools; but they both agree in holding that as far as Truth and Error are concerned, they are to be determined by considering each sample of knowledge by itself. If a system of truths is thought of at all, it is regarded as consisting of such particular truths; and there is no conception in either school of a 'significant Whole' with reference to which the problem of Error is discussed. Such a view, no doubt, marks a comparatively low level of philosophic thought; but the *Mīmāṃsā* theory is not the only one we come across in Indian Philosophy. There are other epistemological theories that rise above this level; but for a discussion of them, we have to go to systems like the *Vedānta*, which are distinguished by a different outlook upon the world. In a piecemeal investigation of knowledge like the one we have in *Mīmāṃsā*, there seem to be strictly but two views possible in regard to the logical implication of knowledge—either to deny that it ever points to an object outside or to aver that it does so always. To postulate the object where knowledge is true and to deny it either directly or indirectly where it is erroneous is self-contradictory. The former view which is subjectivistic was consistently maintained by the *Yogācāra* school of Buddhism, while practically all the other Indian systems adopted the latter. But as it is difficult to establish the existence of an objective reference in the case of *all* knowledge, they have constructed diverse theories to get over the difficulty. Hence arises the difference in the explanations which these systems give of Error. *Prabhākara* and *Kumārila*, though belonging to the

¹ The discussion here entirely ignores the standpoint implied in *svarūpa-pararūpābhyāṃ sarvaṃ sadasadātmakam*. [Cf. *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 476, st. 12.]

same school, differ from each other in this respect. Their explanations are respectively known as *akhyāti* and *viparīta-khyāti*¹. We shall begin with a general statement of them:

I. AKHYĀTI

The word '*khyāti*' means 'knowledge' and the term '*akhyāti*' which is literally equivalent to 'no knowledge' is applied to Prabhākara's theory, to indicate that Error, according to that theory, is not a unit of knowledge, but a composite of two *jñānas*. When shell, for instance, is mistaken for silver and we say to ourselves, "This is silver", the "this" is actually perceived, as also certain features of the shell which it possesses in common with silver². The knowledge of those features revives in our mind the impression of a former experience, and we recollect silver. The so-called Error really consists of these two *jñānas*—perception and memory. Of these, the first is true so far as it goes, though it may not go sufficiently far; for its object,—the 'this'—is not sublated afterwards since even when the Error is discovered, we feel "*This is shell*". The same, no doubt, cannot be said of the second *jñāna*, viz., memory, because silver is not found in the context. But in this it only exhibits its normal character; for, according to Prabhākara, *all* memory as such is invalid. That is, the former knowledge claims to be true and the claim is justified; the latter does not put forward any such claim at all. All knowledge, in this view, is of the one or of the other type; and there is none which may partake of the character of both³. Indeed, Prabhākara does not admit that knowledge can ever play false to its logical nature. If so, it may be asked how we get the notion of Error at all in the common acceptance of that term. The answer is that in what passes for Error, we overlook the fact that there are two *jñānas*; and as a natural consequence of it, we also fail to notice the separateness of their respective objects. This failure to know, however, cannot by itself account for Error, for

¹ See *Śāstra-dīpikā*, page 58 (Nirnayasagar Press).

² The very fact that we mistake the two shows that they resemble each other. For a different type of error, see later.

³ Prabhākara divides knowledge, like the followers of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, into two classes (i) Memory (*smṛti*) and (ii) other forms of knowledge (*anubhūti*); and holds that while the latter is always valid, the former is never so. See

if it did, Error would be found to occur in sleep¹, which also is characterized by a similar absence of knowledge. This negative factor of failure should accordingly, in giving rise to Error, be viewed as operating with the positive one to which we have already referred, viz., the perception of the 'this' as characterized by the features that are common to shell and silver². We may therefore describe Error as partial or incomplete knowledge; only in so doing, we must be careful to remember that there is no *single* unit of knowledge here to which that term is applicable. To take another instance, a white crystal placed by the side of a red flower may wrongly be regarded as a red crystal. There also we have two *jñānas*, viz., the perception of the crystal *minus* its true colour and the sensation of the redness alone of the flower. Each of these *jñānas* is quite valid so far as it goes; only here both the *jñānas* are derived through the senses³. As before, they convey only a partial knowledge of the objects, viz., the crystal and the flower; but the basis of Error here lies in the contiguity of the objects, not in their similarity. Further, there are two objects bodily given here instead of one and the features comprehended are what characterize them singly and not their common ones. But the distinction between the two *jñānas* and their objects is, as before, not grasped and we are therefore said to fall into Error. Here also the *akhyāti* view lays down two conditions—one positive and the other negative—for Error becoming possible at all—(i) a partial knowledge of the things presented and (ii) a failure to note the distinction between their knowledge.⁴

Prakaraṇa-pāñcīkā, pp. 42 and 127. Memory may be described as invalid only in the sense that it is dependent upon a previous *jñāna* for its content. It only lies outside epistemology [and] has no logical status at all.

¹ *Prakaraṇa-pāñcīkā*, iv. 5.

² Ibid. iv. 26-29.

³ Ibid. iv. 60.

⁴ Both these conditions may be included in a single one: error is caused by *mere* (*kevala*) partial knowledge, which in the case of 'shell-silver' means "nothing more than a knowledge of common features" and in the case of 'red-crystal', "nothing more than a knowledge of the positive features in question." It is better to state the conditions thus as Prabhākara recognizes no *abhāva*. But the other statement conduces to greater clarity and is found in pp. iv. 36.

2. VIPARĪTA-KHYĀTI

Kumārila also maintains that knowledge points to an object beyond itself. In 'shell-silver', for instance, there is something directly given, viz., the 'this'; but the 'silver' is not so given¹. Yet it should not, on that account, be taken as 'mental' or 'non-existent'; for, its notion, being due to the suggestion of a former experience, goes back eventually to an objective counterpart. This view, like the previous one, splits up the object of erroneous knowledge into two parts—the 'this' (*viśeṣya*) and the 'what' (*prakāra*) and explains them separately. The first of them, as before, is not sublated when the mistake is rectified; and the explanation of the second element also is practically the same as before. Though not given here and now, the silver should have been experienced before; for otherwise it could not at all have been fancied in the shell². The difference between the two views is that while according to *akhyāti*, Error is due to a losing sight of the fact that the presentative and the re-presentative factors stand apart unrelated (*asamsargāgraha*); here in *viparīta-khyāti*, it is ascribed to a wrong synthesis of them (*samsargāgraha*)³. In the former case, Error, so far as that term is applicable at all, is an error of omission; because it only fails to grasp a part of what is given. So its discovery, when it takes place, does not mean the discarding as false of any feature previously cognized. Right knowledge may convey additional information about the reality in question; but it does not cancel any part of what is already known of it. In the latter, the Error becomes one of commission, for it includes as its content more than there is warrant for in the reality that is presented, thus necessitating the subsequent rejection of a portion of it as false. In other words, illusion is here taken as *unitary* knowledge instead of as two *jñānas*. To put it more definitely, the subject and the predicate elements are explained here as related in it, while they are not so in reality. Similarly in the case of the 'red crystal', the two relata, viz., the crystal and

¹ See *Śloka-vārttika: Nirālambana-vāda*, st. 32, 53 etc., and especially pp. 242-246.

² This fact, viz., that no one that has not actually seen 'silver' can mistake shell for it, vouches for its objective reality and shows it cannot be purely imaginary.

³ *Sāstra-dīpikā*, p. 58.

the redness, are actually given; but while they are not unified in fact, they are explained as such in Error.

This view is, no doubt, more in accord than the previous one, with experience, which shows the object of Illusion as a synthetic whole; but epistemologically it presents a difficulty which needs an explanation. However unconvincing the *akhyāti* view may be, it is true to its realistic postulate in admitting no subjective element whatsoever in knowledge. Knowledge may not be adequate to the given reality, but it never goes beyond it. Here, on the other hand, it overshoots the mark and, though it may agree with outside reality so far as the subject and the predicate are concerned, it fails to do so in respect of the relation between them. As a consequence, the silver, instead of being a mere memory-image, shows itself to be out there making the shell appear *differently* from what it is¹. The redness of the flower likewise, instead of standing apart from the crystal, appears to qualify it. It is just this misrepresentation in both the examples that constitutes Error; and to admit a misrepresentation in Error is to admit a subjective element in it². It is, of course, possible that Kumārila meant to do so; but such an assumption is against the spirit of the whole of his polemic against Buddhistic subjectivism (*nirālambana-vāda*) and nihilism (*śūnya-vāda*) and some explanation of it therefore appears to be called for. The mistaken judgment relating to the 'red-crystal' (to take our second example first) contains three factors—the subject, the predicate and the relation between them; and of these, the last alone is not there. Such a position would conflict with the realistic postulate, if by it we meant that *all* modes or forms of knowledge had necessarily an objective reference, but not if we understood it as signifying the need for such reference, only in the case of *perception*, for the erroneous judgment we are considering, being more than perceptual, might well include an element corresponding to nothing in the relevant objective situation. The raw material, so to speak, of the judgment is reached through perception, and for that reason the reality of it in its two-fold

¹ This, by the way, accounts for the name *viparīta-khyāti* which literally means 'appearance as other'. See *Śloka-vārttika*, p. 245, st. 117 and 312, st. 160 (Com.).

² The cause of the misrepresentation is stated to be *manodoṣa* which may be taken as equivalent to a defect in the observer.

aspect of subject and predicate is indubitable.¹ That is all that the hypothesis of *viparīta-khyāti* means; and no violence is done to it, if it turns out that the judgment which is based upon that material goes, in its synthesis, beyond the data of perception and imports an element that is not given. This explanation, it must be confessed, makes a distinction which may appear artificial, between the truth of perception and the truth of judgment. But there is a parallel to it in Indian Philosophy in the *Nyāya-vaiśeṣika* system, which confines the notions of Truth and Error to the *savikalpaka* or 'knowledge of the complex' as distinguished from the *nirvikalpaka* or 'knowledge of the simple'.²

Such a re-statement of the realistic position suits cases like the 'red crystal', where the subject as well as the predicate is actually presented; but it is not adequate to explain those like the 'shell-silver', where the predicative element, though presupposing a corresponding reality eventually, appears in a place where, and at a time when, it is not. That is, there is an additional subjective element here, which, however, is not in respect of silver as such, but as regards its 'here-ness and now-ness' or its particularity. The silver itself, in its general or universal aspect, is real; only it is not found in the present context.³ If *viparīta-khyāti* should represent a realistic doctrine in spite of its admitting a subjective element of this kind, we have to understand it as maintaining the validity of knowledge whether it refers to an *existing* object or only to a *subsisting* one. In the example we are considering, the shell exists bearing the stamp of the particular time and place; but the silver only subsists in its non-temporal and non-spatial character; and knowledge in either case is equally valid. That such a modification of the realistic position was intended by Kumārila seems to be suggested by the distinction he makes between general and special aspect of objects⁴. It is also implied by the context in which he discusses the topic of erroneous knowledge, viz., in controverting the *Yogācāra* and the *Mādhyamika*⁵ schools of Buddhism. The

¹ The crystal and the redness are to be viewed as the *unanalysed* data of perception.

² See e.g., *Kārikāvalī*, st. 135.

³ See *Śāstra-dīpikā*, p. 58.

⁴ *Śloka-vārttika*: e.g., p. 932, st. 309-12. Compare also the view maintained in *Mīmāṃsā* that the meaning of a word is *jāti* not *vyakti*.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 327-28, st. 207, 11, in addition to references already given.

former maintained that the so-called objects of knowledge were only 'ideas' (*viññāna*) projected outwards and perceived as if they were other than *jñāna*; and the latter denied the reality of even these 'ideas', maintaining that all was void. The refutation of these doctrines will be fully accomplished, as Kumārila himself explicitly states¹, if it is shown that knowledge has an external basis—that it is grounded in the objective—even though it may not be established that what it refers to is invariably present *then* and *there*.

These varying views of Error which we have so far stated imply a fundamental contrast between the two schools of *Mīmāṃsā* in their conception of knowledge. Kumārila recognizes Error as such; and it can therefore be easily distinguished from Truth. According to Prabhākara, on the other hand, there being truly no Error at all², the distinction disappears. The distinction, however, being universally recognized, must have some basis; and, if Prabhākara should explain it, he cannot like Kumārila, do so from the purely logical point of view, but has to seek another. The new standpoint he finds in the view he takes of knowledge in general,—that it is essentially a means to an end,³ and that its chief, if not the sole, function is to guide action or subserve *vyavahāra*⁴, as it is said. The final value of knowledge then lies for Prabhākara in its practical utility; and judged by this fresh criterion, Truth becomes quite distinguishable from Error. Knowledge may not be misleading in its logical implication; but it may be such as does or does not 'work'. In the former case, we have Truth; in the latter, Error. Error satisfies the first of these conditions, but not the second, so that it is deceptive only in respect of the claim it puts forward to be serviceable.⁵ Accordingly when, after rectification, it yields place to Truth, what happens is not any modification of its logical character, but only the cessation of the activity that had been prompted by it⁶.

¹ Ibid. p. 245, st. 116. ² Barring memory (*smṛti*) which, as already stated, is 'other than valid' and invariably so.

³ Compare his view of *śabda-pramāṇa* which is based upon the principle that knowledge must be relevant to the practical context.

⁴ In its twofold sense of practical utility (*hānādāna*) and linguistic usage (*śabda-prayoga*). Compare *Bhāmātī* on *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*, under *akhyāti*.

⁵ See *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, iv. 37-40 and p. 43.

⁶ In cases where Error has led to suspension of activity, its discovery will prompt it.

In other words, the effect of the discovery of Error is seen on the reactive side of consciousness—not on its receptive side. In *viparīta-khyāti* also, its discovery arrests activity; but that is only a further result, the immediate one being a re-adjustment of our cognitive attitude towards the object. Any effect this adjustment may have on our volition is only subsequent to it. Kumārila's attitude towards knowledge is thus primarily detached and scientific; that of Prabhākara, pragmatic.¹ Kumārila also takes into account the practical value of knowledge, but only for testing whether it is true. For Prabhākara, on the other hand, it constitutes the very nature of Truth.

¹ It is not suggested that there is resemblance on any large scale between Prabhākara's view and modern Pragmatism.

BHĀSKARA'S VIEW OF ERROR

Like other old exponents of Vedānta, Bhāskara also commented upon the *Vedānta-sūtra*, the *Upaniṣads*¹ and the *Bhagavadgītā*.² Of them, it is only the *Bhāṣya* on the first that is at present available in a rather imperfect edition³. Since throughout this work, he finds fault with Śaṅkara for his interpretation of the *Vedānta-sūtra*, and since he himself is, in turn, criticised by Vācaspati, it is not difficult to fix his date fairly definitely. If we take for granted the dates now generally assigned to Śaṅkara (800 A.D.) and Vācaspati (850 A.D.), we may conclude that Bhāskara should have flourished in the early part of the 9th century A.D. The type of Vedānta taught by him is a very old one. It is described as *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*, and references to it are found in the *Vedānta-sūtra* itself.⁴ It maintains that the relation between *Brahman* and the *jīva* or the physical universe is one of identity in difference, and is therefore also designated as the *Bhedābheda-vāda*. It was once largely prevalent in India; and may, broadly speaking, be regarded as Hegelian in its spirit. Śaṅkara criticised it often and severely; and it was chiefly owing to his criticism that it completely lost the hold which it seems, till then, to have had on the Indian mind. Efforts were made later to resuscitate it by thinkers like Bhāskara and Yādava-Prakāśa; but they did not succeed. There are, at least, two forms of this type of Vedānta, with differences in matters of detail; but, as they are not familiarly known⁵, it is desirable to state here the salient features of the particular variety of it taught by Bhāskara, before we can deal with his explanation of error.

Bhāskara is a monist like Śaṅkara, and holds that *Brahman* is the sole reality; but his conception of it is vastly different. He

¹ For example, Bhāskara alludes to his Com. on *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* on pp. 155 and 240 of his *Bhāṣya* on the *Vedānta-sūtra*, (hereafter referred to as BB.).

² See *Indian Historical Quarterly* for 1933, pp. 663-77, for an article on this commentary by Mr. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma. Only fragments of it seem to be available now. ³ Issued from the Chowkhamba Press, Benares, 1915.

⁴ Cf. I. iv. 20-21.

⁵ An excellent summary of Bhāskara's doctrine is found in Prof. P. N. Srinivasacharya's book, *The Philosophy of Bhedābheda* (Srinivasa Varadachari and Co., Madras).

believes that *Brahman* is endowed with infinite potency, which he classifies under the two heads of *bhogyā-śakti* and *bhoktṛ-śakti*¹. The former manifests itself as the objective world; and, as a consequence of such manifestation, the other aspect of *Brahman* becomes split up into an indefinite number of parts.

These self-differentiated parts or *aśās*², as they are termed, are the *jīvas*. The physical world is thus an actual transformation or *pariṇāma* of *Brahman*, and not merely its appearance as in Śaṅkara's *Advaita*. The *jīva*, on the other hand, is a determination of *Brahman* formed by its own evolutes on the physical side, such as the internal organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*) and the physical body. It is the multiplicity of these adjuncts (*upādhi*) that accounts for the multiplicity of the *jīvas*. What should be particularly noted here is that the *jīva* is not a *pariṇāma* of *Brahman*³, as it is according to some other teachers of the *Bhedābheda* school like Bhartṛprapañca and Yādava, but an *aupādhika* or conditioned state of it. It is only the result of *Brahman* being delimited by certain adjuncts that are its own transformations. The adjuncts being real, the limitation characterising the *jīvas* also is real; and in this lies the chief distinction between the view of Bhāskara and that of Śaṅkara. In its transmigrating state, the *jīva* forgets that it is intrinsically the unconditioned *Brahman* itself, and imagines that its limited character is natural (*svābhāvika*) to it. This is the root-cause of *saṁsāra*; and escape from it is possible only when it realises the true nature of those adjuncts and of itself. Except for the important distinction in the conception of *Brahman*, already mentioned, Bhāskara's view of *mokṣa* is the same as that of Śaṅkara. In both the views, the *jīva* loses its individuality and gets merged in *Brahman*⁴. This is Bhāskara's idea of the triple subject-matter of philosophy, viz., God, soul and matter.

Ignorance of its own true character then is the source of the *jīva*'s bondage in this doctrine, as in so many others. This ignorance has two aspects⁵. There is a negative one (*agrahaṇa*) on account of which the *jīva* loses sight of its infinite nature; and there is a positive side (*viparīta-grahaṇa*) also, owing to which it comes to look upon itself as finite. The latter gives rise to a feeling of separateness from others; and, as a necessary consequence of it,

¹ BB., pp. 85 and 105.² BB., pp. 112 and 140-41.³ BB., p. 134.⁴ BB., p. 231.⁵ BB., p. 19.

follow all forms of evil like narrow love and hate. Here the error consists not in the *jīva*'s sense of relationship with adjuncts like the body and the internal organ; for that relationship is conceived as actual, but in regarding it as essential (*svābhāvika*) while it is only adventitious (*aupādhika*). Thus the *jīva* is under a delusion only in so far as it takes what is provisional for what is permanent. The dispelling of this error is possible, according to Bhāskara, through scriptural testimony. But, though wrong knowledge is removable in this life, actual release from the limiting conditions does not ensue until death, for an adventitious feature, as is well known, does not disappear until the element advening is itself removed. A person suffering from fever may know that sugar is sweet, but it continues to taste bitter as long as he has a bilious tongue. In the present case the adjuncts, which are instrumental in giving rise to the notion of limitation, persist till death when, in the case of a knower, they once for all cease to be.¹

In the above error, the fact that two things, viz., the self and the adjunct, are involved is well realised; and yet there is error. It consists in misconceiving the nature of the relation between them. There is another and a more radical form of error, in which this fact is wholly overlooked; and the two things are, as a consequence, mistaken for one as a person looking at two trees in the dusk may mistake them for one. The self and the not-self thus come to be identified as shown by convictions like 'I am *Devadatta*' (understood in the Cārvāka sense)². Here what is strictly denoted by the term '*Devadatta*' is the physical organism; and the conviction implies the complete ignoring of spirit which is the true significance of the 'I'. That is, the condition (*upādhi*) is here mistaken for the conditioned (*upahita*); but both, we must remember, are in this doctrine equally real. The dispelling of the error consists in realising, on the strength of scriptural teaching, this fact, viz., that there are two factors and not merely one. Being real, the physical body will of course continue to be; but it will no longer be identified with the self.

So far, we have dealt with metaphysical error or the error which

¹ It is worth noting in this connection, that Bhāskara does not accept the possibility of *jīvan-mukti* or freedom while one is still alive. See BB., p. 220.

² Bhāskara refers to this as the primal error in several places in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*. Cf. pp. 21 and 219.

is the source of *saṁsāra*, as explained by Bhāskara. It is *anyathā-khyāti*¹; and it is so described because it explains error as presenting its object in a manner which is different from what it actually is. This error, in its double form, will help us to understand his view of common error, which also is twofold. Instances of such error are cited by him as illustrations, but there is no direct treatment of the topic in his *Bhāṣya*. To get at his view, we have consequently to piece together the information available in it, and in a few of the works belonging to the other schools of Indian thought:

(1) Let us take as an example of the first variety of common error a white crystal which looks red, because a red flower is placed by its side. Here, according to Bhāskara, the redness of the crystal is real so long as it characterizes it², and not merely apparent as some other thinkers hold. But if any person, through ignorance, took that feature to be natural to the crystal, he would be in the wrong for it is purely adventitious, being caused by the presence of an *upādhi*, viz., the red flower. There may, of course, be other contributory causes also, such as, a defect in one or more of the aids to proper visual perception (*karāṇa-doṣa*); but it is the presence of the flower that gives the error its distinguishing character. It is accordingly an example of what is known as *sopādhika-bhrama*. The knowledge that the crystal is actually white (*bādhaka-pratyaya*) obtained, for instance, by advancing towards it, dispels the error. But, as in the parallel case under metaphysical error, the actual disappearance of the red colour depends on the removal of the flower itself. Till then, though the truth may be known, the appearance of redness in the crystal persists; but it no longer misleads the person in question. The only difference is that the correcting knowledge can here be gained through one or other of the common *pramāṇas*, and does not require the aid of revelation. The removal of the *upādhi* again is possible in this case, here and now, for it is not permanent³ as in the other.

¹ Cf. *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, i. 42 where, according to the commentator the view of error considered is Bhāskara's. See also *Prakatārtha-vivaraṇa*, p. 660.

² BB., pp. 139 and 210.

³ The physical body is not strictly a permanent adjunct of the *jīva*, for it lasts only during this life. But, according to the doctrine of *karma*, it is replaced by another then, so that the body as such may be regarded to be so. The *antaḥkaraṇa* on the other hand, endures until the *jīva* is liberated.

(2) As an example of the second variety of common error, we shall select the mistaking of a piece of shell for silver. But before we can explain it, it is necessary to refer to a fundamental principle of Bhāskara's epistemology, viz., that the non-existent, say, a unicorn or a square-circle can never make itself known. Since he recognizes no being intermediate between *sat* and *asat*, as Śaṅkara's *Advaita* does, he views whatever is experienced as necessarily real¹. Its being may be only provisional or temporal; but that does not conflict with its reality as conceived here. That is to say, *bādha* or contradiction does not signify the falsity of a thing, as it does in many other doctrines. In fact, Bhāskara contends that the idea of *bādha* is intelligible only in the case of the real which can be known, and not in that of the unreal which cannot be known². He would say that there is no need to deny the unreal. In the above example, the silver should be real on this principle, for it is distinctly apprehended. But it may be asked how it comes to be there. Bhāskara holds that the silver springs up, for the time being, where the piece of shell is. It may be difficult to conceive how it can do so, but that such was his view is not only implied by what he says in the *Bhāṣya*³; it is also explicitly stated in some works of the other schools which refer to this point. Thus the *Dvaita* commentator Jaya-Tīrtha says: *Tatraiva tātkālikam-utpannam (rajatam) saditi Bhāskaraḥ*⁴. Now this error corresponds to that of 'I am *Devadatta*', considered under metaphysical error; and its explanation is similar. One thing is here mistaken for another, and the mistake disappears when it is known, say, that it is too light to be silver. An important distinction from the corresponding form of metaphysical error is that right knowledge not only removes error but also its object, viz., silver. But it should not be forgotten that, according to the principle above enunciated, this knowledge points only to its impermanence and not to its falsity.

It must be confessed that there is some indefiniteness in our account of this variety of common error. It is due to the fact, already mentioned, that there is no separate treatment of it in the only work of Bhāskara now available. We referred above to the difficulty in understanding how silver can come into being,

¹ BB., pp. 67 and 95.² Cf. *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, i. 42.³ P. 93.⁴ *Pramāṇa-paddhati*, p. 68 (Ed. with eight commentaries). See also *Laghu-candrikā* on the *Advaita-siddhi*, pp. 32-3 (Nirn. Sag. Ed.).

albeit for a time only, where the shell is. Another point requiring elucidation is why, if the silver is real as it is claimed to be, it is perceived only by the victim of the error and not by others. The only explanation conceivable is that Bhāskara regarded it as what is called a 'private' object and not a 'public' one, some of the causes giving rise to it (say, weakness of sight) being special to the person in question. A thing's being 'private', it may be added, does not take away from its reality. Our pains and pleasures are personal to each one of us, but they are not the less real on that account. This explanation gets support from what he says of dream-objects, viz., that they are the creations of the dreaming *jīva* and not of God¹. There is, however, no direct evidence pointing to its correctness.

But whatever may be the solution of such difficulties one thing is clear, viz., the persistence with which Bhāskara tries to uphold the realist position. He does not, indeed, go so far as Prabhākara does and deny error altogether. He admits it; but he still maintains that it invariably points to a *real* object, though that object may be false when viewed from a particular standpoint. To confine our attention to the examples of common error given above: The 'redness' of the crystal is real, and it is false only when taken as natural and not as adventitious to it. Similarly, in the case of the 'silver' also. It is quite real; but it is there for the time being, and would be false only if viewed as what was originally given.

¹ BB., p. 161. If this be Bhāskara's view, he would not be alone in holding it. Though there are differences in minor points, Rāmānuja also held that dream-objects and the objects of certain other forms of error are private. See *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress* (1925), pp. 79-80. [See pp. 59-60, post.]

THE PLACE OF REASON IN ADVAITA

There are two types of reasoning generally recognized in Indian philosophy. The first of them is what is familiarly known as syllogistic inference, and is illustrated by the example of inferring the presence of fire from observing smoke. We shall have an instance of the second type of reasoning if, from the observed fact that an effect like a jar requires for its production a competent agent like the potter, it is concluded that the world, as an effect, should also have been brought into existence by a competent Being, God. It is called *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭānumāna*,¹ and corresponds to what in modern logic is known as analogical reasoning.² There are important differences between the two types of inference in their logical character; but it will suffice, for the present, to state that while the first is applicable only to cases falling within the sphere of common experience, the second applies to those that lie beyond it.

Since Brahman, the chief theme of the Vedānta, as so often stated by Śaṅkara,³ transcends the sensuous, it is only the second type of reasoning that can have a bearing upon it. But the view that it is a *pramāṇa* for establishing extra-empirical truths is only of some Indian thinkers; and the advaitin, like the other Vedāntins, does not share it. The reason why he excludes it from the category of *pramāṇa* will be seen by examining one of the stock examples by which it is illustrated.⁴ Qualities like odour and colour are found to inhere in substances like earth and fire; and it is said that we may deduce from it that the quality of touch or temperature (*sparsa*) also implies as its ground a substance, viz., air (*vāyu*). Here the qualities of odour, colour, etc., and the substances which they respectively characterize, viz., earth, fire, etc., are all perceivable; but air is not so, although the quality

¹ This term is variously interpreted. We are taking it here in the sense in which it is used, e.g., in *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, st. 6.

² It is sometimes stated that the first type of reasoning also is analogical (cf. H. N. Randle, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, p. 313), as shown by the definition of *hetu* given in the *Nyāya-sūtra* (I. i. 34). But we are viewing it here as based on the nature of *vyāpti* and not on that of the *hetu*. See commentaries on the *sūtra* in question.

³ See particularly com. on *Vedānta-sūtra*, I. i. 3 (second *varṇaka*).

⁴ See *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, II. i. 9-10, 15 and 16.

of touch may be. That is, we are extending here a principle verified in experience to something beyond it; and such an extension, according to Advaita, is not legitimate for in it we virtually jump from one particular to another, without passing through a general truth based upon actual observation, as we do in ordinary inference. It is, as the name given to it indicates, an inference which is based not on perception but on what is 'seen from likeness' (*sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*). Adapting the words which Śaṅkara uses in a similar context, we may say: If air also were perceivable like earth or fire, we might discover that touch was a quality of it. But, as a matter of fact, it is only touch that is perceived; and we cannot therefore decide whether it is connected with air as its quality, or with something else.¹ Hence this variety of reasoning, the advaitin says, cannot be a *pramāṇa* in the strict sense of the term.

The outcome of such a view, it may appear, is to exclude reasoning altogether so far as the truth of Advaita is concerned. But it would be wrong to think so, for the advaitin does assign a definite place to the second variety of inference, if not to the first. For, although he denies to it the rank of *pramāṇa* or means to valid knowledge, he admits that it may indicate the probability of a conclusion which has been otherwise reached; and where sufficient care has been exercised, the degree of probability indicated by it may, indeed, be quite high. That is, it may support the truth, though it may not establish it. For this reason, he designates it as *yukti* or *tarka* which has no independent logical value, but is only a help to a *pramāṇa*. It is in this form, i.e., as ancillary to scriptural testimony that the advaitin utilises reason.² Thus as regards the question, already mentioned, of the existence of God as the author of the universe, this kind of reasoning may be used, provided it is not forgotten that the belief in it is primarily based upon *śruti* or revelation. Here the question will naturally arise whether there is any need for seeking assistance from reason as regards a fact which has been established by another *pramāṇa*; but we shall postpone its consideration to a later stage.

Before explaining how exactly this variety of inference is utilised in respect of the final truth of Advaita, it is necessary to draw attention to the nature of that truth as taught in the *śruti*. It is that Brahman is the sole reality. This teaching

¹ Com. on *Vedānta-sūtra*, I. i. 2.

² *Ibid.* II. i. 11.

implies, on the one hand, a contrast between Brahman and the world or, to state the same otherwise, the self and the not-self; and, on the other, the falsity (*mithyātva*) of the latter. The advaitic truth has accordingly two phases, and the doctrine recommends the use of the second kind of reasoning in grasping both of them.¹

(1) The first step in understanding the advaitic truth, as we have just stated, is to discriminate well between the self and the not-self, which are commonly confounded with each other; and the process is called *śodhana* or 'clarification of the concept of the self.' To state, in the traditional form, one line of the argument used in this connection: 'The body is not the self for it is knowable, like (say) a jar.'² The general principle on which this argument is based, as indicated by the reason assigned, viz., knowability, is that the knower and the known are distinct or, more strictly, not identical—a principle which goes back to a much wider one that all transitive action involves elements which are not the same.³ The reasoning here may appear to involve no analogy, and therefore to be of the first type; but it is not so, for the contrast drawn in it is not between the knower and the known or the subject and the object, as required by the principle in question; it is between the components of the former, viz., the transcendental or ground self and the body, of which it is not the knower but merely the witness.⁴ Here the transcendental self, unlike the subject, is not accessible to common experience; and we are therefore transferring a principle which holds good in the empirical sphere to one beyond it. Hence the reasoning is of the second type.

¹ See *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, ii. 44-5.

² *Deho nātmā dṛśyatvāt, ghaṭavat*. There are other similar arguments; but it is not necessary to refer to them, as they are the commonplaces of all manuals of Advaita. We may, however, draw attention here to the treatment of this point, in relatively non-technical language, by Sureśvara in his *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* (Bombay Sanskrit Series), particularly chap. ii. See also *ibid.* p. 108 and note thereon.

³ This is known as *karṣṇ-karma-virodha*, and may be illustrated by the example that fire burns only what is not itself. Cf. Śaṅkara's com. on *Vedānta-sūtra*, III. iii. 54.

⁴ That is, not *draṣṭṛ* and *dṛśya* but *dṛk* and *dṛśya*. The question whether such a self may not be a mere abstraction does not concern us here. It may be observed, in passing, that this self is not of any particular individual, but is impersonal.

(2) The next step in understanding advaitic truth is to repudiate as false the not-self, which has thus been discriminated from the self; and the argument used for it runs as follows: "The whole of the objective world is an appearance for it is the not-self, like shell-silver."¹ Here the analogy is drawn not from the sphere of normal experience as in the previous case, but from that of perceptual illusion. The falsity of the silver that may be seen where there is only shell is verifiable at the level of everyday experience; and there is consequently no difficulty in accepting it. But no such verification is conceivable as regards the falsity of the things constituting the not-self, so long as we continue to think under ordinary human conditions. Yet, if we extend to it on the basis of analogy the principle observed in the sphere of illusion, we may come to see that all that is objective, whether it is an adjunct of the self like the physical body or is a part of the external world like a jar, is an appearance. Such an argument may not give us certitude; but it can show that there is nothing necessarily absurd in the advaitic conclusion.

To consider now the question whether the utilisation of reason would not be superfluous in regard to a truth that has been categorically and once for all taught in the scripture. It would, of course, be so in the case of those who accept the teaching at once. But there may arise in an inquiring mind a doubt as to how the teaching that Brahman is the sole reality and that the world is an appearance, which *prima facie* appears so strange, can be true. It is in bringing home to such minds that there is nothing intrinsically improbable in it that reason of this type is serviceable. By adducing familiar examples like shell-silver, it connects the teaching with our everyday experience, so far as it can be done; and to adduce such examples as Śaṅkara observes, is to enable us to get an insightful apprehension of the revealed truth.²

Thus though reason, in neither of its two forms, is competent to establish the central truth of Advaita, it can certainly help its proper comprehension. It has accordingly a very important place in the doctrine, though only as subsidiary to revelation. In fact, it is indispensable for, in the words of Sureśvara, the true

¹ Cf. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, Chap. ii. *Brahma-bhinnaṁ sarvaṁ mithyā Brahma-bhīmatvāt, śukti-rajatavat.*

² *Dṛṣṭāntena hi pratyakṣibhavati vivakṣito'rthaḥ.* Com. on *Bṛ. Up.* IV. iii. 21.

significance of the scripture in this respect is revealed completely only to one who has profited by using his reason in the above manner.¹ But it may be said that the doctrine, however important the place it assigns to reason may be, is essentially dogmatic, because its truth is primarily to be known through revelation. We shall now consider briefly whether this conclusion actually follows. The ideal of Advaita as in the case of the other Indian doctrines, we should remember, is not merely to grasp the ultimate truth intellectually, but to realise it in one's own experience. But if the knowledge of the final advaitic truth should actually bring about such realization, it needs to be transformed into direct experience. Our belief in the diversity of the world and its reality is direct, and nothing but an equally direct knowledge of the contrary truth can dispel it. Seeing is believing. But the *śruti*, as such, being a form of verbal testimony can convey only mediate knowledge. To attain the ideal therefore means to advance farther than merely comprehending what the *śruti* teaches. Revelation is not accordingly sufficient, though necessary; and, like reason, it also becomes only a subsidiary aid to the attainment of the goal. Truth, as learnt from either, is not an ultimate, but an instrumental, value.² Thus we finally get beyond both, and rest on direct experience.³ Hence if the Advaita is dogmatic, the dogma is there only to be transcended, for the final criterion of its truth is neither reason nor revelation but one's own intuitive experience.

¹ Cf. *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, iii. 5 and 53.

² *Phalibhūtamiti: Ajñāna-nivṛtti-rūpa-phala-sādhana-tvena phalibhūtam-ityarthah*: Pūrṇānanda's com. on the *Ratna-prabhā*, p. 12.

³ *Anubhāvāvasānatvāt Brahmajñānasya*: Śaṅkara's com. on *Vedānta-sūtra*, I. i. 2.

EXTRA NOTES

1. The aim in this article has been to define the place of reason in Advaita strictly according to the traditional teaching, a prominent feature of which is the belief in the divine and eternal character of *śruti*. It is possible, however, to look upon it as only a record of the intuitions of ancient seers. In that case the function of reason naturally becomes quite transformed. The observed analogy between two sets of facts which are apparently disparate (e.g., the world of everyday experience and the sphere of illusion, in one of the instances considered above) may, by suggesting a new affinity between them, lead to the inclusion of both in a wider whole (viz., the realm of appearance). Reason may thus become the chief means to the construction of a philosophic theory. See Bradley's *Logic*, pp. 459, 600, 601, 612. The function of *śruti* would then be to secure a trans-subjective footing for it by means of furnishing corroborative evidence. This altered relation between reason and 'sacred tradition' is, indeed, the implication of those portions of the Upaniṣads which do not merely declare the ultimate truth but also indicate the process by which it was reached. We may refer, in illustration, to the way in which the *Virāt*, according to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (I. iv. 1-10), starting from the notion of diversity given in ordinary experience arrives through reflection at the truth *Ahaṁ Brahma asmi*. And, as we may expect, the section closes with citing, as confirmatory of it, the direct experience of an old and renowned seer, Vāmadeva—*Ahaṁ Manurabhavaṁ Sūryaśca*: 'I was Manu and Sūrya as well'.

2. The purpose of *śruti*, according to the traditional teaching is to regulate reasoning from the outset. According to the view mentioned above, it secures an objective footing to a rational hypothesis. The truth underlying the advaitic emphasis on *śruti* seems to be only that reason is not adequate for this purpose. And the view accepts this position.

3. Further both according to the traditional view and this view, it is inference in the sense of construction and not of subsumption. According to the latter, we are urged to it by the necessity to answer a question which we cannot suppress. Ac-

cording to the former, the authority of *śruti* is complete; only it is not incompatible with reasoning.

4. The advaitin may be asked why reasoning by itself will not do here. The answer is: Reasoning may be satisfactory in itself; but it cannot exclude other conclusions like the solipsistic (*viññāna-vāda*) and nihilistic. See *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*; *Vedānta-sūtra*, II.i.11 (*tarkāpratiṣṭhāna*). Sureśvara throughout speaks of *anātman* as *other* than *ātman* (cf. ii. 44). But he really means *nābhinna*. The justification for him to speak so is probably that the not-self is eventually to be repudiated as false. Cf. *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, Beginning.

5. Vṛṣabha Deva in his commentary on *Vākya-paḍīya* (i.30) distinguishes between *puruṣa-tarka* and *vākya-rtha-tarka*. He seems to imply that where revelation is not admitted, one is driven to trace things to *svabhāva* finally, but no *svabhāva* is known of supersensuous things. He also adds that individual intuition is ultimately derived from revelation.

6. Ānandagiri in his *Ṭikā* on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad-Bhāṣya* (p. 389) designates *śruti* as *karāṇa* and *yukti* as *upakaraṇa*. Advaitins do not generally recognize the distinction between *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭānumāna* and *viśeṣato-dṛṣṭānumāna*. But sometimes it is mentioned. See *Tattva-pradīpikā*, p. 11, and Rāmātīrtha's commentary on *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*, xviii.123. Śāṅkara refers to it in his commentay on *Br.Up.*; but it has this meaning in the *pūrva-pakṣa*. He himself does not seem to countenance the distinction. The *Ṭikā* of Ānandagiri on *Taitt. Bhāṣya* also refers to it. See p. 52. The advaitin's conception of the nature of *anumāna* and of its function differs from that of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*.

7. *Padaśodhana* and *padārthaśodhana* must not be confounded with each other. The former is part of *śravaṇa*; the latter is *manana*. See Rāmātīrtha's commentary on *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*, sec. xviii.

8. According to *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* and *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, it is only the dependence (*pāratantrya*) of *sparsa* that is known through *sāmānyato-dṛṣṭānumāna*. That the substance is *vāyu* is known through *pariśeṣānumāna*. See *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 52. *Nyāya-vārttikatātparyā-ṭikā* makes it also clear. Hence the difference between these and other logicians is as regards the way in which this *pāratantrya* is known.

9. Note that calling the *sparsāsraya*, *vāyu* is a matter of naming. The point to decide is that it is a *dravya* like earth, etc. Further, the *dharmin* to be determined may be altogether unknown or only doubtful. This is the significance of *Nyāya-vārttika* citing *nānupalabdhe na nirṇīta iti*. *Ātman*, e.g., is not all unknown; but God may be. Further this constructed entity is known only in so far as it is *sparsāsraya*. Nothing more is known through this *pramāṇa*. See *Nyāya-vārttika*, pp. 51-2.

10. Inclusion of both under a wider whole (*prthivī* and *vāyu* under *dravya*). See for support of this view *Sāṅkhya-kārikā*, p. 102, p. 104, fn.; *Sāṅkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, i. 103. See *Prasastapāda-bhāṣya*, p. 212.

11. See Suresvara, *Br.-Up.-Bhāṣya-Vārttika*, pp. 1137-8.

RĀMĀNUJA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

It may appear to some that not much light can be thrown on the problem of knowledge by Indian thinkers whose prime interest is in Ethics and Ontology. It is so to some extent in the case of early Indian thought where the reference to the question of knowledge is only implicit; but as philosophic inquiry progresses, the problem receives a more and more explicit treatment, though it still be only incidentally; and we find in the end that almost every system formulates its own more or less distinctive theory of knowledge. Of the several theories found in Indian Philosophy, we shall deal with one here. These theories, however, it must be remembered, are generally found mixed up with matters that are not strictly philosophical and therefore require to be freed from them before they can be properly appreciated. Two such matters, we may mention here—one, the eschatological reference which practically all the Indian systems contain, whatever be the topic they discuss; and the other, the allegiance which they directly or indirectly show to the authority of the *Veda*. The first, as mere speculation and the second, as mere faith have no direct relation to the true meaning of knowledge. We shall accordingly avoid, as far as possible, dwelling upon discussions bearing upon these aspects and endeavour to give a purely philosophic version of the problem and its solution. To the two circumstances interfering with a proper unfolding of a theory of knowledge which are common to nearly all the Systems, we have to add in the case of Rāmānuja's *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, a third, viz., the incorporation in its philosophy, mainly based upon the *Upaniṣads*, of elements drawn from *Vaiṣṇavism* which seems to have sprung from a different source. We shall not refer to this point either, except at the end where, if the conclusion we reach suggest any ideal of knowledge, we shall in pointing it out, briefly indicate how far the general character of the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* doctrine, as taught by Rāmānuja, is warranted by his theory of knowledge.

Like many another Indian thinker, Rāmānuja holds that knowledge implies on the one hand a subject to which it belongs, and on the other, an object to which it refers. Our consideration of his view, to be complete, must refer to both these factors;

but we propose to confine our attention to the objective or logical side of knowledge, adding only a few words, in a preliminary way, on the other, viz., its psychological side. Each Indian school of thought has its own psychology, for this branch of study was never separated in India from general philosophy and cultivated independently as it is in modern times. And since belief in an enduring self is an integral part of the teaching of many of these schools, they do not countenance what is termed a 'psychology without a soul.' Rāmānuja is no exception to this rule and the self or *jīva* in which he believes is a permanent spiritual entity. There are many such *jīvas*, each with its own individuality, and each is described as a *kartā* and *bhoktā*, by which we must understand that it can both *will* and *feel*. *Jñāna* or knowledge is what eternally belongs to this self. To understand its exact nature, it is necessary to know a certain classification of ultimate entities which is peculiar to Rāmānuja's system. To the well-known distinction between 'spirit' and 'matter,' respectively termed *cetana* and *jaḍa* in Sanskrit, it adds another which is neither, but is partly like the one and partly like the other. *Jñāna* is of this intermediate type. It is different from the *jaḍa* in that it can, unaided, manifest itself and external objects as well, neither of which is possible for the *jaḍa*. But what it thus manifests is never for itself but always for another. That is, it can only *show* but cannot *know*. In this latter respect, it is unlike the *cetana*, which knows though it is unable, according to the doctrine, to show anything but itself. To cite an analogy from the physical sphere, *jñāna* is like a lamp which can reveal the presence of a jar (say) as well as its own, but cannot *see* either, its revelation of things being always for another. *Jñāna* also similarly functions not for itself but for another—the self of which it is a unique adjunct. The classification of ultimate things here then is not into *jaḍa* and *cetana*, but *jaḍa* and *ajāḍa*, where the second term which may comprehensively be rendered into English as 'the immaterial', stands for the *cetana* (*pratyak*) and what is also partly like it and yet distinct from it, viz., *jñāna* (*parāk*).¹

Since *jñāna* always and necessarily pertains to the *cetana*, it is described as *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*—literally, secondary or subsidiary *jñāna*, the primary or higher *jñāna* implied by such a description being the *jīva* which, as its owner, is comparable

¹ See *Yatindra-mata-dīpikā*, pp. 51 and 67 (Ānandāśrama edition).

to the flame of a lamp as distinguished from its rays which belong to it and radiate from it. When *jñāna* which is similarly associated with the *jīva* 'streams out' from it, through one or other of the senses and comes into contact with an object, it is able to manifest it to that particular *jīva*. The exact process in which objects come to be known is not clear from the description¹ given; but what is important for us here is—our interest being logical rather than psychological—that objects are regarded as prior to knowledge and that what knowledge does, is to bring them into relation with the knowing self. Throughout life, *jñāna* is supposed to function in a more or less restricted manner—even at its best. That is, knowledge, as known to us, has limitations. But it never ceases to be. Even in *śuṣupti*, it is, though it does not function then and therefore does not show itself, the theory being that *jñāna* is known only *along with* some object or not at all. Then the *jīva* remains in its intrinsic state of self-consciousness, along with what we may describe as the unrealized presence of its *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*.

Another distinguishing feature of Rāmānuja's view is that knowledge invariably refers to a complex object (*savišeṣa-vastu*) and that it is impossible for the mind to apprehend anything in isolation—without some qualitative characteristic or other being known at the same time. What is known is necessarily known as qualified, its *jāti* or generic feature in any case being inseparable from it. The importance of this view, we shall appreciate if we compare it for instance with the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* one of *nirvikalpaka*, according to which isolated reals—substance by itself, quality by itself, etc.—are all that are apprehended at first. According to Rāmānuja, such a stage is a psychological myth. The *savikalpaka* of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, according to him, marks the most primitive stage of knowledge. Any simpler form of it is the result of later analysis and has nothing corresponding to it in the mental process as it actually takes place. This does not however mean that Rāmānuja rejects the distinction between *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka*; only to him, the two alike involve a complex presentation. Perceptual experience is termed *nirvikalpaka* when the object is cognized for the first time. It is

¹ The explanation appears to be modelled upon that given in the *Sāṃkhya*, the chief difference being the substitution of *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* for *antaḥ-karaṇa*.

primary presentation that does not call up any previous impression of the same. A child sees a cow, let us say, for the first time; even then it sees the object as qualified in some manner or other. When it sees the animal again, the sight of it is accompanied by a revival of the former impression and it is this second and subsequent apprehension—this cognition of the new in the light of the old—that is described as *savikalpaka* by Rāmānuja. While 'This is a cow' represents the form of perceptual experience at the *nirvikalpaka* level, 'This also is a cow' does the same at the *savikalpaka*, so that the development involved in *pratyakṣa* is not from the simple to the complex, as it is according to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, but in the complex itself, once less familiar becoming more so. To put the same in another way, while according to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, only the *savikalpaka* involves judgment, the *nirvikalpaka* furnishing the material for it, all perceptual experience, according to Rāmānuja alike involves judgment.¹

It is not only in the primal stage of perception that Rāmānuja rejects the possibility of knowing an unqualified object (*nirviśeṣa-vastu*). It is never knowable. In fact it does not exist. This constitutes a radical difference from Śaṅkara who, though he like Rāmānuja refuses to admit that *pratyakṣa* begins as simple and grows to be complex, lays down that the object in itself (*akhaṇḍārtha*) can be apprehended, as for example through '*tat tvam asi*' which points to the *nirguṇa-brahman*. Rāmānuja controverts this view at length, pouring scorn upon its exponent in the course of doing so, and asserts that *jñāna* is always and necessarily of a complex object and that all objects, including the ultimate Reality, are complex. 'All that the term *nirviśeṣa* can mean is that *some* qualities are denied of the object, while there are still others characterizing it; and this does not mean that there are things which are wholly unqualified.'²

¹ The *savikalpaka* does not thereby become the same as recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), 'This is that Devadatta'—for while in recognition one and the same object is recognized twice, here it is not so. In both alike, no doubt, 'a present fact is associated with a present *idea* of a past fact'; yet the *savikalpaka* is only re-cognition and not recognition. Further though all perceptual experience equally entails judgment, recognition includes a specific reference to the difference in time and space in which the object was cognized on the two occasions—Devadatta *there* and *then* as distinguished from Devadatta *here* and *now*.

² *Śrī-bhāṣya*, p. 71 (Nirṇaya Sāgara Press).

To turn now to the objective implication of knowledge. We have already drawn attention in noticing Rāmānuja's description of the process of knowing that objects are viewed as preceding knowledge—as existing already before they are known. They are therefore to be reckoned as real and since they depend in no way upon the self or the knowledge which brings them into relation with it, their reality is not merely objective or relative but absolute. Rāmānuja traces this realistic view to the old teaching of the *Veda*.¹ That is however only his way of putting it and we may regard it for our purpose here as a postulate of his system. His view in particular is described as *sat-khyāti* or *yathārtha-khyāti* which means that what exists (*sat*) is alone cognized and that knowledge in the absence of an object corresponding to what is given in it (*yathārtha*) is impossible. It is not enough for securing the correspondence here meant, if something or other exists outside to serve as the source from which a *general* stimulus comes. Consistently with Rāmānuja's view that only complex objects exist and are known, the *kind* of the object also should be as it is given in knowledge. In other words, the agreement between knowledge and its object should extend from the *that* (*prakārin*) to the *what* (*prakāra*) also of what is presented. That is, Rāmānuja believes in a real world having real qualities. While it is easy to understand this position so far as normal perception is concerned, the question will arise as to how it can be maintained in the case of illusions where we seem to have knowledge without corresponding things. Rāmānuja's explanation of them, broadly speaking, is twofold. It necessarily involves the interpretation of certain physical and physiological facts and the interpretation, because the Indian theories were all formulated before the days of experimental science, is sometimes fanciful. But this need not always affect the soundness of the accompanying logical theory. We shall have to bear this in mind as we proceed and see that we do not judge the logical significance of our theory by the value of the scientific beliefs cited in the course of its exposition.

(i) In some cases the realistic position is maintained on the basis of the Vedāntic doctrine of *pañcīkaraṇa*, according to which objects of the physical world, which are all compounds contain all the five *bhūtas* or gross elements, though in varying proportions.

¹ Compare Śālika-nātha's *Prakaraṇa-pañcīkā*, p. 32.

Thus in the case of the 'mirage,' what is being looked at is a heated sandy waste which contains not only *prthivī* which is the preponderating part of it, but also *ap*, however slight, and the apprehension of water there, it is said, is therefore only of what is actually presented to the eye. That is, Rāmānuja justifies his view of *sat-khyāti* here by pointing to what is a fundamental tenet of his system, the unity of the physical world and the structural affinity that is discoverable among the things that belong to it. But such an explanation may do only in cases where the object of illusion, as in the example given, is one or other of the five *bhūtas*. Illusions however are by no means confined to such rare cases. We may for instance mistake 'shell' for 'silver' where neither is a *bhūta*. To explain cases like these, Rāmānuja resorts to an extension of the principle underlying *pañcīkaraṇa*. The illusion of 'shell-silver' is due, among other causes, to the similarity between the two substances, viz., their peculiar lustre. This similarity means to Rāmānuja the presence in the 'shell', though only to a very limited extent, of the very material which constitutes 'silver'. Likeness is to him only another term for partial identity and so even here what is perceived is what is actually presented. Only it is not the *bhūtas as such* that are brought together here, but what are derived from them—*bhautikas*. The 'shell' is a compound not of *prthivī*, *tejas*, etc., in their primitive form, but of certain differentiations of them—the 'shell' being a particular modification of *prthivī* and the 'silver', as indicated by the lustre, of *tejas*.

(ii) In other cases such as the white conch seen as yellow by a person with a jaundiced eye, a different explanation becomes necessary. The 'yellowness' in this case is no doubt there outside the knowing self and is therefore real. But the point requiring elucidation here is not whether the 'yellowness' is real but how it comes to be seen in the conch. The explanation of Rāmānuja, which is based upon beliefs current at the time, assumes that the 'yellowness' found in the diseased eyeball is actually transmitted from there to the conch along with the 'rays' of the organ of sight (*nāyanaraśmi*) as they travel to it in the process of seeing and that the new colour thus imposed upon the conch obscures the whiteness natural to it. The conch is thus supposed to become actually yellow, though only for the time being; and so here also knowledge is of what is given not only in respect of the relata but also the

relation between them. To the question that if the conch becomes actually yellow, others also should find it so, the answer is given that the 'yellowness' here is of too subtle a kind to be perceived by any one who, unlike the person in question, has not followed it throughout its course of transmission.¹ The explanation is no doubt arbitrary and unconvincing; but what our present purpose requires us to note in it is not its scientific correctness but the spirit of persistent realism that underlies it. The question will readily occur here as to how dreams are to be accounted for. There at least we seem to have experience without corresponding objects existing at the time. The explanation once again is arbitrary and it is stated, now on the authority of the *Upaṇiṣads*,² that objects like the elephant (say) seen in dreams, are actually there at the time, though as in the case of the yellow conch, they are perceivable only by the individual dreamer. 'God is their creator,' says Rāmānuja and adds that the reason for His creating such unique things is the same as in the case of objects of the waking state, viz., the providing of *suitable* means for the individual to experience pain or pleasure according to his past *karma*.

It is instructive to find out what may be the basis of this twofold explanation. The 'yellow-conch' and the 'dream-elephant' are objects *solely* of individual experience. The illusion of the 'mirage' or the 'shell-silver' also in one sense has reference to particular individuals; but the 'water' and the 'silver' perceived there by one are *verifiable by all*, for when the illusion disappears they are not sublated being absolutely real by hypothesis, but as we shall see presently, only set aside or superseded (*abhi-bhūta*). In the case of the 'yellow-conch' or the 'dream-elephant' also, the objects perceived, being quite real, can be testified to; but the testimony can, in the nature of the case, be only of the individual that saw them. This shows that Rāmānuja distinguishes two classes of objects — one which is common to all or many and may therefore be called 'public'; and the other, special to single persons and may therefore be termed 'private'. It may seem from this distinction that he admits different kinds of orders of being — an admission which would place his doctrine epistemologically

¹ The analogy is here adduced of a small bird soaring in the sky which, he that has followed its course from the moment it began to fly, is able to spot easily but not others.

² *Br. Up.*, IV. iii. 10.

on the same footing as Śaṅkara's *Advaita*. Really however no such admission is made. In fact it is in denying that there is such a distinction that he formulates the doctrine of *sat-khyāti*. In point of reality, 'private' and 'public' objects differ in no way according to him. Both alike are equally outside and independent of knowledge and both therefore are equally and absolutely real. A thing's being 'private' does not take away from its reality. Our pains and pleasures are personal to each one of us but they are not the less real on that account. This aspect of *sat-khyāti* is of the utmost moment to Rāmānuja's doctrine on its meta-physical side.

However diverse the explanation in the two cases and whatever we may think of its scientific value, it is clear that the aim of *sat-khyāti* is to show that *jñāna*, including the so-called illusion, cannot deviate from reality and that even in the case of objects whose existence can be vouched for only by individual experience, there is no ideal or purely subjective element. If all knowledge be equally valid, it may be asked how the distinction between truth (*pramā*) and error (*bhrama*), which is universally recognized, is to be explained. Before answering this question, it is necessary to draw attention to another important aspect of *sat-khyāti*. While the doctrine postulates that only what is given is known, it does not admit that *all* that is given is apprehended. Knowledge, no doubt, is always of the given and of nothing but the given; but it need not be of the *whole* of what is given. This is evident from the examples cited above. Besides the 'water' and the 'silver' for instance, there is much in the 'sandy waste' and the 'shell' that is left unapprehended. Rāmānuja bases his explanation of error on this feature of knowledge. The peculiar view upheld in *sat-khyāti* however makes one thing certain: there can be no errors of commission. But the same cannot be said about those of omission; for knowledge, though invariably valid, may be incomplete and incomplete knowing (*agraha*)¹ may give rise to errors of this kind. Thus in the case of the 'yellow-conch,' it is the failure to comprehend its whiteness that causes the error. In dream-objects again, their being 'private' to the particular dreamer is overlooked and they are therefore confounded with the corre-

¹ Here is a point of agreement between Rāmānuja's *sat-khyāti* and Prabhākara's *akhyāti*. The two are not identical. Compare Vedānta-Deśika's description of the former as *akhyāti-saṁvalīta-yathārtha-khyāti*.

sponding objects belonging to the normal order of nature. The omission and the consequent error are clearer still in the case of another example given—the 'firebrand-circle' (*alāta-cakra*) where a point, owing to its rapid movement, is mistaken for its locus, because while the fact that it occupies every point on the circumference is apprehended, the other fact that the occupation takes place successively and not simultaneously is lost sight of.

These illustrations and the statement that error is due to incomplete knowing may lead us to conclude that truth is complete knowledge. But that would not be right, for according to *sat-khyāti*, there may be an element of omission even in the so-called truth. When for instance we perceive 'shell' as 'shell', there is present in it 'silver', but it is ignored quite as much as the 'shell'-aspect is, when the same object is mistaken for 'silver'. Similarly in the case of the 'desert', when we cognize it as such, our mind lets slip the element of 'water' in it. Since completeness like validity fails to differentiate truth from error, Rāmānuja enunciates a new principle, viz., that for knowledge to be true, in its commonly accepted sense it should, in addition to agreeing with outside reality be serviceable in life. When the 'mirage' and the 'shell-silver' are described as false, what we have to understand is, not that 'water' and 'silver' are not present there, for in that case, we could not have become conscious of them at all; but that they are not such as can be put to practical use. The distinction between truth and error comes thus to be significant only from the practical standpoint; from the theoretical one, it does not exist. All knowledge without exception is valid and necessarily so, but such validity need not guarantee that what is known is adequate to satisfy a practical need. A geologist may correctly adjudge a piece of ore as golden; but it does not mean that a bracelet (say) can be made out of the metal in it. This is the significance of the *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* definition of truth¹ as not only *yathārtha* or 'agreeing with outside reality,' but also *vyavahārānuguna* or 'conforming to *vyavahāra* or the practical interest of life'. If knowledge should conform to *vyavahāra*, it should in the first place refer to objects of common or collective experience. It is deficiency in this respect, due to their 'private' character, that makes the 'yellow-conch' and the 'dream-elephant' false; and it is this very deficiency when supplied that exposes their falsity.

¹ See *Yatindra-mata-dīpikā*, p. 3.

In the second place knowledge to conform to *vayvahāra* should comprehend the *preponderating* element in the object presented. The object we call 'shell' may contain 'silver', but the 'shell' part predominates in it and it is this predominance that explains its being put to use as the one and not as the other. 'Silver' though certainly present, does not count *practically* on account of its *alpatva* or smallness and it is this very feature when discovered that changes the erroneous knowledge of 'silver' into the true one of 'shell'. *Pramā* not only apprehends rightly so far as it goes, but also goes far enough to be of service in life. *Bhrama* also is right so far as it goes; but it does not go far enough and therefore fails to help us in the manner in which it may be expected to do. So when erroneous knowledge disappears, and truth comes to be known, as Rāmānuja's commentator says, "the *artha* (object) is not negated but only *pravṛtti* (activity) is arrested." To express the same otherwise, the discovery of error touches the reactive side of consciousness, not its receptive side.

Two important corollaries follow from such a view. The practical activities of life do not require a complete knowledge of our surroundings. It is enough if we know them approximately fully. In other words purposive thought is selective, not exhaustive; and partial or imperfect knowledge is not necessarily a hindrance to the attainment of the common ends of life. It is important to realise that this is not the same as saying that absolute validity is not found in common knowledge for the advocate of *sat-khyāti*, as we know, insists that all knowledge—even *bhrama*—is correct so far as it goes. The doctrine also recognizes a social or intersubjective side to knowledge. So far as theoretic certainty is concerned, there is no need to appeal from the individual to common consciousness for, as we have so often remarked, it is in the very nature of knowledge, without reference to its being peculiar to one or common to many, to point to reality; but its serviceability depends upon the general, though tacit testimony of society—upon the 'common' sense of mankind. These observations are sure to suggest a likeness between the doctrine of *sat-khyāti* and what is now known as Pragmatism. Both recognize the instrumental character of knowledge and adopt practical utility as the criterion of truth. But there is one essential difference between them. Here knowledge is valid by its own intrinsic nature and not because it 'works' or is serviceable.

That is, Rāmānuja admits the cognitive value of knowledge apart from the practical, whereas Pragmatism in its familiar form seems to admit no such distinction. Even in error, there is some revelation of reality, so that in adopting the pragmatic attitude Rāmānuja does not relinquish the philosophic one. In fact knowledge according to him has not one but two functions to perform—to reveal reality and to serve the purposes of practical life. Both are equally important; and if either is to be emphasized more than the other, it would undoubtedly be the former. This should not be understood as introducing a double criterion for judging knowledge, for practical value and logical validity, according to Rāmānuja, do not exclude each other. Doubtless the two are not the same, but there is no incompatibility between them, especially as one of them, viz., validity is a constant and not a passing feature of knowledge.

The view which we have so far sketched somewhat alters the nature of the epistemological problem. The question to be decided about knowledge is not whether it is valid or not—for by deficiency in this respect knowledge would lose its very title to that name—but whether it comprehends less or more of its object. In other words, it is not quality that varies in knowledge but range. If we take this along with what was stated above, viz., that even truth may reveal reality only incompletely, we see that the *sat-khyāti* doctrine contains the suggestion of an ideal form of knowledge which is not only valid and has practical value but is also all-comprehensive. This ideal of perfect knowledge¹ which we may deduce from the premises of *sat-khyāti* is actually recognized by Rāmānuja as characterizing the *jīva* in its condition of *mukti*. Throughout *saṁsāra*, as we have already stated, *jñāna* is said to operate under limitations, for *doṣas* of one kind or another interfere with its free activity. Consequently common knowledge, including *pramā* or truth, only half reveals reality. Its full revelation is possible only in *mukti* when all *doṣas* are overcome and all possibility of error is removed. Man's vision then becomes extended to the maximum. 'It blossoms to the full,' as it is said; and the *mukta* knows each and every thing fully and as it is. We do not mean by referring to this support from the side of logic to

¹Compare the *kevala-jñāna* of Jainism with which this ideal may not be historically unconnected.

the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* conception of *mukti* that it is necessarily right in all its details. It may well be that several of them have nothing more than speculation or dogma as their basis. All that we wish to point out here is that there is no disharmony between Rāmānuja's theory of knowledge and the final goal of *Viśiṣṭādvaita* as taught by him.

PRAMĀṆA

The word *pramāṇa* comes from the root *mā* 'to measure' and signifies 'that by which we measure' or 'the means of measurement'.¹ This etymology gives us a clue to the aim of *pramāṇas* as first understood in Indian philosophy. It is the measuring or testing the correctness of knowledge. It implies that the scope for *pramāṇa* arises when a thing is known but its knowledge is still uncertain.² The same also appears to be indicated by the well-known maxim—*lakṣaṇa-pramāṇābhyām hi vastu-siddhiḥ*—which means that, for anything to be completely established, description and investigation are both necessary.³ In holding this view of *pramāṇas* Indian philosophy, according to Prof. Deussen, exhibits kinship with modern philosophy which also sets itself the task of critically examining the store of knowledge that is already in us. We shall discover the probable reason why the ancient Indian took such a view of *pramāṇas*, if we remember the state of things at the time when they first came to be formally investigated. Words derived from *pra* + $\sqrt{mā}$ are quite rare in Vedic literature; and where they occur,⁴ they seem to bear no logical significance. The term *pramāṇa* itself is, no doubt, used clearly with that significance in the *Maitrī Upaniṣad*;⁵ but as the section where it occurs, if not the whole *Upaniṣad*, only nominally belongs to Vedic literature, we may conclude that *pramāṇa* as a logical concept came into vogue after the Vedic period. Now we know that the topic of *pramāṇas* was prominently discussed in India at the time of the Greek invasion;⁶ and we may therefore fix the date of their first formulation early in the post-Vedic period. Let us consider what the circumstances prevalent

¹ See Deussen, *System of Vedānta*, p. 88. [See also Extra Note 1.]

² *Nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte nyāyaḥ pravartate: Nyāya-sūtra-bhāṣya*, I. i. 1.

³ Quoted, for example, in the *Jaiminiya-nyāya-mālā-vistara*, I. i. 2. Others add probability (*sambhāvana*) as a third condition, so that the existence of the thing in question should be credible before we can examine whether it is. See *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha* (p. 25).

⁴ As, e.g., in the *Atharva-veda* (X. vii. 32): *Yasya* (i.e., of *Skambha*) *bhūmiḥ pramā antarikṣam utodaram*.

⁵ vi. 14. The two or three other *Upaniṣads* like the *Kālāgnirudra Upaniṣad*, in which the word occurs, are still later.

⁶ *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. i. p. 421.

then were. The Vedic period had closed and the whole of the complex orthodox tradition handed down from that period was challenging, so to say, examination. There had also grown up, as the history of Indian philosophy shows, a mass of heterodox thought which, as the result of independent thinking in different circles, exhibited a good deal of diversity.¹ Philosophy had thus for the most part become a matter of conflicting tradition, and the chief function of *pramāṇas* was naturally conceived as scrutinizing this tradition. The importance attached to *śabda* in the sense of 'tradition' or 'revelation' (whether regarded as an independent *pramāṇa* or not), which is a unique feature of Indian thought, seems to lend colour to such a view.

From this account of the origin of *pramāṇas*, we should not assume that the Indian systems of philosophy, which all emerged after the Vedic period, are merely the result of organizing the beliefs that had come down from the past and are not the outcome of an independent investigation of the nature of reality. But the consideration of this question will take us away from our subject. So we shall proceed to find out whether *pramāṇas* serve any purpose, other than investigation or scrutiny. Vātsyāyana, in his commentary on the first aphorism of Gautama, defines the distinctive feature of philosophy, as understood by him, as *pramāṇaiḥ artha-parīkṣaṇam* or 'the examination of the data of experience by means of *pramāṇas*'^{1a}. This definition, at first sight, seems entirely to support the view stated above, that the *pramāṇas* in general are means of scrutiny. But, according to Vācaspati, the word *pramāṇaiḥ* here is to be understood as signifying not all the *pramāṇas* but only one of them, viz., reasoning or 'the five-membered syllogism', as he puts it.² That the restriction of this function of investigation to but one of the *pramāṇas* does not overstep the intention of Vātsyāyana is shown not only by what he says regarding the category of *avayava* further on in his commentary on the same aphorism, but also by what he adds in the course of elucidating the statement cited above: *pratyakṣāṅgamaiḥ iṅkṣitasya anvīkṣaṇam anvīkṣā; tayā pravartata ity anvīkṣikī*. That is, the purpose of philosophy consists in a reviewing or rational consideration of the data of perception and

¹ See the present writer's *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 43-4.

^{1a} [See Extra Note 2.]

² *Tātparya-ṭikā*, p. 42; (Benares Edition, 1925). [See also Extra Note 3.]

verbal testimony. If it be so, two of the three *pramāṇas* commonly recognized by Indian logicians, viz., perception and verbal testimony^a, are to be regarded as *sources* of knowledge, and the third, viz., inference alone as the means of appraising its logical worth. Here we find recognized a second purpose of *pramāṇas* of which there is no indication in the etymological meaning of that term. A *pramāṇa* may scrutinize what is already known, but is not known for certain; it may also reveal the existence and nature of things not hitherto known at all. But, from what we have stated so far, it seems that no *pramāṇa* can do both.

This division of the *pramāṇas* into two groups, each with its own distinctive purpose, cannot, however, be the final truth about them. For experience shows us that there is no such demarcation between them. Thus perception and verbal testimony can very well aid investigation. The former, for example, may be the means of verification as when an object apprehended by the organ of sight is tested by means of touch, or when a doubt arising in respect of something inferred is cleared by actual observation. Inference again may bring to light facts previously unknown, since in all genuine forms of it the conclusion reached, in one form or other, goes beyond the premises and does not merely reassert what is already contained in them taken separately. In view of this fact, we have to modify our interpretation of Vātsyāyana's statement that inference is the sole means of investigation. As Uddyotakara suggests¹ and as Vātsyāyana himself shows by the use of the word *nyāya* in this connection, we have to understand from 'reasoning' or 'inference' here not a process of convincing oneself of the truth of anything (*svārthānumāna*) when in doubt but that of formally demonstrating it to others (*parārthānumāna*)^{1a}. Such demonstration necessarily involves the expression of the reasoning process as a five-membered syllogism, especially when the topic in question is a metaphysical one; and it is for this reason that Vātsyāyana refers to inference alone in this connection, and not because he thinks that the other *pramāṇas* can never be instruments of investigation. In fact, he recognizes the need for them even in the case of this form of inference, though only as auxiliaries to it. For instance, there would be

^a [See Extra Note 4.]

¹ *Nyāya-vārtika* (Benares Edition), pp. 13 and 17.

^{1a} [See Extra Note 5.]

little chance of convincing another of any truth, if there were no *dr̥ṣṭānta* or 'example', which depends upon perception and forms the basis of the third (*udāharaṇa*) of the five members of the Indian syllogism. We may accordingly say that all *pramāṇas* serve a twofold purpose. They may be sources of knowledge as well as means of scrutiny; and this duality of function naturally renders their conception ambiguous.

There is another ambiguity affecting the same conception which also needs to be noticed here. We have seen that a *pramāṇa* may be the source of knowledge, but this knowledge may be right or wrong. Perceptual knowledge and inference may be true or false, and verbal statements may be significant without being valid. In other words, *pramāṇas* may give rise to knowledge either in a purely psychological or in a purely logical sense. The names of the several *pramāṇas* are used for both. Thus, in the second of the two sentences quoted above from Vātsyāyana, *pratyakṣa* should be taken in a psychological sense because its data are there said to stand in need of a critical examination; but the same term in Gautama's definition of it is used in a logical sense, since it represents there knowledge that does not go astray (*avyabhicāri*)¹. From what Uddyotakara says², it appears that even the general term *pramāṇa*, whose recognized use is in the sense of what leads to right knowledge (*pramākaraṇam*), might occasionally share this ambiguity and be used where the knowledge is erroneous.

The failure to distinguish between these two uses accounts for some perplexing statements met with in philosophical works. We have one such instance in *upalabdhi-hetuḥ pramāṇam*, an old definition of *pramāṇa*; and Vācaspati in commenting upon it, feels constrained to interpret the first word in it as *pramā* or right knowledge, although Gautama himself has declared it to be a synonym of *jñāna* or knowledge in general³. As a second instance, we may refer to Viśvanātha's definition of *pratyakṣa*, viz., *indriya-janyaṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣam*⁴ where, according to the *Rāmarudrīya*, the word *jñāna* is to be taken as equivalent to *pramā* for, otherwise, the definition will be out of accord with Gautama's definition of the same^{4a}. Prof. Randle points out that the contention of certain

¹ I. i. 4.² *Nyāya-vārttika*, pp. 3 and 7.³ *Tātparyā-ṭīkā*, pp. 20 f.; *Nyāya-sūtra*, I. i. 15. [See also Extra Note 6.]⁴ *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, pp. 235-6 (Nirṇayasāgara Edition)^{4a} [See Extra Note 7.]

Indian thinkers, like the followers of Nyāya, viz., that the validity of knowledge is established *ab extra* (*parataḥ-prāmāṇyam*) is also traceable to the same source.¹

To sum up: The general term *pramāṇa* and the special ones also like *pratyakṣa* have three different, but closely connected meanings: They signify first, a source of knowledge, without reference to its being either true or false; secondly, a source of valid knowledge; and lastly, a means of scrutiny. The distinction between the first two of these meanings is clear; but the same cannot, perhaps, be said of that between the last two. So a word of explanation may be necessary about it. *Pramāṇas*, in the second sense, are thought of as simply revealing truth. In the third sense also, their aim is taken to be the revelation of truth; but they are regarded as always presupposing doubt, and reaching truth after the discovery of the logical grounds for believing in one and not believing in the other of the two alternatives involved in doubt.² If the emphasis in the one case is on the cognitive side, it is on the probative side in the other. We may add that we have cited in the course of this paper only the authority of Nyāya teachers, because the *Nyāya* is pre-eminently a *pramāṇa-śāstra*, and not because the imperfect terminology referred to (so far as it is imperfect) is peculiar to that system.

¹ *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, p. 58, note 2. [See also Extra Note 8.]

² Cf. *Nyāya-sūtra*, I. i. 41. [See also Extra Note 9.]

EXTRA NOTES

1. *Pramīyate aneneti pramāṇam*. Here *pramīyate* refers to *viśaya*. But this does not matter, as we say 'correctness of knowledge'. To test validity means reference to object.

2. The above is a literal translation. Prof. Jacobi also seems to take it thus. *Indian Antiquary*, 1918, p. 103.

3. The strained manner in which *pramāṇaiḥ* is understood here suggests that Vātsyāyana is probably quoting the statement from an old writer and interpreting it in his own way.

4. Even if *āgama* here means 'revelation', our rendering will do for our present purpose. Note that commentators throw no light on this. '*Anvikṣā* is a reconsideration of what has been attained through perception and tradition. *Anvikṣikī* is so called because it adopts that as its method.' It should be added that *Nyāya-vārttika* interprets *pratyakṣa* and *āgama* here as two of the five *avayavas*.

5. See Kuppuswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic*, p. 290.

6. Note that Vācaspati says on page 20, *saṁśaya-viparyāsa-rūpopalabdhi*, implying the general use. Gautama's *sūtra* may be only a rejection of the view that these are different. But yet there is the word *jñāna* used by him here.

7. The words on which a forced interpretation is put are *other* than *pramāṇa*, *pratyakṣa*, etc.

8. Randle seems to use 'means of proof' for 'means of right knowledge.'

9. Now we may admit that a *pramāṇa* is able to help investigation because it can reveal truth; but still the purpose it serves is distinct. See McDougall, *Psychology*, p. 364. According to *Nyāya-vārttika* all knowledge may be suspected; according to *Mīmāṃsā*, only some (*bādhaka-pratyaya* and *karāṇa-doṣa*). In either case scrutiny means doubt.

SVABHĀVA-VĀDA OR INDIAN NATURALISM

In Sanskrit philosophical works, we sometimes find mentioned a world-view which is designated *Svabhāva-vāda*, a term which we may, without implying exact equivalence, render by the English word 'naturalism.'¹ It is a very old doctrine going as far back as the Upaniṣads² and representing a current of thought opposed to belief in the supernatural or *Adṛṣṭa-vāda*,³ advocated generally by the priests. We know that the reaction against the Vedic religion was very old. Buddhist and Jain works refer to numerous philosophical schools,⁴ many of them heretical, as having existed when Gotama and Mahāvīra taught. It is difficult to believe that all of them took their rise only in that generation, and some at least of them must be much older. Hindu tradition also refers to the courts of ancient kings like Janaka teeming with a hundred teachers expounding separate doctrines including heretical ones⁵. The *Svabhāva-vāda* should have been an important off-shoot of this reaction. Though the origin of the doctrine can be traced only vaguely, its influence is transparent in more than one sphere of Indian thought as we now know it. In the later scholastic philosophy, it is represented, however inadequately, by the Lokāyata system, and is seen to have contributed important elements to the growth of other systems like the Sāṃkhya. The doctrine represents in fact an ancient and distinctive current of Indian thought—parallel to the orthodox creed through the greater part of its history. It should once have been quite prominent for we find Sage Ajagara, an advocate of the doctrine⁶ speaking

¹ Cf. e.g., the references to it in Śaṅkara on *Br. S. I. i. 2* and Sureśvara's *Br. Up. Vārttika*, I. iv. 1487. Ānanda-jñāna in explaining these references uses the term *Svabhāva-vāda*. See also *Saṃkṣepa-śārīra*, i. 528; *Kusumāñjali*, p. 16 (Benares Edition), 1912.

² See *Śvet. Up.*, i. 2; vi. 1. According to Uvaṭa's commentary, *asambhūti* as used in *Īśa Up.*, 12 also refers to a variety of this school of thought.

³ Nilakaṇṭha in commenting on *Mbh.*, XII. 231. 11 makes this contrast.

⁴ See 'Cambridge History of India,' Vol. I. pp. 150 and 302.

⁵ See, e.g., *Mbh.*, XII. 218. 4-5.

⁶ See *Mbh.*, XII. 179. 11. The term *animittataḥ* occurring in the previous stanza should, in the light of what is stated in this one, be taken as meaning 'without any external cause.'

of it as 'widely mentioned' (*bahukathita*)¹. Notwithstanding its secular or non-priestly origin, it counts among its teachers Brahmins² along with Kṣatriyas and others.

Though it represents so important a school of thought, no detailed exposition of it is to be found anywhere in Sanskrit literature. It no doubt appears³ either as an established view (*siddhānta*) or as one to be rebutted, (*pūrva-pakṣa*)⁴ in the *Mahābhārata* which like the *Atharva-veda* is a great storehouse of popular and non-priestly beliefs. But its tenets there, owing to this revision which the Epic has undergone at the hands of its later editors, appear largely modified by those of other schools. It has also in this process of revision come under the review of unsympathetic thinkers as is clear for example from its being traced often to such objectionable sources as demons (*asuras*)⁵. Though modified, the *Mahābhārata* account⁶ is the only considerable one from which we have to draw our information about the doctrine in the early stages of its history. We propose to state here, chiefly on the basis of this account, its broad features but, owing to the uncertainties of our source and the uncritical character of the editions of the Epic so far published, the statement should, for the most part, be regarded as tentative.

It is necessary to distinguish this doctrine first from another which is also very old and may be mistaken for it, viz., 'accidentalism' described as *Yadycchā-vāda* or *Animitta-vāda*. Both the *Yadycchā-vāda* and the *Svabhāva-vāda* are found separately mentioned in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*⁷. While the one believed that the world was a chaos and ascribed whatever order is seen in it to chance, the other recognized that 'things are as their nature makes them.'⁸ The word *svabhāva* means 'one's uniqueness'—the power or property restricted to one object or

¹ *Mbh.* XII. 179. 35.

² Sage Ajagara for instance, referred to above is a Brahmin.

³ Cf. XII. 179, 222, 224, and 288.

⁴ Cf. XII. 186, 187, 218, and 275.

⁵ E.g., Ahrāda and Bali who expounded this doctrine in XII. 222 and 224 of the Epic.

⁶ Sometimes the Purāṇas contain allusions to this doctrine though not on such a large scale. Buddhistic and Jain works also are of use in this connection.

⁷ The *Animitta-vāda* is refuted in *Nyāya-sūtra*, IV. i. 22-4.

⁸ *Mbh.*, XII. 222. 27. See also stanzas 15 ff.

one class of objects.¹ Hence according to the *Svabhāva-vāda*, it is not a lawless world in which we live but a world which only has no external, especially a transcendental, principle governing it. It is self-determined — neither undetermined, nor determined by a supernatural agency. The nature of a thing entirely determines its history and it is because we are blind to this fact that we imagine that it obeys no law or that its course may be altered by the intervention of human or divine will. Both these views, however, were at one in rejecting the idea that Nature reveals any divine power working behind it or indeed any transcendental being which controls it or is implicated in it. Nor did either doctrine seek for its views any supernatural sanction. In the former of these, we have to look for the source of the sensualist school of *Cārvāka* thought which also ascribes the events of life to mere accident.² It is the latter that is of real philosophic importance.

(i) THEORETICAL TEACHING

The first point that needs to be noted about this doctrine is its positivistic character which is implied by its contrast with *Adṛṣṭa-vāda* already referred to. The *Mahābhārata* in one of its sections³ ascribes to this school belief only in Perception and Inference, based upon it; and describes it as not accepting anything, that is the result of mere speculation. Later in the same chapter⁴ *āgama* or tradition is compared to the *mahout* that entraps elephants and explicitly condemns it as deceiving the unwary. In this strict limitation of the sources of knowledge consists the contrast of *Svabhāva-vāda* with the supernaturalism of the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas on the one hand, and, on the other, with the metaphysical view of the Upaniṣads. In its rationalism and empiricism also consists its general resemblance to modern thought. In fact it is this doctrine and the other Indian systems, so far as

¹ Cf. Vardhamāna's definition in his Com. on the *Kusumāñjali* passage referred to in note 1 (*ekaniyato dharmah*).

² Indian Materialism as set forth in works like the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* is a curious mixture of *Svabhāva*- and *Yadṛcchā-vādas*. Here probably we find the basis for the distinction which Jayanta makes between the 'cultured' (*su-śikṣita*) and the 'vulgar' (*dhūrta*) *Cārvāka*. See *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 64 and 467.

³ XII. 218. 23 and 27. *Kṛtānta* in the latter stanza, according to the commentator, Nilakaṇṭha, stands for Inference. It seems to be the same as *dr̥ṣṭānta* and suggests Inference in its older form of analogical reasoning and not the later syllogistic one.

⁴ St. 45.

they involve it, that may appear to deserve the name of 'philosophy' in the modern sense of the term. It refuses absolutely to shelter itself behind any dogma and rejects every form of mysticism. This positivistic character of the teaching—its 'mundane metaphysics'—seems to have been the original significance of the term *lokāyata*¹ ('restricted to the *experienced* world') more generally applied to it in later literature. Its refusal to believe in a Hereafter, is what is meant by the term *nāstika*² sometimes used by the orthodox in speaking of its followers.

If we understand *svabhāva* to mean, as we have said, the unique power or property of an object or a group of objects, the doctrine implies, unless we regard everything to be distinct from everything else, the classifiability of the things in the world according to the resemblance which they bear to one another. But the classification, we must assume, is such as will leave diversity in the end as the characteristic of the universe. If the view were monistic, there would be no point in describing the nature of a thing as *svabhāva* where the term *sva*, with its meaning of 'one's own', implies contrast with 'the other'³. The necessary presupposition of *Svabhāva-vāda* is thus dualism, if not pluralism, and we find this conclusion supported by old references to the doctrine. The *Svabhāva-vāda* is sometimes ascribed to *bhūta-cintakas*⁴ or 'such as believe in the ultimacy of the elements.' It means that the *svabhāva-vādin* stopped in his analysis of the world at the 'elements'. As regards the number of the 'elements' he postulated, nothing can be definitely stated. The evidence of the later *Lokāyata* system points to four; that of the *Mahābhārata* to five.⁵ But on account of the modifications which both these accounts have undoubtedly undergone, they cannot be taken to give us the exact truth about the earliest stage of *Svabhāva-vāda* in this respect. We know⁶ that in the history of ancient Indian thought three stages of growth are noticeable in regard to this point;

¹ Max Müller suggests 'prevalent in the world' or 'world-wide' as the meaning. See *Six Systems*, pp. 98-9.

² See, e.g., *Mbh.*, XII. 216. 28.

³ Compare Vardhamāna's statement referred to in foot note 1, p. 73.

⁴ *Mbh.*, XII. 232. 19. The *Śvet. Up.*, however distinguishes between the two (i. 2.).

⁵ See XII. 224. 17; 275. 4-14; 288. 36.

⁶ Deussen, *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 190 ff.

first, when only one element was known; then, three; and last, five. It looks probable that the *Svabhāva-vāda*, which is very old, originally believed in only three elements mentioned, for instance, in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (VII.ii)—earth, water and fire which are directly experienced unlike the remaining two. Since the course of thought in this early period is not clearly known, it is difficult to say which of these is indebted in this respect. In the absence of any clear evidence to the contrary, we must presume the Upaniṣadic account¹ to have been the original.

The *Svabhāva-vāda* denied the existence of a transmigrating soul and may therefore be contrasted with what is described as *Adhyātma-vāda*, which took for granted an immortal soul. 'When experience clearly shows that all that constitutes a living being perishes, it is hard to believe in anything beyond, on the basis merely of traditional teaching.'² In fact the denial of such transcendent entities, is, as we have seen, the very aim of this doctrine. According to the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*³ it is this controversy of a surviving soul that sets Naciketas seriously thinking. But there appears to have been no disinclination on the part of the *svabhāva-vādin*⁴ to admit 'personality' lasting as long as life does, understanding by 'personality' a certain unity of the differences characterizing a person. This is a very important admission inasmuch as the unity admitted enables the school to explain satisfactorily psychical phenomena like memory and to find scope for self-discipline according to an ideal.⁵ This personality, however, was not there previously to birth; nor was it believed to endure after death. It was something that emerged when a

¹ There is one circumstance, however, in the Upaniṣadic account which suggests the contrary view. There the original source of the universe, viz., *Sat* first differentiates itself into the three elements which re-combine according to what is described as *tri-vṛt-karaṇa*. The need for such combination is not clear since, as derived from *Sat*, they all must be essentially the same in their constituents, and repeat the complex character of their source, viz., *Sat*, however much they may differ in the proportion of the various elements in them. This shows that the doctrine of the *bhūtas*, conceived as *distinct* entities, may be alien to the Upaniṣad and that its interrelation necessitated this apparently artificial explanation.

² *Mbh.*, XII. 218. 23.

³ I. 20.

⁴ See *Mbh.*, XII. 224. 7. There is an allusion to a view like this in Vedānta-Deśika's *Sarvārtha-siddhi*, p. 175 (Benares Edition.).

⁵ Cf. *Kusumāñjali*, I. 15. See also *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 467.

certain stage of complexity was reached in concatenation of the elements constituting the animal body. Here we see a complete departure from both animism which believes the soul to be a mysterious something which enters the physical body at birth and quits it at death; and from the refined philosophical systems which replace it by a sublimated or superphenomenal self.

(ii) PRACTICAL TEACHING

Freedom of thought, in the case of *Svabhāva-vāda* does not mean licence in conduct; and the chief characteristic of its practical teaching is the stoic severity of the discipline it imposes. Its aim is ascetic¹ and in this it stands pre-eminent among all the old schools of Indian thought. Asceticism certainly was not unknown to orthodox faiths. But, as Dr. Winternitz has observed,² that ideal is 'only from the point of view of the *āśrama* theory, according to which the Aryan has first to pass the stage of Brahmācārin, the student of the Veda, and of the house-holder (*gṛhastha*) who founds a family, offers sacrifices, and honours the Brāhmaṇas, before he is allowed to retire from this world as an hermit or an ascetic.' Quite different is the asceticism of the *Svabhāva-vāda* which means renunciation once and for all. 'Detachment is fearlessness and peace; attachment, certain ruin'.³ Though advocating asceticism in this extreme form, the ideal is as far removed from cynicism as it is from hedonism. It may perhaps be described as rational pessimism.⁴ The spirit underlying it is very well illustrated by the account of Sage Ajagara who realising how the course of events cannot be altered resigns himself entirely to it. Unable to change nature, he submits to it willingly, if not joyfully. Pleasure is not shunned by him, nor pain courted. He takes either as it comes, without being elated by the one or upset by the other. What is condemned in unmistakable terms is all *craving* for the attainment of pleasure and for the avoidance of pain.⁵ Pain and pleasure are regarded as incidental to life which the wise man will regard with indifference. Thus the doctrine, though it is essentially different from the orthodox creeds, yields to none

¹ See, e.g., *Mbh.*, XII. 179. 32; 222. 8.

² Cf. 'Ascetic Literature in Ancient India,' *Calcutta Review*, Oct., 1923, p. 8.

³ *Mbh.*, XII. 288. 13.

⁴ *Mbh.*, XII. 179.

⁵ See, e.g., *Mbh.*, 179. 28; 288. 6.

of them in its insistence upon purity of character. But character by itself will not suffice and needs to be supplemented by *jñāna*, i.e., wisdom or enlightenment,¹ such as can dispel the general delusion (*moha*) that there is a permanent soul and that in its interests we can modify the nature of things.² It is this *moha* that is the source of all selfish desire (*trṣṇā*). What is recommended here is an adjustment of the mind to its circumstances and not the reverse process of changing them to suit our needs—an attempt which, according to the *Svabhāva-vāda*, is bound to end in failure sooner or later. If such wisdom is combined with ascetic discipline, man can rise above the troubles of life and attain the goal of peace³. But the *Svabhāva-vāda* did not believe that he could *wholly* escape from evil and never strove for either permanent or unmixed happiness. Whatever evil there must be, will be; but he that has had the necessary training will be able to endure it with fortitude.

A necessary corollary to this positivistic teaching is the ideal of *jīvan-mukti* or freedom while one is still alive. The conception of *mokṣa* as a condition to be attained after death is incompatible with this doctrine and whatever the ideal be, it has necessarily to be achieved here, on this side of death⁴. *Videha-mukti* which represents the orthodox ideal is, as its name signifies, supposed to occur after dissociation from the physical body takes place. But this doctrine, which did not look forward to a life hereafter, naturally tried to put the present life to the best use and advocated the perfection of character within its limits. It is true that some orthodox systems, like the *Advaita* of Śaṅkara and the *Sāṃkhya* recognize *jīvan-mukti*, but yet it looks as if the conception originated in *Svabhāva-vāda* or some similar school of thought with whose view-point it so well agrees⁵. The summary way in which for instance Āpastamba, a recognized exponent of orthodox tradition, dismisses it, suggests its heterodox origin⁶. Here then is

¹ Cf. *Mbh.*, XII. 222. 35.

² See *Mbh.*, XII. 224. 8-11.


³ See, *Mbh.*, XII. 222. 25; 224. 11.

⁴ This is the significance of *mokṣa* being described as a condition predominantly of *sattva* and not as one transcending it also. See *Mbh.*, XII. 224. 10-12; 288. 25.

⁵ This ideal is as old as the Upaniṣads (see, e.g., *Kaṭha Up.*, v. 1; vi. 14); but we know that the *Svabhāva-vāda* is equally old.

⁶ *Dharma-sūtra*, II. xxi. 14-16.

another important point in which the doctrine breaks away completely from the supernatural teaching of the Veda, and the *svabhāva-vādin*, like Socrates, it may be said, brought philosophy down from heaven to dwell among men. In a series of verses in the Dialogue between Sagara and Ariṣṭanemi ending with the burden 'He indeed is free', (*mukta eva saḥ*) the *Mahābhārata*¹ proclaims an attitude of passionless serenity, attainable in this life, as itself *mokṣa*. The transference of the ideal to the sphere of this life does not in any way minimise its importance; rather it emphasizes it, since the ideal thereby becomes something verifiable under empirical conditions.



¹ *Mbh.*, XII. 288.

BHARṬṚ-PRAPAÑCA: AN OLD VEDĀNTIN

It is strange that the name of this old Vedāntin should now be all but forgotten,¹ though references to him are fairly plentiful in Indian philosophical literature; and the strangeness of it will appear all the greater when we remember that *Brahman* or the Absolute, as conceived by him, is of a type² that has commended itself to some of the most profound philosophers. Like so many other old Indian thinkers, Bharṭṛ-prapañca appears not as the author of an independent system but as an interpreter of the Upaniṣads. We have not so far recovered any of the works of this writer and probably none has survived to the present day. But we know for certain that he wrote a commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Śaṅkara has many references to it in his own *bhāṣya* on that *Upaniṣad*, and the fact is besides specifically mentioned by Ānanda-jñāna in his gloss on that *bhāṣya*. From what is stated by the latter, we gather that Bharṭṛ-prapañca³ commented upon the *Mādhyamīdina* recension of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and not on the *Kāṇva*, as Śaṅkara did; and that B.'s commentary was even more voluminous than Śaṅkara's.⁴ It seems from another statement of Ānanda-jñāna,⁵

¹ The only modern works in which I have found references to Bharṭṛ-prapañca are K.C. Bhattacharya's *Studies in Vedantism*, p. 25; Guha's *Jīvātman in the Brahma-Sūtras*, pp. 24-5 and 227—both Calcutta University publications; and T. M. Tripathi's Introduction to *Tarka-Saṁgraha* (Gaekwad Oriental Series, III), pp. xv-xvi.

² *Brahman*, according to Bharṭṛ-prapañca is, as will be seen, *saprapañca*—cf. *Ṭikā* on *Vārttika*, p. 1123, st. 67—not robbed of its manifestations but possessing all of them. The conception resembles that of the 'concrete universal' in modern philosophy.

³ Hereafter referred to as B.

⁴ See p. 2, *Ānandāśrama Series*: second edition (the one that is referred to throughout this article): *Uṣā veti | Etena cikirṣitāyā vṛtter—Bharṭṛ-prapañca-bhāṣyeṇāgatārthatvam uktam | Taddhi dvayā hetvyādi—Mādhyamīdina-śrutim adhikṛtya pravṛttam | Iyaṁ punaḥ uṣā vā aśvasyetyādi-Kāṇva-śrutim āśṛityeti |* *Bharṭṛ-prapañca-bhāṣyād viśeṣāntaram āha alpa-granthetī*]

⁵ See *Ṭikā* on *Vārttika*, p. 771, st. 1717—*Sūtropāstyākāmādi-dhvaṣṭiḥ phalam . . . vidyām cāvidyām cetyādāvuktam*. See also *Ibid.*, p. 779, st. 1764 ff. The *Bṛ. Up.* in the *Kāṇva* recension contains *Īś Up.*, 9 as IV. iv. 10; the *Mādhyamīdina* recension substitutes *Īś Up.*, 12 for it; but the *mantra*, *Vidyām ca. . .* is in neither. It may be added that the *Īś Up.* forms an earlier section of the same Veda to which the *Bṛ. Up.* also belongs.

that B. commented upon the *Īsopaniṣad* also. From a different source¹ we gather that he possibly expounded the *Vedānta-sūtras*: and, if we may trust Gopāla-Yatindra's gloss on the *Kaṭhōpaniṣad*,² B. must have commented upon that *Upaniṣad* as well. Since we now have none of these commentaries, nor any other work written by B., it is difficult to say what precisely his view of the teaching of the Upaniṣads was; but in the many references to it in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and Suresvara's full and masterly *Vārttika*³ on the same, we get some clues which we propose here to utilize for a tentative reconstruction of B.'s doctrine in its broad outline, contrasting it at the same time for the sake of clearness with Śaṅkara's Advaita.⁴

I

B. maintained like Śaṅkara that monism was the ultimate teaching of the Upaniṣads. A conspicuous feature of the latter's doctrine is the distinction between a *para* or higher and an *apara* or lower *Brahman*. B. also appears to have recognized this distinction;⁵ but while Śaṅkara explains the lower *Brahman* as an appearance (*vivarta*) of the higher and therefore not of the same order of reality, B. regards them both as real in the same sense⁶. This is a difference of much philosophical significance.

¹ Compare *Siddhi-traya* (ch. i.) by Yāmuna-muni reputed to be the *parama-guru* of Rāmānuja; *yadyapi bhagavatā Bādarāyaṇenedamarthānyeva sūtrāṇi praṇītāni . . . tathāpyācārya-Ṭaṅka-Bharṭṭya-prapañca-Bharṭṭya-mitra-Bharṭṭya-hari-Śrīvatsāṅka-Bhāskarādi-viracita-sitāsita-vividha-nibandhana-śraddhā-vipralabdha-buddhaya na yathāvadanyathā ca pratipadyanta iti tat-pratipattaye yuktāḥ prakaraṇa-prakramaḥ*.

² *Anandāśrama Series*: second Ed., p. 3.

³ Referred to as *Vārttika* in this article.

⁴ B.'s commentary on the *Br. Up.* seems to have been known at least in parts not only to Śaṅkara and Suresvara but also to Ānanda-jñāna; for there are in the latter's gloss on the *Br. Up. Bhāṣya* many passages which are undoubted extracts from it. Cf. e.g., *Ṭikā* on *Vārttika*, st. 1467 (p. 724), st. 1693-5 (pp. 767-8). It may also be noted that Suresvara mentions several points in B.'s interpretation not referred to by Śaṅkara. See e.g., *Vārttika*, p. 1155, *Ṭikā* on st. 46.

⁵ See Śaṅkara on *Br. Up.*, I. iv. 10 (p. 151): *Ato dvaitaikatvāparabrahma-vidyayā karma-sahitayā para-brahma bhāvam upasaṁpannaḥ . . . parabrahma-bhāvī*. See also *Ṭikā* on *Vārttika*, p. 760, st. 1659. The description of the *antarālāvasthā* (of B.'s doctrine) by Ānanda-jñāna in his *Ṭikā* on Śaṅkara's com. on *Br. Up.* I. iv. 15, p. 192, also implies the same distinction.

⁶ See *Ṭikā* on *Vārttika*, p. 1955, st. 36, and p. 1957, st. 48.

and to it, practically all the other important divergences between the two teachings are to be traced. According to Śaṅkara, the two *Brahmans* form, as it is put, a non-duality (*a-dvaita*). The relation between them (*tādātmya*) is unreal, it being a relation between things of different orders of being. In B.'s doctrine on the other hand the two things related being equally real, the relation also is real. But the things are not altogether disparate, so that the relation is not one of entire distinction (*bheda*) as between a 'pot' and a 'piece of cloth'. It is rather *bhedābheda* and the ultimate Reality may therefore be described as an identity in difference.¹ We might illustrate what is meant by this term—*bhedābheda*—by the well-known example of 'the snake and its coils, hood, etc.,' or the 'sun and its rays' alluded to in the *Vedānta-sūtras*.² This relation may however exist, as indicated by these very illustrations, between several types of things. Four such are mentioned in the works we are now considering:³

1. *Kāraṇa* and *kārya*: i.e., the material cause and the effect, as for example, 'clay' and 'pot'. The *apara-brahman* with all its variety springs into being from the *para* and eventually returns to it, so that the two are neither altogether distinct, nor quite the same.⁴
2. *Avasthāvat* and *avasthāḥ*: i.e., substance and its modes: as for example, the unagitated and the agitated ocean. The *apara-brahman* would accordingly represent a heterogeneous transformation of the homogeneous *para-brahman*. The difference between this and the previous view is to be explained by the well-known difference between the conceptions of 'creation' and 'evolution'.
3. *Aṁśin* and *aṁśa*: i.e., whole and part, as for example a 'tree' and its 'branches, leaves, etc.' The *para-brahman* would thus be the whole of which the parts are to be found in the variety constituting the *apara-brahman*.

¹ See e.g., *Vārttika*, p. 876, st. 46 ff.

² III. ii. 27-8. The relation considered here is between *Brahman* and the *jīva*. In B.'s doctrine, it holds not only between these two, but also between *Brahman* and the physical universe. See Śaṅkara on *Br. Up.*, V. i. 1, p. 731.

³ See e.g., *Vārttika*, pp. 623-4, St. 948-50, and *Ṭīkā* on st. 952. *Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa* mentions five types of things instead of four (p.259).

⁴ See *Citsukhī*, pp. 328-32.

4. *Sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*: i.e., the universal and the corresponding particulars, as for instance 'cow-ness' and the several individual 'cows'. According to this view, the *para-brahman* would be the basic or inmost principle revealing itself in all existent things—the particulars;¹ and the *apara-brahman*, these existent things themselves.

It is difficult to determine which of these views B. specifically had in his mind when he formulated the relation of *bhedābheda* between the *para* and the *apara-brahmans*. To judge from what Śaṅkara says in his commentary on *Br. Up.*² it would seem that these views were maintained by different thinkers. But according to Ānanda-jñāna's more explicit statement in his gloss on the *Vārttika*,³ all the four views were acceptable to B. Whichever of these statements may represent the actual fact, the view most commonly associated with B. is (2), viz., that of *avasthāḥ* and *avasthāvat* and he seems to have reduced the variety of the universe into eight *avasthās* or 'modes' of *Brahman*, viz., (1) *antaryāmin*, (2) *sākṣin*. (3) *avyākṛta*, (4) *sūtra*, (5) *virāj*, (6) *devatā*, (7) *jāti* and (8) *piṇḍa*.⁴ We shall say a few words about each of these following B., except in one or two cases where, as it is not possible to get at his views definitely, we have to be content with the statement of the general Upaniṣadic position.

1. *Antaryāmin*: This is the spiritual principle controlling everything from within as described in *Br. Up.*, III. vii. and is also sometimes termed *Īśvara* on that account.⁵ It is not *Brahman* in its pure state, but *Brahman* with its homogeneity somewhat disturbed preparatory to the creation that is to proceed from it.⁶

¹ According to *Vārttika*, p. 573, st. 695, and p. 625, st. 954, these particulars would include not only the individuals (*antya-viśeṣas*) but also what the *Vaiśeṣika* would describe as *apara-sāmānyas*, so that the whole is not a mere mass of unrelated particulars but an ordered system.

² III. viii. 12 (p. 492). Śaṅkara does not mention here all the four views but, according to the commentary, they are all meant. More than one form of the *bhedābheda* doctrine is known to Indian Philosophy. Compare, e.g., *Śrūta-prakāśkā* on Rāmānuja's commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtras*, I. i. 4: *Acidbrahmaṇorbhedābhedaḥ svābhāvika itī Bhāskara-Yādavayor apy abhimatam | Cidbrahmaṇos tu bhedābhedaḥ svābhāvikāvīti Yādava-mata-vyāvṛttyarthamāha tatreti*

³ *Ṭikā* on *Vārttika* (p. 624), st. 949-950: *Kvacid ity ubhayatra tadīya-grantha—deśaktiḥ*. ⁴ See e.g., *Ṭikā* on *Vārttika*, (p. 643), st. 1043.

⁵ Cf. *Vārttika*, (p. 532), st. 487. See *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, p. 107.

⁶ See Śaṅkara on *Br. Up.*, III. viii. 12 (p. 492).

2. *Sākṣin*: This is the individual soul which is regarded as another and a much more heterogeneous modification of *Brahman*.¹ It is otherwise termed *kṣetrajña* ('the conscious principle in the body') or *viññānamaya* ('transformation of *viññāna* or *Brahman*').² The *sākṣins* are either cosmic or individual according as they have a universal or a particular function to discharge. *Hiraṇyagarbha* and the deities like *Āditya* are cosmic;³ the rest, individual.⁴

3. *Avyākṛta*: This is the whole of the physical universe in its subtle or causal form⁵. It may be viewed as the adjunct of the *antaryāmin*. Together, they constitute the first transformation of *Brahman* and the distinction between the two is sometimes overlooked.⁶

4-6. Of the next three 'modes', the first or *sūtra* springs from the *avyākṛta* and is the adjunct of *Hiraṇyagarbha*, the highest cosmic soul. From this again the gross material, constituting the visible universe, proceeds. That is *virāj*.⁷ It is well known that this cosmic soul is often described in the Upaniṣads as having for its 'sense-organs' various *devatās* through which its activity, which is the same as the life of the world, goes on. These *devatās*, because they correspond to our *indriyas*, are sometimes so termed.⁸

¹ Ibid.

² See e.g., *Varttika*, p. 1000, st. 49, and Śaṅkara on *Br. Up.*, IV. iii. 7 (p. 560), and *Varttika* on the same (st. 318-23).

³ See *Varttika*, p. 1007, st. 91. Compare *Ṭikā* on *Varttika*, p. 451, st. 121, p. 956, st. 416.

⁴ This is on the supposition that *sākṣins* are many, and it is the implication of statements like that found in st. 100 of the *Varttika* (p. 1009). But to judge from the context in which B. is mentioned in a somewhat later work, (*Vedānta-tattva-viveka* by Nṛsiṃhāśramin, p. 38, Benares edition) he seems to have believed in only a single *jīva*, not however in a sense which would make his doctrine solipsistic, but in the sense that the one *jīva* simultaneously expresses itself through all the bodies in existence, just as in *aneka-jīva-vāda* one and the same *jīva* is supposed to manifest itself through several bodies successively. (i.e., in successive births). For a similar view among the followers of Śaṅkara, see *Siddhānta-leśa-saṁgraha* (Kumbhakonam edition), pp. 107-8.

⁵ See *Ṭikā* on *Varttika*, II. iii. st. 91-2.

⁶ See *Ṭikā* on *Varttika*, p. 1295, st. 29-30.

⁷ See *Br. Up.*, III. vii. 2, and *Varttika-sāra* by Vidyāranya (Benares edition), p. 743, st. 5, where *virāj* is referred to as *aṇḍa*. Cf., also the description of these and the next two as *mahābhūta-saṁsthāna-bheda* in the *Ṭikā* on Śaṅkara's commentary on *Br. Up.*, III. viii. 12 (p. 492).

⁸ Cf. *Ṭikā* on *Varttika*, p. 536, st. 511.

7-8. Of the last two—*jāti* and *piṇḍa*—the meaning of the second is clear.¹ It stands for the individual bodies, such as the human, from which as material cause, no subsequent effects are produced. The meaning of the first term is not quite so certain. It cannot be however understood here in its *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* sense, as there can be no *enduring* universals in monistic *Vedānta*. It may stand for *ākṛti*, a familiar conception in ancient Indian philosophy,² and denote types as distinguished from individuals.³ These numerous types and the still more numerous individuals are all the creation of the *virāj*.⁴ In other words, we have here what is known as the *vyāpti-sṛṣṭi* or 'secondary creation' in its double aspect of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.

Thus on the whole *Brahman* may be said to evolve in two distinct lines—one (1-2) the spiritual and the other, (3-8) the material which constitutes either the adjunct or the environment of the spiritual.⁵

These eight forms together with *Brahman* according to B., may be divided into three *rāśis*,⁶ in which we have the three-fold subject-matter of all religion and philosophy, viz., God, Soul and Matter.⁷

1. *Paramātma-rāśi*; This is the absolute *Brahman* and we have probably to include under this head the *antaryāmin* also, since it can be brought under neither of the remaining two *rāśis*.

2. *Mūrtāmūrta-rāśi*; This comprises the six material forms beginning with the *avyākṛta*. Its designation is derived from *Bṛ. Up.*, II. iii. where *mūrta* and *amūrta* are described as the two 'phases' of *Brahman*. According to Śaṅkara, the term *mūrta* here refers to *pṛthivī*, *ap* and *tejas* and the term *amūrta* to the remaining two—*ākāśa* and *vāyu*. B. understands these terms somewhat differently: *amūrta* means for him the *avyākṛta*, the source of the material world and *mūrta*, the last of the *bhūtas* to evolve from it,

¹ Cf. *Ibid.*, *Ṭīkā* on p. 447, st. 98.

² See e.g., *Nyāya-sūtra*, II. ii. 63. Rāmānuja for instance understands the term in this sense; cf. *Śrībhāṣya*, p. 32 (Bombay Sanskrit Series).

³ Probably *māhāsāmānya* is intended here as also *avāntarajātis*. See *Śloka-vārttika*, pp. 169 f.

⁴ Cf. *Vārttika*, p. 450, st. 117, and p. 432, st. 21; cf. also Vidyāraṇya's *Vārttikasāra*, p. 209, st. 149.

⁵ See *Vārttika*, p. 1007, st. 91. ⁶ Śaṅkara on *Bṛ. Up.*, II. iii. (p. 328.)

⁷ There is reference to this threefold evolution in Rāmānuja's com. on *V.S.*, II. iii. 17.

viz., *prthivī*, the intermediate 'elements' being describable secondarily as either *mūrta* or *amūrta*.¹

3. *jīva-rāśi*²: According to Śaṅkara, this does not form an independent category, for the *jīva* according to him is only *Brahman* in disguise and is therefore already included in (1). But B. regards it as a real transformation of *Brahman* and therefore counts it as a third *rāśi*. The determining factor of the *jīva* is its beginningless *vāsanās*³. These *vāsanās* are the characteristics, as in the *Sāṃkhya*, of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) which is evolved out of the *avyākṛta* and should therefore belong to (2). B. recognizes this; but at the same time he considers that they are transmitted to the *jīva* with which the *antaḥkaraṇa* is associated and thereby transform it into a 'knower' and 'enjoyer'⁴. The transference to the soul of what really belongs to Matter is accounted for on the analogy of fragrance which, though actually belonging to a flower, may be distilled into oil, for example⁵. The *jīva* thus is a real, though temporary, transformation of *Brahman* and is not the result purely of a misconception as in Śaṅkara's *Advaita*. B. also recognizes *avidyā* like Śaṅkara: but it accounts only for the lapse of *Brahman* into the *jīva*-condition of finitude and not also for its worldly life or *saṃsāra*⁶. Though springing from *Brahman*, *avidyā* does not affect the whole of it but only a part which thereby comes to be cut off, as it were, from *Brahman* and forgets its identity with it. *Avidyā* has accordingly its abode in the *jīva* and not in *Brahman*. The *jīva* is thus the result of two conditions—one, *avidyā* which delimits it (*pari-cchetri*) and the other, *vāsanā* which modifies it (*vikartri*)⁷. The second condition is sometimes stated as *āsaṅga*⁸ or 'attachment' since the *vāsanās* are eventually traceable to it.

¹ See *Vārttika*, II. iii. 72-80

² This *rāśi*, though described in somewhat different terms by Śaṅkara and Sureśvara is the *jīva* which word is explicitly used by Vidyāranya in his *Vārttikasāra*, p. 563 (Benares Edition).

³ I.e., the traces of previous *karma* and *jñāna*. See *Br. Up.*, IV. iv. 2, and the reference in note 6, p. 84.

⁴ *Antaḥkaraṇa* seems *nitya* here; *avidyā* is *āvaraṇa* only.

⁵ See *Vārttika*, p. 1012, st. 117-8. The word *vāsanā* indeed means 'perfuming'.

⁶ See *Vārttika*, p. 1154, st. 42, and p. 1156, st. 53.

⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 1156-7, st. 54-55. Compare *Ṭikā* on *Vārttika*, p. 1001, st. 53—*avidyā-karma-pūrva-prajñā-parīkṛtaḥ*.

⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 1156, st. 51, and p. 1163, st. 89. Śaṅkara traces 'attachment' itself to *avidyā*.

II

It seems necessary to differentiate in some sense or other between common and metaphysical knowledge; otherwise there would be no justification for any philosophic inquiry at all. Hence it becomes a matter of importance for a metaphysician to define the relation between these two kinds of knowledge. According to Śaṅkara, both are valid, but while common knowledge is so only for the purposes of everyday-life, the other, as known through the scripture, is absolutely valid.¹ Empirical knowledge thus stands on a lower footing than metaphysical knowledge. It is provisional and true only in a particular 'universe', so to speak. Any discrepancy between the two is to be explained by reference to the distinctive spheres to which they belong.² All empirical knowledge, for instance, presupposes variety but the scripture teaches unity; yet there is really no conflict between them, for empirical knowledge while it involves a reference to duality does not also vouch for its validity³. The view which B. took of this matter was altogether different. To him both empirical and revealed knowledge are equally valid and in exactly the same sense. Perception not only gives diversity but also validates it; for nothing that is properly ascertained by a *pramāṇa* can ever be otherwise than true.⁴ Moreover, the scripture itself confirms the truth of diversity in such of its portions as describe Creation⁵. And it very properly emphasizes in its purely metaphysical portions the unity underlying it which we commonly miss. B. accordingly concluded that *Brahman*, the ultimate Reality, should exhibit both the features and be a unity-in-diversity (*dvaitādvaita*)⁶. This view is termed *pramāṇa-samuccaya* by Ānanda-jñāna in one place⁷.

¹ See e.g., *Vārttika*, p. 249, st. 917 ff. Compare also *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, ch. vii.

² See Śaṅkara on *Bṛ. Up.*, II. i. 20 (p. 296): *Pramāṇāntaraviśayam eva hi pramāṇāntaram jñāpayati*. See also *Ṭīkā* on Śaṅkara's commentary, on *Bṛ. Up.*, I. iv. 7 (p. 121): *pratyakṣādīnāmanātma-viśayatvaccāgamasya bhinna-viśayakatayā nānayormitho virodhaḥ*.

³ See *Vārttika*, p. 265, st. 986, pp. 1962-4, st. 84-94.

⁴ See *Vārttika*, *Ṭīkā* on st. 36 (p. 1955): *svānubhavādvaitasyādvaitasya śruti-vaśāt (pramāṇyam)*.

⁵ See *Vārttika*, p. 1954, st. 32.

⁶ *Vārttika*, V. i. st. 30-36.

⁷ *Ibid.*, *Ṭīkā* on st. 913 (p. 248). This should not be confounded with *pramāṇa-samplava*, such for example as is described by Vātsyāyana in his commentary on *Nyāya-sūtras*, I. i. 3.

Śaṅkara explains the reference to variety in the Upaniṣads as a mere *anuvāda* of what is empirically known and so, as carrying no new authority with it. Thus he restricts the scope of the scripture, as an independent and primary *pramāṇa*, to the teaching of unity alone.

III

As the doctrine of unity is the specific teaching of the Upaniṣads, it is not only perceptual knowledge that is provisionally true, according to Śaṅkara, but also the subject-matter of the *karma-kāṇḍa* of the Veda. Hence one that desires to realise *Brahman* should rise above the notions of obligation implied in that *kāṇḍa* and renounce the world completely. B. follows here the same course as before and tries to co-ordinate the teachings of both the *kāṇḍas* recommending the combination of *jñāna* with *karma* for attaining *mokṣa*¹. In other words, *pramāṇa-samuccaya* on the theoretical side has for him its counterpart of *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* on the practical. Just as in the former case, neither Perception nor Revelation is alone to be taken as valid but both, so here also both *karma* and *jñāna* should be regarded as the means of *mokṣa*, for both alike are prescribed in the scripture. Śaṅkara too does not discard *karma*; but, as is well known, he is not a *samuccaya-vādin*. *Karma*, according to him is only indirectly or remotely useful in securing *mokṣa*. It is the means of *jñāna* which brings about *mokṣa*, unaided.

According to all Vedāntins, *virakti* or 'detachment' is necessary before one qualifies for *mokṣa*. But while Śaṅkara looks to *doṣa-darśana* in the objects of our desire as its means, B. considers that result as possible only through *bhoga*. It is only by learning, through actual experience, the real worth of all things that in one way or another minister to our desires that we can grow indifferent to them. This view is based upon a very ancient Indian theory known as *kāma-pradhvaṁsa-vāda*². The gradual exhaustion of *all*

¹ See *Vārttika*, pp. 768-9, st. 1700-1. Consult generally on this subject of *samuccaya*, *Vārttika*, I. iv. 1702 ff., III. ii. 41ff., and IV. iv. 719 ff.

² See for an account of this theory, *Vārttika*, p. 106, st. 343 ff. See also *Manu-smṛti*, ii. 94, which clearly contains a criticism of it. It is necessary to add that this was formulated not purely as an ethico-psychological theory but in the course of reconciling the teaching of the *karma-kāṇḍa*, with that of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*. *Yadypi bhogān na kāma-nivṛttiḥ tathāpi brahmānandaḥ śrutaḥ viśaya-kāmaṇi manmīkaroti tatas tat parityāgena brahma-sākṣātkaraṇe pravartate iti*

worldly enjoyment is obviously impossible;¹ but there is another course open to us according to the Upaniṣads and that is by attaining to *Sūtra-hood* and in that state participating in universal life. Nobody, according to B., can acquire genuine *virakti* who has not reached this state². Hence the first aim of a person that is desirous of liberation is to strive to reach this stage, by identifying himself, through *upāsana* as taught in the Upaniṣads, with the *Sūtra* or *Hiraṇya-garbha* and carrying on simultaneously the *nitya-karmas* enjoined in the scripture³. This is the first kind of *samuccaya*. It leads to *apavarga*⁴ or 'escape from *saṁsāra*', which B. viewed as distinct from *mokṣa* though on the way to it. The soul that has so far succeeded will not be born again, for it has given up all narrow attachment, and its condition then is described as *antarālāvasthā*, (i.e., a condition intermediate between *saṁsāra* and *mokṣa*). It is there free from all the ills of life. Though the baleful influences of attachment (*āsaṅga*), one of its two limiting factors, have then been overcome, the *jīva* has not yet realized its true nature, for *avidyā*, the other factor, persists separating it from *Brahman*⁵. For accomplishing this further end of overcoming *avidyā*, *samuccaya* again is necessary. The precise nature of this second *samuccaya*, however, is unfortunately not quite clear. One element in it is certain. The *jīva* has so far identified itself with only *Hiraṇya-garbha*, a part of *Brahman*; and it has now to realize it as a part thereof. In other words the oneness of the *jīva* with *Brahman*—not merely with *Hiraṇya-garbha*—is to be known, as taught in *Ahaṁ brahma asmi*. This knowledge is *vidyā*. But it is not regarded as sufficient by itself to destroy *avidyā* and is required to be combined with meditation

āśaṅkyāha apy ānandaḥ śrutah sākṣāt etc. *mānenāviṣayīkṛta ityaśyāyam arthaḥ anupabhukta iti na punar ajñāta iti | śabdāpratīter iti |—Āraṇyaka-vṛtti-sambandhokti* (Madras MSS. Lib., R. 2755), Vol. I. p. 80. For *prapañca-vilāpana*, see Śaṅkara on *V.S.*, III. 2. 21.

¹ This is to [attain] final calm by satiety rather than self-conquest—to outlive one's passions, not master them.

² See *Vārttika*, p. 778, st. 1761.

³ See Śaṅkara on *Br. Up.*, I. iv. 10 (p. 151); also *Ṭikā* on *Vārttika*, p. 659, st. 1128-9, and *Br. Up.*, I. i. and ii.

⁴ Cf. Śaṅkara on *Br. Up.*, III. ii. 13 (p. 416): *apavargākhyāmantarālāvasthām*.

⁵ Śaṅkara on *Br. Up.*, III. ii. 13 (p. 416). *Vārttika*, p. 770, st. 1713, p. 1154 st. 42.

upon the *sūtra* once again¹. The object of this second element in the *samuccaya* is not manifest. It is introduced probably because it is thought that the knowledge of *Ahaṁ brahma asmi*, while it may lead to the conviction that all spirit is one, leaves out of account the entire physical universe. Hence also probably the statement that the meditation now on the *sūtra* (i.e., the adjunct of *Hiraṇyagarbha*) should be, not merely as a *finite effect* as in the previous stage, but as one with the infinite *Brahman*, its cause². It seems that *karma* also has to be performed here as in the case of the previous *samuccaya* but in a totally different spirit—not as a means to an end, but, like all else, as one with *Brahman*³. The doer, the deed, its means and its end are all *Brahman*, for *Brahman* is the sole reality. Thus for *apavarga* as well as for *mokṣa*, *samuccaya* is necessary according to B.

IV

A distinguishing feature of Śaṅkara's doctrine is that self-realization is attained *directly* through revealed texts like *Tat tvam asi*, for he believes that verbal statements also may yield immediate knowledge⁴. According to B⁵, and also according to all other Indian logicians, verbal statements, whether revealed or not, can never lead to immediate knowledge. Thus from the formula *Tat tvam asi* only mediate knowledge is possible; but it is not adequate to destroy our *immediate* belief in the truth of mere diversity, until it also has been transformed into immediate knowledge. The means of doing this is constant meditation (termed *prasamkhyāna*, *bhāvanā*, *dhyāna*, etc.)⁶ upon it. It is only when one successfully carries out this meditation that one can realize the self. While B. like Śaṅkara admits the aid of the scripture as essential for knowing the ultimate truth, he considers that scriptural knowledge has to be supplemented by meditation. It is the result of such meditation that we have to understand from

¹ Ibid., p. 770. st. 1709. *Samuccayaadvayam tvayābhyeva gamyate hiraṇyagarbhopāśanasya nitya-naimittikakarmanā saha ekah| samuccayaḥ dvītiyas tu hiraṇyagarbhopāśanasya kāraṇopāśanayā saha |—Āraṇyaka-vṛtti-sambandhokti*, Vol. II, p. 140.

² Cf. *Vārttika*, p. 769, st. 1703.

³ See e.g., *Vārttika*, p. 179, st. 1706-7, cf. *Bhagavadgīta*, iv. 24.

⁴ See e.g., *Vārttika*, p. 64, st. 206.

⁵ Ibid., p. 1837, st. 708.

⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 623, st. 948; p. 1837, st. 706 ff. See also Śaṅkara on *Br. Up.* (p. 190).

the *Vidyā* of the second *samuccaya* referred to above and not a mere intellectual apprehension of the truth of *Ahaṁ brahma asmi* or *Tat tvam asi*. If *bhāvanā* is thus necessary for securing *mokṣa* and if the need for it, which is a *kriyā*, i.e., something to be done, is known only through the scripture, the two *kāṇḍas* of the Veda are drawn together more closely here than in Śaṅkara's *Advaita*. As in the *karma-kāṇḍa* we find injunctions about sacrificial acts, so in the Upaniṣads we find, according to B., injunctions about meditative acts. Śaṅkara makes a vital distinction between *jñāna* and *bhāvanā* or *upāsana*; and while he regards the latter as *kriyā* and admits 'vidhi' in respect of it, he uncompromisingly denies that the former is either a *kriyā* or requires a *vidhi*¹. A consequence of this difference of view is that statements like *Tat tvam asi* which are of the first importance in Śaṅkara's *Advaita* are useful in B.'s doctrine only as supplying the theme for meditation and statements like *Ātmānam eva lokam-upāsita*² take precedence of them.

V

So far we have recounted the more important doctrines of B. as they can be gathered chiefly from the writings of Śaṅkara and commentaries on them. There, however, remains an important point to be mentioned yet. Sureśvara in more than one place in his *Vārttika* tries to explain B.'s view-point as in effect the same as Śaṅkara's and represents B. as a *vivarta-vādin* instead of a *pariṇāma-vādin*³. Whatever of the latter view we find in B. is to be explained, according to Sureśvara, as only a provisional solution of the ultimate philosophical problem, exactly as it is the case in Śaṅkara's *Advaita*. It seems strange that if B. did teach such a doctrine, Śaṅkara should have subjected it to so severe and so frequent a criticism. Sureśvara is not unaware of this objection, and, raising it in his *Vārttika*,⁴ answers it by saying that what Śaṅkara intended to controvert was not B.'s view but rather his view as expounded by some of his followers⁵. Generally speaking, however, Śaṅkara's criticism appears to be directed against B. himself. However that may be, one point becomes clear from this, viz., that B. was long anterior to Śaṅkara and

¹ See e.g., Śaṅkara on *Vedānta-sūtras*, I. i. 4.

² *Br. Up.*, I. iv. 15.

³ See e.g., *Ṭikā* on *Vārttika*, p. 666, st. 1164.

⁴ See *Vārttika*, p. 666, st. 1165. ⁵ See *Vārttika*, p. 1593, *Ṭikā* on 1203-4.

Sureśvara; for B.'s teaching by then had been, in certain respects, forgotten¹. Another fact of importance is that Sureśvara thought it worth his while to cite B. in his favour. Whatever B. might have taught, it is clear that his name carried weight with the Vedāntins at the time; and the expounders of Vedānta found it useful to quote his authority in support of their own views. This attitude of regard on the part of Sureśvara bears out the relative antiquity of B. With the information available, it seems, we may also determine the superior limit of his date. In the very beginning of passage 10 of *Br. Up.* (I. iv.), the word *brahma* occurs and Śaṅkara in his commentary notices two interpretations of this word, both of which he discards before giving his own explanation of it. Ānanda-jñāna in his gloss refers the first of these to the *Vṛtti-kāra*, and the other to B.² In his gloss on the corresponding passage in the *Vārttika*,³ he makes the *Vṛtti-kāra*'s view the *pūrva-pakṣa* or *prima facie* view leading to B.'s interpretation. If it thus involves a reference to the view of the *Vṛtti-kāra*, it follows that B. should have flourished after him⁴.

This is perhaps the best place to allude to a point of some biographical interest touching B. He seems to have been a devotee of *Agni-vaiśvānara*⁵ and Sureśvara has more than once a gibe at him in reference to it⁶. But it is not clear what exactly is the significance of this allusion. It may be that it refers to what was a noticeable feature of B.'s creed in life; for his doctrine, as we know, lays stress on the importance of *Hiraṇya-garbha*—identifiable with Agni⁷—in the penultimate stage of a Vedāntin's training. Further since Sureśvara pointedly draws attention to a *vara* or 'boon' received by B. through the *prasāda* or 'grace' of

¹ In note 4, p. 80, it was stated that B.'s commentary was in all probability known to Sureśvara and even to Ānanda-jñāna. This need not clash with the present statement that B.'s doctrine, in some of its details, was differently understood by different interpreters at the time. Witness variations of view among the followers of Śaṅkara regarding his teaching.

² See *Ṭikā* on *Br. Up. Bhāṣya* (p. 152).

³ P. 671, st. 1189.

⁴ The suggestion of T. M. Tripathi in his Introduction (p. xv) that B. is the *Vṛtti-kāra* is thus beside the mark. (See note 1, p. 79.)

⁵ This is merely the personification of *tejas*—the first creation, *Ch. Up.*, VI.

ii. 3.

⁶ Cf. for example, *Vārttika*, I. iv. 490, 700, 701, etc.

⁷ See *Br. Up.*, I. i and ii, as also I. iv. 15.

*Agni*¹, we may also probably conclude that B. recognized in some form the doctrine of *bhakti* — a doctrine which does not find any considerable place in Śaṅkara's *Advaita*.

VI

The resemblance between the *Sāṃkhya* and the doctrine of B. is noteworthy. There is, of course, this important distinction that while B.'s Vedānta is monistic and idealistic, the *Sāṃkhya* is dualistic and realistic. Barring this distinction, there is a general similarity in the philosophic standpoint of the two. Both are theories of *pariṇāma*, though in the *Sāṃkhya*, it is the *Prakṛti* that evolves, and here it is *Brahman*. In the process of evolution, according to both, the ultimate reality becomes differentiated into the manifold things of experience which are both identical with and different from it. The parallelism extends beyond this general standpoint to details also:

1. Though the conception of the *antaryāmin* can have no place in atheistic *Sāṃkhya*, it has something more or less corresponding to it in the sister system of *Yoga*.² The *sākṣins* of B. are practically the *Puruṣas* of the *Sāṃkhya* and the *avyākṛta*, its *Prakṛti*. The *sūtra* again may be identified with *mahat*,³ since as *buddhi*, it is the pre-eminent element in the *linga-śarīra*, though for a complete equivalent of it we shall have to take along with it the eleven *indriyas* (*devatās*)⁴ and the five *tanmātras*. When the gross elements emerge from the last, we have the *virāj*—the visible vesture of the cosmic soul. This comparison, it will be noticed, breaks down in the case of two of the eight *avasthās* recognized by B., and only one out of the twenty-five principles known to the *Sāṃkhya*. The lack of anything corresponding to *jāti* and *pinḍa* in the *Sāṃkhya* system is significant. It has in all probability to be explained by the supposition that, while B.'s scheme includes not only the *samaṣṭi-sṛṣṭi* but also the *vyasta-sṛṣṭi*, the *Sāṃkhya*

¹ See *Vārttika*, p. 1164, st. 98, p. 1236, st. 136. Compare generally in this connection the speculations contained in the *Agni-rahasya* (*Śatapatha Br.*, X.), wherein also occurs the name of Śaṅḍilya associated from very early times with the doctrine of *bhakti*.

² Cf. *Vārttika*, p. 1286, st. 38.

³ The *Mādhara-Vṛtti*, for instance, equates *mahat* with *Hiraṇya-garbhā*. See under *Kārikā*, 22, Benares Edition.

⁴ See *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, II. 18.

concerns itself only with one of them. This deficiency in the *Sāṃkhya* scheme throws light on what has always been a matter of some perplexity to scholars, viz., whether its *tattvas* are cosmic or individual¹. The comparison here instituted suggests that the whole of the *Sāṃkhya* scheme is in reality cosmic only and that the adjuncts of the individual *Puruṣas*—their subtle and gross bodies—are further *pariṇāmas* as *jāli* and *piṇḍa* are from *virāj*. If this conjecture is right, it will be easy to see that the dropping of the idea of the cosmic soul, at some stage, transformed an originally cosmic scheme of *tattvas*² into one having reference to individuals only and the introduction into the evolutionary series of *aham-kāra*³, to which nothing corresponds in B.'s doctrine, led to the definite emergence of classical *Sāṃkhya*. The word *mahat* with its cosmic significance though often replaced by *buddhi*—the adjunct of an individual—is still there to disclose the course of this transformation.

2. A familiar point in the *Sāṃkhya* doctrine is what is known as *prakṛti-laya*,⁴ which is the designation for the condition reached by one that has succeeded in realising the nature of *Prakṛti* but has not distinguished it from *Puruṣa*. In this condition the *Puruṣa* has neither pain nor pleasure, and so far, it agrees with what B. terms *antarālāvasthā*, to which allusion has been made already. There may be points of difference between the two, but the coincidence is still striking.

3. Both according to the *Sāṃkhya* and the doctrine of B. the knowledge of the ultimate truth—acquired in the one case mainly through Reason and in the other mainly through Revelation—is only mediate; and this knowledge, being, as already stated, not adequate to remove the wrong convictions on which our empirical activity is founded, has in both cases to be transformed into immediate knowledge through meditation.⁵

4. The *Sāṃkhya* describes the evolution of *Prakṛti* as designed to bring about *bhoga* or *apavarga*. The emphasis laid upon *bhoga* as a preliminary to *apavarga* may suggest a kinship with the

¹ See, for example, Max Müller's *Six Systems*, pp. 246-7; Deussen: *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 242 ff.

² See *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, iii. 9-10.

³ Cf. Deussen: *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 243.

⁴ See *Kārikā*, 45. *Sāṃkhya-pravacana*, ii. 54.

⁵ See *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 64.

kāma-pradhvaṁsa-vāda as in the case of B.'s doctrine. But in the form in which the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* teaching has come down to us, *virakti* is explicitly traced, as in Śaṅkara's *Advaita*, to *doṣa-darśana* in the objects of our desire.¹ Hence we cannot point to this as another feature common to the two doctrines we are considering. But it probably suggests some original connection of the *Sāṃkhya* with the theory of *kāma-pradhvaṁsa*.

We may conclude by drawing attention to the confirmation which this inquiry brings to the conclusion already reached by some like Deussen, that the *Sāṃkhya* is an off-shoot of the teaching of the Upaniṣads. We may assume that there was from very early times a dualistic interpretation of those works like the monistic one. This view also by the way satisfactorily accounts for the comparatively large number of references to the *Sāṃkhya* in the *Sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa*. It would perhaps be not far from correct to say that one of the foremost aims—albeit a negative one—of *Bādarāyaṇa* in composing the *Vedānta-sūtras* was to refute the view that the realistic and dualistic *Sāṃkhya* was the teaching of the Upaniṣads.

¹ See *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya*, iv. 27-8 and *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya*, ii. 15.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BHEDĀBHEDA¹

I am contributing this Foreword at the desire of Prof. Srinivasacharya, but I altogether fail to see the need for it in the case of a book written by one whose studies in Indian philosophy, like those relating to Rāmānuja and Bhāskara, are so well known.

The main purpose of the present work is to give an account of that school of Vedānta philosophy which admits the truth of what is known as the principle of *bhedābheda*. The expression *bhedābheda* does not bear precisely the same significance in all the schools that make use of it, but it may generally be taken to indicate a belief that *bheda* or 'distinction' and *abheda* or 'unity' can co-exist and be in intimate relation with each other. Substance and attribute, universal and particular, whole and parts may seem to be different from, or even opposed to, each other, but really there is no incompatibility between them, for they can be reconciled in a unity which pervades the difference and is its very being. This view is sometimes described also as *pariṇāma-vāda* or 'theory of development' implying that reality, conceived as *bhinnābhinna*, is not static but is continually changing and that it yet maintains its identity throughout. Such a theory is to some a direct violation of the law of contradiction and is to be rejected as a fallacy. In their opinion, it only restates the problem to be solved and, by a certain verbal adroitness, makes it appear as the solution. But to others the theory, helped probably by its paradoxical character, makes an irresistible appeal. Whatever may be its true logical value, this principle of explanation underlies a good deal of Indian thought. Amongst the doctrines not falling within the strict limits of Vedic teaching it appears, for example, in the *Śāṃkhya-Yoga*. It is also found in the purely orthodox school of *Mīmāṃsā* splitting it up into two branches, one of which adheres staunchly to this mode of explanation and the other denounces it equally staunchly. The same observation holds good of the Vedānta; and while we have Vedāntins who pin their faith on it, there are others who are never tired of assailing it. But the principle as it appears in the Vedānta differs in one important

¹ Foreword to *The Philosophy of Bhedābheda*. P. N. Srinivasachari, M.A. Srinivasavaradachari & Co., Madras, 1934.

respect from the same as it appears elsewhere. The diverse elements of the universe are only partially reconciled in the other systems, for the application of the principle is restricted in them at some point or other. Thus the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* though it explains the whole of Nature as a unity in totality, does not extend that explanation to the realm of Spirit and therefore leaves the dualism of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* unresolved in the end. The principle suffers no such restriction here; and the result is the affirmation of the *sole* reality of *Brahman*. It is the one source of all that exists, and the whole world is an actual manifestation of it. This variety of the Vedāntic doctrine is known as *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*; and, when one remembers that '*Brahman*' is the Upaniṣadic word for 'spirit', its general resemblance, we may add by the way, to Hegel's philosophy of the Absolute, becomes clear. Whether such a view of the ultimate Reality is in accordance with the teaching of the Upaniṣads, we cannot say. But it is not at all difficult for an adherent of the view to claim their support for it. It is well known that these ancient scriptures, though they emphasize the unity of Being, sometimes distinguish *Brahman* from the individual self on the one hand, and from the physical universe on the other. This may be only an apparent discrepancy as those who look upon the Upaniṣads as literally the 'word of God' maintain. Nevertheless the discrepancy has somehow to be explained, and the easiest way to do it is to assign equal validity to the two teachings. That will yield the *bhedābhedā* view; and the ultimate Reality, as taught in the Upaniṣads, will be neither a bare unity nor a mere plurality but a vital synthesis of both.

This version of Vedānta—the one with which we are concerned here—has its own distinctions. All of them agree, no doubt, in holding that *Brahman* changes or *becomes*; but, as set forth so fully and clearly in the following pages, they differ in the manner in which they explain its relation to the individual self and to the objective universe. The doctrine is also very old and, in some form, was probably known to Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the *Vedānta-sūtras*. The foremost among its early exponents, so far as we know at present, was Bharṭṛ-prapañca, none of whose works, however, has come down to us. Śaṅkara, though he never mentions him by name, often criticizes his view; and, chiefly as a result of his criticism, the *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda* lost its attraction once for all for the Indian Mind. Weaker echoes of it were heard once or

twice in later times, but they soon died away. As a consequence, the doctrine, in its various phases, is little known now. Prof. Srinivasacharya has done a great service to Indian philosophy by bringing it to light, and giving an admirable exposition of it in the present volume. The exposition is followed by a critical estimate of the value of the doctrine in comparison with other Vedantic views and with the views of Western philosophers. The book deserves the careful attention of all that are interested in Indian thought, and particularly of those that wish to study the Vedānta in its several bearings.

DEFINITION OF BRAHMAN

It is usual to find in advaitic works a twofold definition of Brahman—one called *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* and the other *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*. This distinction is apt to be taken as peculiar to the Advaita doctrine; but there is nothing in the terms to restrict them to that doctrine or to make them applicable exclusively to Brahman. They are of almost universal application, and practically all things can be defined in both the ways. It may, therefore, be useful to say a few words about the nature of these definitions, and point out the exact difference between them.

The object of defining a thing is to differentiate it from everything else; and this result is attained generally by reference to a property that is distinctive of it.¹ To give the stock example, a cow is defined by reference to the dewlap (*sāsnā*)—a feature which is found in all animals of the species and in none other. This is an instance of *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*, for the defining characteristic is an essential feature or a part of the nature of the animal defined. It will serve our present purpose better to take another example. Let us think of a village in which there is only one house that is built of bricks, the rest being all huts or mud houses. Now, we may define it by reference to this character, and the definition will enable any one to identify the house correctly. This is also an instance of *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*, for 'being built of bricks' forms an essential feature of the house.

The above, however, is not the only way of distinguishing the house in question from others. If we suppose that there is some kind of tree, say a mango tree, just by the side of the house and that no other house in the village is similarly characterized, then that mark will suffice to define the house. This definition, or more properly description, equally well helps in the identification of the house. The mark here, however, is not a part of the nature of the house, but is external to it. The definition is accordingly designated as *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*, literally 'definition by reference to a nearby circumstance or an accidental feature.'

¹ This is *vyāvṛtti* or 'differentiation.' There is also another purpose of definition, viz., *vyavahāra*, or fixing the meaning of a term for the sake of conveying an idea to others, which we are not taking into account here.

One advantage in this variety of definition is that it serves to identify the house (through appeal to memory), even when the mark has disappeared from the locality.¹ There is an important distinction between the two types of definition which we should bear in mind. While both alike differentiate the thing defined from the rest, the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* alone gives us a notion of its character.

In some cases, however, the first of these *lakṣaṇas* is not possible. Let us take the case of a primary colour like 'red'. It cannot be defined by means of its intrinsic character, for 'red-ness,' which is its sole *distinctive* feature, is obviously of no help in doing so. In such cases, the only course open to us is to describe it in the other way. We may do so, for example, by indicating its precise place in the prismatic spectrum. That would be a *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*, since it identifies the colour by reference not to its essential nature but to its relation to elements external to it in a connected system of colours.

There are cases in which neither of these definitions is possible; and a pre-eminent example of it is the supreme Brahman as taught in Advaita.² No *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* is conceivable of it because, though Brahman is not without its own essence, it has no characteristics by means of which it may be defined. For, according to the doctrine, it is *nirguṇa* or altogether without attributes. Nor is the other type of definition feasible for, by hypothesis, Brahman is the sole reality and there is nothing outside it. But for purposes of teaching or expounding the doctrine, a definition of Brahman is necessary since, without a general idea of it, no inquiry into its nature (*jijñāsā*) can be instituted. The work of reason presupposes some knowledge of the thing reasoned about. *Lakṣaṇa-pramāṇābhyām hi vastu-siddhiḥ*.³ Hence the Advaitin has devised means to define Brahman in both the above ways. But before

¹ Sometimes the two *lakṣaṇas* are distinguished from each other on this basis of separable connection: *Taṭastha-lakṣaṇam nāma yāvalakṣya-kālam anavasthitatve sati yad vyāvartakam tad eva. (Vedānta-paribhāṣā, vii)*. We have based the distinction here on the circumstance whether the mark is or is not a part of the nature of the thing defined; *Taṭasthatvam ca lakṣyasvarūpa-bahirbhūtatvam*. See *Siddhānta-leśa-saṃgraha* (com.), p. 53, Kumbhakonam Ed.

² *Sūnyā* or the Absolute of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism would be another instance of it.

³ Cf. Aristotle: 'Definition is the beginning and the end of all knowledge.'

describing those ways, it is necessary to draw attention to an important principle underlying the advaitic inquiry as a whole.

All philosophy starts from experience. But it is usually assumed that the data of experience, if they are to lead to right conclusions, should stand for actual facts or be valid. This is not admitted by the Advaitin as necessary; and he illustrates his position by examples like the false image of a person, reflected in a mirror, being the means of showing to him what is true about his appearance.¹ That is, the Advaitin attaches no necessary ontological significance to the data that serve as the bases of reasoning. He begins his inquiry, taking them at their face value, and leaves their validity or invalidity to reveal itself in the course of the inquiry or as its result. This is the meaning of the distinction of *prasiddha* and *pramāṇa-siddha* among them, which is sometimes made in advaitic works.² The former are mere reiterations (*anuvāda*) of common beliefs, and are not demonstrated truths like the latter. They are psychologically given, but are not logically established. In other words, *kalpita* factors may, according to Advaita, be as fruitful in philosophic inquiry³ as actual ones. Or, as it is somewhat differently stated, empirical facts, though they are not finally true, may be the means of leading us to transcendental truth.

This method of utilizing untested beliefs is extended to the field of definition also. To explain how it is done, we shall go back to the example of the house. We may describe it, say, as 'haunted,' if there is a popular belief to that effect in the neighbourhood and there is no other house with the same evil repute in the village. The definition will serve to identify the house quite as well as either of the two given above but it does not necessarily mean that the person who defines it thus, or he for whose sake the definition is framed, believes in the actual existence of ghosts. The Advaitin defines Brahman on similar lines:

¹ See Śaṅkara on *Vedānta-sūtra*, II. i. 14, and cf. *Vākya-pāṭi*, ii. 240: *Asatye vartmani sthītvā tataḥ satyaṁ samīhate*. It may appear that the *jñāna* is real here; although its object may be false. But knowledge without reference to its object is a mere abstraction. Or, as the Advaitin puts it, the former cannot be real when the latter is not so. Strictly, it is not *jñāna* at all, according to him, but *jñānābhāsa*. See *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, i. 9. ² See e.g., *ibid.*, p. 2.

³ It is clear that this principle does not apply to the realm of being, and does not therefore mean that unreal causes can give rise to real effects.

(1) It is a common belief that the world is an effect which owes its existence to God. The Advaitin, utilizing this belief, defines Brahman as the cause of the world; and he thereby distinguishes it from entities like Prakṛti and atoms which are regarded as the source of the world by other schools of thought. The definition merely means that there would be no world but for Brahman, and does not imply that the one has *actually* emerged from the other. The true nature of the relation between the two is to be known through investigation¹. It is *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa* in that the characteristic of being the cause of the world (*kāraṇatva*) does not, according to Advaita, really pertain to Brahman. This is how the second *sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa—*janmādyasya yataḥ*—is explained by Śaṅkara.

(2) It will be seen that the above definition only marks off Brahman from certain entities, but does not give us any notion of the actual nature of Brahman. That can be done, as stated above, by the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of Brahman. It also is framed in a similar way. Phenomena like knowledge (*cit*) and bliss (*ānanda*) are often explained as qualities of the self; and they are usually taken to characterize God also, who is the highest self. The Advaitin starts from this common conviction, and describes Brahman as their substrate. All that he does thereby is to convey to us the idea that Brahman is spiritual in its nature. Whether it is their substrate, in fact, is left to be determined by subsequent inquiry. According to the advaitic conclusion, as it is well known, none of them, as such, is a fact. The single or non-dualistic Brahman merely *appears* to possess these qualities by association with the *antaḥkāraṇa*². Really, therefore, they are manifestations through an imperfect medium, or limited revelations, of Brahman; and, though they cannot in themselves represent its nature which is infinite knowledge and infinite bliss, they are fitted to give us a 'conjectural insight' into it as, for instance, limited space, which is what we know, may enable us to get an idea of infinite space.

This twofold way of defining Brahman, it is pointed out, has the support of the Upaniṣads. In the third section of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, for example, Varuṇa, in teaching his son, Bhṛgu, the

¹ Primarily this means a rational consideration of the teaching of the scriptures.

² Cf. *Ānando viśayānubhavo nityatvam iti santi dharmāḥ aprthaktve'pi caitanyāt prthag iva avabhāsante: Pañca-pādikā* (p. 4).

nature of Brahman, starts with its *taṭastha-lakṣaṇa*: 'That verily from which all these beings are born; by which, when born, they live; and into which they pass at death—that is Brahman.' Bhṛgu is then taken through a succession of inadequate conceptions of the ultimate reality, like matter (*anna*) and unconscious life (*prāṇa*); and the teaching culminates in the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of Brahman which refers, though but indirectly, to its very essence, viz., bliss (*ānanda*): 'From bliss all these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they live; and into bliss they pass at death'.¹ Only the Advaitin, as the result of his reading of the scriptures, regards the defining characteristics in both cases as *kalpita* or fancied.

¹ As another form of *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of Brahman may be instanced *Prajñānam Brahma* (*Aitareya Upaniṣad*).

EXTRA NOTES

1. *Sāsnādimatī gauḥ*. This is *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*, in one sense, since the two are equivalent in denotation (*abhinna*). There is no *ādhārādheyabhāva* as in what may be called *dharma-lakṣaṇa*. The latter is when we say that *sāsnā* is the *lakṣaṇa*. Similarly in the case of *gandhavatī pṛthivī* and *gandha*. *Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* in this sense is not considered in the article.

2. *Svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* may also be exemplified by *jñānam brahma*, where *jñāna* stands for *svarūpa-jñāna* and not *dharma*. This is *svarūpaṃ eva lakṣaṇam*, the *eva* excludes *dharma*. It means *itarānirūpyam lakṣaṇam*. Then it should be explained negatively (*apohavidhayā*). This sense too is not taken into account in the article.

3. It may appear that the *tatastha-lakṣaṇa* can apply only to particulars. Really it is not so. The example of red colour given in the article is a class.

4. *Ānanda* as a *dharma-lakṣaṇa*, i.e., *kalpita-dharma-lakṣaṇa* is countenanced by *VP. vii*. See *VS. III. iii. 11*: *ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya*.

5. See *Taitt. Up. iii*. According to other Vedāntins, both the *dharma*s, viz., *jagat-kāraṇatva* and *ānanda-guṇakatva* would be actual and signify *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* in the ordinary sense.

ADVAITIC CONCEPTION OF TIME

It is well known that Advaitins differ among themselves in regard to several points relating to their doctrine; and it may appear strange that they should do so, when all of them alike claim to be the followers of one and the same teacher, Śaṅkara. Appayya Dikṣita explains, in the beginning of his *Siddhānta-leśa-saṁgraha* that these differences of view do not matter, because they relate to the details of the doctrine and not to the central conclusion of it, viz., the identity or, more strictly, the non-duality of the individual self and Brahman. We propose to refer here to the divergence of opinion among Advaitins in respect of one such detail, viz., Time. At least *four* distinct views can be traced about it in extant advaitic works. Only one of them, as we shall see, has the approval of Śaṅkara: yet the others are not rejected, since they do not affect the main point of the doctrine.

(1) The first view is what Śaṅkara himself states in his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*¹. According to it, Time is an effect (*kārya*) of *avidyā* or *māyā* like Space. That is, it is not primary. This view makes Time objective in the sense in which all effects of *avidyā* are, viz., that they are not construction of the individual's mind. It also means that temporal relations are irrelevant not only to Brahman but also to *avidyā*², taken by itself. Again, being an effect, Time must have a beginning as well as an end. It may be said that it is difficult to think of a beginning or an end in regard to Time, for all thought presupposes it. But this difficulty is only to be expected since, as an effect of *avidyā*, it is merely an empirical reality. All empirical objects are riddled with such inconsistencies, and it is just for this reason that they are described as 'appearances'. They are quite familiar to us, but yet we cannot give a coherent account of them.

(2) The second view is that Time is not an effect of *avidyā*, but is the relation between it and spirit or Brahman. It is

¹ *Etena dik-kāla-manah-paramāṇvādinām kāryatvam vyākhyātam* (II. iii. 7). The same is the significance of *saṁvatsaro vai Prajāpatiḥ* (*Prāśna Up.* i. 9). See also *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-Stotra*, st. 2.

² Cf. the description of *avyākṛta* as *kālāparicchedya* in the *Bhāṣya* on *Māṇḍūkya Up.* 1.

referred to in the *Vana-mālā*¹, a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. Time thus falls outside *avidyā*, unlike the rest of the physical universe including Space. It is not accordingly conceived here as co-ordinate with Space, as it is in the previous view. But though Time does not fall within *avidyā*, it is dependent upon it which is one of the relata it relates. That is, it is not given by itself. The significance of this view is that Time is beginningless although it has an end and ceases to be, along with *avidyā*, when right knowledge is acquired. Further, it is false (*mithyā*) because one of the relata, viz., *avidyā* is so, and the relation between reality and appearance must necessarily be an appearance.

(3) The third view identifies Time with *avidyā* and is mentioned by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Siddhānta-bindu*², which is a commentary on what is known as the *Daśa-śloki*, a work ascribed to Śaṅkara. Madhusūdana might have meant his statement to be understood literally; but, in view of Sureśvara's description of Time as a *śakti* (i.e., *kriyā-śakti*)³, we may perhaps take it to mean that Time is an aspect of *avidyā*, and not identical with it. That is, it is the dynamic aspect of *avidyā*. Since *avidyā* and Brahman must be thought of as related so long as we reckon them as two, we should assume that the present view admits that relation in *addition to* Time.

(4) The last view takes Time to be an aspect (*rūpa-bheda*) of Brahman itself. It also is referred to in the *Vana-mālā*⁴ already mentioned, but is there traced to the authority of the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*. Since Brahman, according to Advaita, excludes all diversity, Time is to be explained, in this view, as identical with it, like *sat* and *cit*. Like them, it is not what characterizes Brahman but is the very essence of it. That is, by Time here we have to understand eternity. In the three views so far considered, it is in one sense or other connected with the principle of becoming; here it is identical with the principle of Being. In other words, *Kāla* is changing time in all those cases, but it

¹ *Cidavidyā-sambandhaḥ kālāḥ*, p. 121 (Sri Vani Vilasa Press, Srirangam).

² *Kālas tu avidyāiva*, p. 180 (Kumbhakonam Edition).

³ Cf. st. 14 of his *Mānasollāsa* on st. 2 of the *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-Stotra*. It is there ascribed to Īśvara; but that, according to Advaita, is virtually to ascribe it to *avidyā*.

⁴ p. 121.

is changeless eternity here in which, as Eckhart says, there is no before or after. It is this 'aspect' of Brahman, we should add, that appears as phenomenal time, when viewed from the empirical standpoint.

The common aim of the first three explanations is to show that time and change are transcended in the ultimate Reality. The last view implies that the Advaita doctrine has no objection to regard it as real and ultimate, provided its conception is transformed into that of eternity.

WHAT IS SAMAVĀYA?

The conception of *samavāya* is described as the corner-stone of the Vaiśeṣika in modern works on that system of philosophy¹. While the description shows that the importance of *samavāya* is recognized, the terms employed in rendering it into English such as 'inherence',² 'inhesion',³ 'inseparable relation'⁴ and 'intimate union'⁵ raise a doubt whether its exact nature is well understood. The object of this paper is to endeavour to determine its nature and to seek for a parallel to it, if any, in the other systems of Indian philosophy which may help us to discover its true meaning. That *samavāya* is a relation is clear enough; but it is not the only relation admitted in the system, there being others like *saṁyoga*, *vibhāga*, *paratva*, *aparatva*, etc., and until we interpret *samavāya* in reference to them, we cannot claim to have understood it completely. It is not possible however within the short compass of this paper to deal with the several relations recognized in the Vaiśeṣika. So we shall select *saṁyoga* as typical of them, alluding to the others only in a general way. We propose also to consider the question, as far as possible, in the light of the distinction made in modern philosophy between external and internal relations.

The relation of *saṁyoga*, it is stated, holds exclusively between *dravyas*⁶ while that of *samavāya* is found not only between *dravyas*—though only when they satisfy a special condition, as we shall see—but also between *guṇa*, *karma*, *jāti* and *viśeṣa* and entities to which they may belong⁷. The relation involved for instance in 'hat on the head' or 'cloth in the jar' is *saṁyoga*; but that between the 'cloth' and the 'threads' out of which it is

¹ Cf. *Tarka-saṁgraha*, pp. 98-99 (Bombay Sanskrit Series, 1918).

² Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 196.

³ Gough, Translation of *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, p. 4 (Benares Ed.).

⁴ Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 332.

⁵ *Tarka-saṁgraha*, Eng. Translation, p. 96 (Bombay Sanskrit Series, 1918).

⁶ See *Dinakarīya* on the *Muktāvalī*, p. 85 (Nirn. Sag. Ed., 1916).

⁷ These would be the following: *dravya* and *guṇa*, *dravya* and *karma*, ultimate *dravya* and *viśeṣa*, and *vyakti* ('particular') and *jāti* ('universal'). The last again may be of three sorts—*dravya* and *jāti*, *guṇa* and *jāti*, *karma* and *jāti*.

made or between the 'rose' and its 'redness' is *samavāya*. That is, while *saṁyoga* obtains only between objects of one particular order, *samavāya* may be found between objects of the same or of different order. We shall refer later to *samavāya* of the former kind, viz., that between two *dravyas*, and shall, for the present, restrict our observations to the latter. Now in the example of *saṁyoga* given above, viz., 'cloth in the jar', the objects may or may not be related in the manner indicated by the preposition 'in'. They are seen separate before they are conjoined and again, when they are disjoined, they continue to be so. In both cases alike each object, at least according to Vaiśeṣika, remains in itself and unaffected¹. If for this reason, viz., that it makes no difference to the relata, *saṁyoga* is taken to be an external relation², one is apt to regard as internal, *samavāya* which as found between 'rose' and 'redness,' say, is far unlike it and is actually contrasted with it in Vaiśeṣika works³. To see whether it would be correct to regard it so, a slight digression into the Vaiśeṣika view of knowledge is necessary. The system, as is well known, is realistic, and as such believes in the existence of objects independently of and outside the knowledge which refers to them. To avoid however the familiar difficulty that faces all realistic doctrines of accounting satisfactorily for Error, the Vaiśeṣika restricts the scope of its realistic postulate to what is known as the *nirvikalpaka* and maintains that the statement, that whatever knowledge points to exists apart from that knowledge, applies only to *that* level of perception. As regards the *savikalpaka* which is derived from or built out of the *nirvikalpaka*, it may or may not refer to a fact; and whether it is true or false in a particular case has to be determined on entirely other grounds. By *nirvikalpaka* here, we have to understand mere presentation as distinguished from perception involving judgment; and what is given in it is the *isolated* thing—altogether uncharacterized. Thus when we perceive a 'red rose,' the perception, it is assumed, is necessarily preceded by a presentation of the particular 'substance,' the particular 'quality' and the particular 'relation'—each by itself. All these must be real since, by hypothesis, we are then in direct contact with reality;

¹ Cf. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 574.

² Compare, e.g., Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, pp. 147-8.

³ See for example, *Tarka-saṁgraha-dīpikā*, p. 62 (Bombay Sanskrit Series, 1918).

and an erroneous *nirvikalpaka* is a contradiction in terms¹. In the *śavikalpaka* which involves judgment these three are pieced together, and it accordingly gives us a composite with two factors connected by a third. The *nirvikalpaka* also, as we have stated, includes the 'relation' but, as the relation there does not relate the terms as here, its content is regarded as multiple and discontinuous.

This view is based upon what may be described as atomistic psychology and may seem to put the cart before the horse, for it assumes to be primary what is only the result of later, and according to some, falsifying analysis. We are not however now concerned with criticizing the system but only with understanding it. So we may, without stopping to inquire into the validity of its epistemological position, proceed to remark that, according to the Vaiśeṣika, neither the terms nor the relation can be described as abstractions². They are all alike real and disparate. Such a view at once precludes the explanation that *samavāya* is not independent of the terms it relates, but is only a mode or state of them.³ Being intrinsically different, it cannot fall inside the terms. Nor can it be said that *samavāya*, though real and separate from the terms, may yet qualify or modify them⁴, for such an explanation also is inadmissible according to the fundamental notions of the Vaiśeṣika. The system is not only realistic it is also pluralistic and postulates a manifold of ultimate entities — the atoms of the four kinds of 'elements', other *dravyas*, universals, etc. These entities are all simple and partless which altogether excludes the possibility of their being modified by any relation into which they may enter. It may however be thought that though ultimate entities may be unmodifiable, the objects derived from them—a 'jar' for example—might admit of modification. This raises the whole problem of change and the Vaiśeṣika solution of it. As a matter of fact, the system rejects the very notion of change;⁵

¹ See, e.g., *Sapta-padārthi*, p. 25 (Vizianāgaram Series) and compare *Kārikāvalī*, st. 135.

² See Bradley, *Truth and Reality*, pp. 150, 151, 289; *Aristotelian Society Proceedings* (1919-20), p. 41.

³ See *Śloka-vārttika*, sūtra 4, st. 149-50 (p. 181). Jha, *Prābhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, p. 92; cf. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 29.

⁴ Compare for this type of internal relation, Joachim, *Nature of Truth*, pp. 11-12, 46. See *Appearance and Reality*, p. 617.

⁵ See *Upaskāra* on Kaṇāda's *Sūtras*, p. 275 (Gujarati Printing Press, Bombay, 1913).

but it is not necessary for our present purpose to enter into that question. For *samavāya* relates eternal entities as well—for example an 'atom of *prthivī*' and its 'odour'—which as we have said are not modifiable; and since the explanation we give of it in that case must be identical with the explanation in the other case, change, even supposing that things that are not ultimate are subject to it, cannot be ascribed to *samavāya*. It accordingly follows that in all cases alike *samavāya* leaves the terms it relates entirely unaffected.¹ In other words, it is an external relation like *saṁyoga*. The very fact that it is independent and relates ultimately simple factors shows that it cannot be an internal one.

If *samavāya* also is an external relation, 'wherein,' it may be asked, 'does it differ from *saṁyoga*?' The distinction between the two may be stated in various ways. For example, things in *saṁyoga* relation are in juxtaposition and occupy different spaces; those which are connected by *samavāya* are experienced in one and the same space.² The most important difference however from the present standpoint is that while *saṁyoga* is transient (*anitya*) and manifold (*aneka*); *samavāya* is eternal (*nitya*) and one (*eka*)³. Things related by *saṁyoga* can, as we know, be separated; and the separation does not affect them but only destroys the relation. Things related by *samavāya* cannot always be sundered⁴; but where they can be, one at least of them suffers destruction as the result of such sundering. But the relation itself, it should be remembered, though it ceases to be revealed through that particular instance, continues to be⁵; and is revealed through other similar instances, just as 'cow-ness' (*gotva*), which is a universal and therefore one and everlasting, does not disappear when a particular 'cow' dies but persists in others⁶. In other words, while *saṁyoga*

¹ This is made quite explicit in the Vaiśeṣika maxim: *Vīṣṭaṁ śuddhāt nātiricyate*. Cf. *Muktāvalī*, p. 296. One term may be destroyed thereby but it is not modified.

² Cf. *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 312: *Pratīti-bhedāt bhedo'sti deśa-bhedas tu neṣyate*.

³ The later *Naiyāyikas* and the *Mīmāṃsakas* following Prabhākara refuse to view *samavāya* as either eternal or one. See *Dinakariya* on the *Muktāvalī*, p. 86, and Jha, *Prābhākara School of Mīmāṃsā*, p. 92.

⁴ E.g., 'atom of earth' and its 'fragrance.'

⁵ See *Upaskāra* on Kaṇāda's *Sūtras*, p. 296.

⁶ Compare for the parallelism between the two, Prāśastapāda's *Bhāṣya*, pp. 326-328 (*Vizianagaram Series*).

only exists, *samavāya* subsists¹. It should not be thought that in so describing them, we are importing into the Vaiśeṣika philosophy a notion alien to it; for the distinction between subsistence and existence is quite fundamental to it. It divides the six positive categories it postulates into two classes—one consisting of the first three which are *sat* (*real*) because of the universal *sattā* attaching to them (*sattā-sambandha*) and the other consisting of the last three which are described as *svātma-sat* or 'intrinsically real'. They are neither in Time nor in Space and are independent of both. The former are characterized by borrowed being; the latter, on the other hand, *are* in their own right. This distinction is remarkably like that between subsistence and existence; and as *samavāya* is one of the last three *padārthas* and *saṁyoga*, as a *guṇa*, is one of the first three, the description we have given of them is quite in accordance with the basic principle of Vaiśeṣika philosophy².

A second distinction of equal importance may also be deduced from what has been stated thus far. The relation in *saṁyoga* are technically described as *yuta-siddha* or 'normally separate'; and those in *samavāya*, as *ayuta-siddha* by which we should understand that this relation holds between things of which one is invariably associated with the other.³ The 'redness', for instance, is never apart from a 'rose' or some such object and it is inconceivable that we should find it without at the same time finding its correlate. The two are, no doubt, as conceived in the system, ontologically quite distinct; but while one of them can exist by itself, the other cannot⁴. That however is no disproof of its distinctness. The reason why it is not seen by itself is that it becomes related to its correlate *as it comes to be*. Its origination, as it is said, is simul-

¹ See Joachim, *ibid.*, p. 45.

² Praśastapāda's *Bhāṣya*, pp. 17 and 19, and *Bhāmati*, p. 387 (Nirn. Sag. Pr., 1904). In later *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* thought this distinction was practically given up by the expedient of what is described as *ekārtha-samavāya*, see *Dinakarīya* on *Muktāvalī*, pp. 40-41. See *Kandali*, p. 12; *Upaskāra*, 281 and 293; *Vivṛti*, p. 57.

³ See *Tarka-saṁgraha*, p. 61. Compare the term *asvātantrya* used in respect of it in the *Nyāya-kandali* (Vizianagaram Series), p. 325. This seems to be the origin of the name *paratantratā* sometimes given to *samavāya*. See Jha, *Prābhākara School of Mīmāṃsā*, p. 88.

⁴ A lack of independence in its nature. See *Mind* (1904), p. 207.

taneous with its relation: *jātaḥ sambaddhaś ca iti ekaḥ kālaḥ*.¹ In other words, unlike *saṁyoga* which is adventitious or contingent, this relation is necessary, though the necessity, we must add, is only one-sided. The 'redness' in our example presupposes a *dravya* but the reverse does not hold good², for the 'rose', may exist out of this relation and it is the self-same thing whether in this relation or outside it.³ Hence 'when we describe *samavāya* as an external relation, it is not in the sense that both its terms are independent as in *saṁyoga* but only one. There seems to be sufficient warrant in modern philosophy for describing such a relation as external⁴.

We have so far treated of *samavāya* as it manifests itself through certain sets of entities. It is also manifested, as we have stated already, in another situation and like *saṁyoga* is found between two *dravyas*. But while the latter can exist between practically any two *dravyas*⁵, the former is found only between certain kinds of them. To determine what the *dravyas* should be in order that *samavāya* may hold between them, it is necessary to draw attention to the rather peculiar view of causation held in the system. It maintains that the effect comes into being anew and is quite other than its material cause. The 'cloth' made from the 'threads' for example is, according to this principle, an entirely new product and abides in them, the relation between the two being *samavāya*. This is the condition for *samavāya* being found between two *dravyas*: they should be material cause and effect⁶. Here also then we find the same conditions as before:

¹ Uddyotakara: *Nyāya-vārttika*, II. i. 33 (Benares Ed., 1915), p. 236. *Nyāya-mañjarī*, p. 312. The former work enunciates this principle in connection with the question of 'whole' and its 'parts'. Its applicability to all cases involving *samavāya* is clear from the latter work.

² This is explicitly recognized by some: *Utpannam dravyam kṣaṇam aguṇam akriyākam ca tiṣṭhati*. Compare *Tarka-saṁgraha-dīpikā*, pp. 4 and 7 (Bombay Sanskrit Series).

³ See *Ratnaprabhā*, p. 445; *Śrī-bhāṣya*, p. 532 (*Sāpekṣatvam*). See Taylor, *ibid.*, p. 146; *Aristotelian Society Proceedings* (1919-20), pp. 51 and 62.

⁴ See Joachim, *Nature of Truth*, p. 50 n., and Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 337 n.; *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 142, 573 and 576.

⁵ The Vaiśeṣika denies *saṁyoga* between all-pervading (*vibhu*) *dravyas* like *ākāśa* and *ātman*. See *Dinakarīya* on *Muktāvalī*, p. 73.

⁶ These, according to the Vaiśeṣika, are the same as 'parts' and 'whole'. See *Tarka-saṁgraha-dīpikā*, p. 62. Like the material cause, the 'parts' are conceived as prior to the 'whole'.

First, there are two entities which on the basis of common experience are regarded as distinct; secondly, one of them, the effect, is dependent upon the other, its material cause and presupposes it which is independent; and lastly, when the latter emerges into being, it becomes, in the very act of doing so, related to the former. Thus there is complete parity between this case of *samavāya* and the others which we have already considered. To judge from Kaṇāda's *Sūtra*, VII. ii. 26, the doctrine of *samavāya* seems to have been first enunciated in connection with the production of *dravyas* and thereafter extended to the other cases like *dravya* and *guṇa*, *vyakti* and *jāti*¹. The problem of causation always loomed large in ancient Indian thought; and the Vaiśeṣika, in contradistinction to the other schools maintaining identity in some sense or other between the material cause and the effect, formulated absolute distinction (*atyanta-bheda*)² between them, devising *samavāya* at the same time as their connecting link. The basis of the extension from this to the other cases is probably to be found in the fact that wherever *samavāya* is revealed, casual factors will have been in operation as implied by the maxim already quoted: *jātaḥ sambaddhaśca iti ekaḥ kālāḥ*. In the case of the 'red rose' the colour is what is caused; in the case of 'cow named Khaṇḍa,' it is the particular cow. That is, what is produced in these cases is not the relation which by hypothesis is eternal, but one of the relata³. *Samyoga* also involves a reference to causation similarly, but what is produced there is the relation itself. Now whatever positive thing is produced, according to the Vaiśeṣika, not only is in Time and Space but also necessarily abides in some *dravya* which is described as its *samavāyi-kāraṇa*⁴. *Samyoga*, being a product, must abide, so soon as it arises, in a *dravya*; and since it cannot be either a *dravya* or *karma*, it is classed as a *guṇa*, these three being the only things that can be produced. *Samavāya*, on the other hand, is regarded as an independent *padārtha* which only relates but is not caused and therefore

¹ See *Vivṛti on Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, p. 294 (Gujarati Press Ed.) and Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, pp. 196-8. The extension already appears in *Prāśastapāda*.

² Note the expression *ihedam* occurring in the *Sūtra*.

³ This extension, owing to the similarity of the circumstance, necessitated the admission of cases where the relatum too is not produced: e.g., 'atom of earth' and its 'fragrance'. See *Prāśastapāda*, *Bhāṣya*, p. 324.

⁴ See *Prāśastapāda*, *Bhāṣya*, pp. 16, 18, and 26.

requires no *dravya* or *samavāyi-kāraṇa* to abide in, like *saṁyoga*¹. Accordingly it is described as directly connected with the relata²; but *saṁyoga* is indirectly so, for, being a *guṇa*, it needs *samavāya* as an intermediate link to connect it with its *samavāyi-kāraṇa*. That is, *saṁyoga* is a mediated relation while *samavāya* is an immediate one. This constitutes a third difference between them.

There is a conception in another system which confirms our view of *samavāya*. The Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja formulates a relation known as *apṛthak-siddhi* which corresponds to *samavāya* practically in all respects³. It accepts real distinction between the two things related by it and also inseparability between them. But there is one important difference: the relata are represented there as implying an inclusive unity (*viśiṣṭaika*)⁴ and as subserving it.⁵ On account of its implication of unity and interconnection, *apṛthak-siddhi*, in spite of its resemblance to *samavāya* in other respects, is to be taken as an internal relation. It seems in fact the Viśiṣṭādvaita rendering of *samavāya*⁶. The relata and the relation are the same in the one system as in the other, but the manner of interpreting them is different. Tagore, the poet, has somewhere stated that a road between two places may be looked upon either as linking them up into one whole or as keeping them apart. The situation is the same but the explanation is different. Exactly like it seems to be the distinction between *apṛthak-siddhi*

¹ See *Nyāya-kandalī*, p. 329.

² This is technically described as *svarūpa-saṁbandha*, i.e., it is self-related not unrelated. The connection is continuous. See Taylor, *ibid.*, p. 152.

³ See *Śrī-bhāṣya* and *Śrūta-prakāśikā*, pp. 75-6 (Nirm. Sag. Press), also *Tattvāmuktā-kalāpa* (Benares Edition), p. 646. There are a few differences between the two conceptions but they are such as are necessitated by the basic difference between the two systems. The Viśiṣṭādvaita does not recognize *viśeṣa*: hence one variety of *samavāya*, viz., that between ultimate substance and *viśeṣa* is not found in it. Another difference is that the relation between 'body' and 'soul', which is not *samavāya* in the Vaiśeṣika, is *apṛthak-siddhi* here.

⁴ 'Not independent of the whole'—*Appearance and Reality*, p. 572; *Truth and Reality*, pp. 193 and 200.

⁵ This is wrong. All that we can say is that one of them is never external to the other. The basis for this explanation is to be found in the second of the interpretations given of *samānādhikaraṇavākya* on p. 132 of *ŚP*. [Note added later.—Ed.]

⁶ There is explicit authority for saying that *apṛthak-siddhi* is *ekatva-vyavahāra-prayojaka*. But is that all? Or is it more than linguistic convention? Note in this connection Rāmānuja's definition of *pramā*.

and *samavāya*. While the pluralistic Vaiśeṣika looks upon *samavāya* as holding its terms apart, the eventually monistic Viśiṣṭādvaita regards them as unified by *apṛthak-siddhi*. Now if *samavāya* also were an internal relation, as implied by the several English expressions used as its equivalents in modern works, the fundamental difference between the two schools of thought would disappear and Rāmānuja's refutation of the doctrine of *samavāya* would have no point in it.¹

To sum up: The relations of *saṁyoga* and *samavāya* are both external—the former in the sense that it relates co-ordinate factors; the latter in the sense that one of the terms is relative and subordinate to the other. Speaking generally, the Vaiśeṣika seems to repudiate internal relations altogether. Its uncompromising realism and pluralism render this conclusion necessary. It recognizes only external relations but they are not all of the same kind and there are at least two varieties of it as illustrated by *saṁyoga* and *samavāya*.²

¹ *Śrī-bhāṣya*, II. ii. 12-16.

² See Taylor, *ibid.*, p. 140.

ADDITIONAL NOTES AND EXPLANATIONS

1. 'These distinct perceptions are distinct existences'—so says Hume referring to qualities only. The Vaiśeṣika which also accepts this view extends it to substances and relations. Hume probably did not recognize these latter at all.

2. See Praśastapāda, p. 19. See Note 5 below. The common distinction of substance and existence seems inadequate in old Vaiśeṣika, which admits a triple division:

(a) Entities neither in Time nor in Space nor abiding in a *dravya*, of course, and are intrinsically *sat*.

(b) Entities which resemble the above-mentioned ones except in their being *sat* through *sattā-yoga*, e.g., atoms.

(c) Entities existing in Time and Space and abiding in a *dravya*.

These are *anitya* as contrasted with (b) which are *nitya*.

N.B. 1. This classification omits 'negative facts' or *abhāva*.

N.B. 2. The notion of insisting on abiding in a *dravya* in the case of created things appears to be a *new feature*.

3. *Aprthak-siddhi* in Rāmānuja is not an *atirikta-padārtha*. It is probably to be put under *śakti*.

For the use of the term *aprthak-siddhi* see Praśastapāda, pp. 15, 325; Śaṅkara on *VS.* II. ii. 17; Bhāskara uses *aprthag-bhāva*. The *Sapta-padārthī* uses *aprthak-siddhi* as = *ayuta-siddhi*. See com. on p. 80. Note however there is this important difference between the two according to Rāmānuja's use of *aprthak-siddhi*. The word means *aprthak-sthiti* and *aprthak-pratīti* in Rāmānuja. It means only the former in Vaiśeṣika.

4. We have *samavāya* where *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is found without *matvarthīya-pratyaya*; *saṁyoga* where it is found without that *pratyaya*, according to Rāmānuja. See *Śrī-bhāṣya*, p. 205. But how about *hasī ghaṭaḥ*? See *Upaskāra* on VII. ii. 19 (p. 284).

5. Time and Space are not *samavāyi-kāraṇa* though they are *dravyas*. See Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, pp. 139, 176-8. The *samavāyi-kāraṇa* may be viewed as the substratum of effects. See Note 2 above. But see Note 32 below.

6. *Saṁyoga* appears to be a symmetrical relation since we can say *ghataḥ bhūtala-saṁyuktaḥ* as well as *bhūtalaḥ ghaṭa-saṁyuktam*; but it is not so as is seen by the definition *īha-pratyaya-hetu*. Compare *kuṇḍe badarāṇi*.

7. *Utpannam dravyam ityādi*. This does not apply to *jāti* and it does not matter, for even one case of exception is enough to refute that the two are mutually dependent always. Further this maxim is not acceptable to all followers of Vaiśeṣika. Yet they maintain the same theory that the *dravya* can exist by itself. It is just a matter of fact that it does not. That is to say, there is no inherent necessity that they should be together. According to this view probably both the *relata* in *samavāya* may be made out to be independent. How should *ayuta-siddhi* be defined then? Not as in *Tarka-saṁgraha*. Though the rose is never actually without a colour, it might well have existed without it. Actual relation is no disproof of separateness. See G. E. Moore: *Aristotelian Society Proceedings* (1919-20), pp. 60, 61, 55 and 57.

8. *Svarūpa-sambandha*: This seems just the monist's internal relation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika postulates it only to emphasize the distinction between the *relata* which really does not exist, as e.g., in the case of the *bhūtala* and *ghaṭābhāva* where also the *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva* is only *svārūpa*. That is even where the conception is precisely that of the monist, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika refuses to recognize it and invents an ontological fiction to connect things which are not distinct. This shows its wholehearted opposition to the monist's view of Relations. See Taylor, *Metaphysics*, pp. 154-7.

N.B. Note that the *svārūpa* here intended is that of either relation.

9. In the case of the universal, say *gotra*, the particular is merely a *vyāñjaka* so that it does not, by revealing itself through it, become spatial in any sense.

10. The *āśrayāśrita-bhāva* of the Vaiśeṣika in respect of *samavāya* is the *prakṛti-vikṛti-bhāva* of the monists. See *Ratnaprabhā*, p. 448. In the case of *jāti-vyakti* the latter relation may appear to fail; but it does not for all monists explain *jāti* as 'configuration' and not a simple ultimate.

11. Colours etc., also may be regarded as ultimate and simple. Compare Joachim, *Nature of Truth*, p. 44. They subsist also. See id., p. 47.

12. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika consistently with its pluralistic postulate gives up the notion of change. James seems to have both and so fails. See Bradley, *Truth and Reality*, pp. 151-2.

13. According to the Vaiśeṣika, *nirvikalpaka* experience is a matter of inference. That is, it states that the atomistic entities known to begin with are a matter of inference, not of immediate experience. In one sense of course they are immediately given but they are not realized as such. See Bradley, *Truth and Reality*, pp. 151 and 290.

14. Since *samavāya* relates only *dravyas*, it may appear that it is an internal relation (See Bosanquet, *Logic*, II. p. 278). But it is not so far *dravyatva* which is common to the two and the condition for *saṁyoga* is itself different from the *dravyas* related.

15. It is interesting to note that *samavāya* = 'collection' or 'aggregate' in Pāṇini. Compare IV. iv. 43; VI. i. 38. See also Das Gupta, *Indian Philosophy*.

16. The *paṭa*, no doubt, has the threads for its cause and is an *avayavi*, but it itself is simple though not ultimate.

17. *Aṇu* and *vibhu* are both spaceless. See Śaṅkara on *VS*. p. 447.

18. *Samavāya* is *sarvagata*. See Praśastapāda, p. 20.

19. *Tādātmya* in the Naiyāyika sense. Compare Bradley, *Truth and Reality*, p. 283. In this connection note that *bheda* in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is not a relation but an *abhāva* and *saṁbandhaś ca saṁbandhi-bhinno grāhyaḥ* (*Dinakarīya*, p. 84).

20. Note that *guṇa*, *karma*, *jāti* and *viśeṣa* together constitute what is termed in English as Quality. They are thus the predicates in a judgment. The subject however may be *dravya*, *guṇa* or *karma*. According to Prabhākara it is only *dravya*. The 'whole' also can stand in apposition to the 'parts' in a Proposition. Cf. *mṛd ghaṭaḥ*, *kapālaṁ ghaṭaḥ*. See *Brahmānandīya*, p. 32.

21. For knowledge neither true nor false, like the Vaiśeṣika *nirvikalpaka*, see Bertrand Russell on Meinong in *Mind* for 1904, p. 216.

22. *Samyoga* is related with its *dravya* by *samavāya* which

is a *different kind* of relation. This may to some extent ward off the objection of indefinite regress.

23. Through the expedient of *ekārtha-samavāya*, the later Vaiśeṣika renounces the notion of *svarūpa-sattā*. But even then *sattā* at least needs to be recognized as *subsisting*. Actually however even this is brought under the explanation involved in *ekārtha-samavāya* on the principle of relating a thing with itself as if it were another. See *Bhāmātī*, p. 387.

24. *Aja-saṁyoga*—*Ajaś cāsau saṁyogaś ca not ajayos saṁyogaḥ*. See *Praśastapāda*. *Aja-saṁyoga* = *vibhu-saṁyoga*. This is rejected though the relata are both *dravyas* because the relation is not adventitious but eternal. Nor is it *samavāya*, though the relata occupy one and the same space, and though it is eternal for there is no necessity for the relation. They only happen to be related. That is all. It is in fact a difficulty created by the Vaiśeṣika hypothesis. See Śaṅkara on *VS*. II. ii. 18.

25. Note the manner of explaining the import of a proposition like 'the rose is red'. According to the Sāṅkhya which construes the proposition as it is, we have here expressed identity between the subject and predicate. The Vaiśeṣika on the other hand takes it as a loose statement equivalent to 'Redness is in the rose' so that the identity indicated by the proposition is, not between substance and quality, between the *dravyas* respectively denoted by the terms—each with its own separate connotation. See *Bhāmātī*, p. 445; Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 20. See *Śrī-bhāṣya*, pp. 118, 132, and 204-9.

26. The Vaiśeṣika makes *guṇa* etc., temporal and *samavāya* eternal; the Prābhākaras reverse it and say that *samavāya* is *anīya* and *guṇa* etc., are *nīya*. *Nīla-rūpaṁ naṣṭam* is the *pratīti* according to the former; *nīla-rūpa-samavāyo naṣṭaḥ* according to the latter. Of course the former is closer to common sense.

27. *Avirodhāntaraṅgatva-jāti-bhogādyabhedataḥ |*
Ekoktir aprthak-siddher deśakāladaśādibhiḥ ||

—Vedānta-deśika in *Nyāyasiddhāntajana*.

(a) *avirodhaḥ—sarve rājānaḥ ekībhūtāḥ |*

(b) *antaraṅgatvam—Rāma-sugrīvayor aikyaṁ devyaivam samajāyata.*

(*Rāmāyaṇa*)

- (c) *ġātiḥ—ayam ayam caiko vrīhiḥ.*
- (d) *Bhogah—purohito rājā sanivṛttaḥ (rājavadbhonūtyarthiḥ)*
- (e) *apṛthak-siddhiḥ—sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ brahma.*
- (f) *deśaḥ kālaś ca—sāyaṁ goṣṭhe sarve gāvaḥ ekībhavanti.*
- (g) *daśā—age for instance.*

28. *Karma* subsists in *pralaya*. See *Kusumāñjali*, p. 67.

29. *Paratva* and *aparatva* are not *saṁbandhas*, there being only two such of the nature of *vṛtti* or *ādheyatva*. Yet they may be relations in the sense in which that term is understood in modern philosophy. That is, relation as used here is not so narrow as *vṛtti-rūpa-saṁbandha*.

30. 'Material cause' is sometimes used in the Paper as equivalent to *samavāyi-kāraṇa*.

31. Grammatical analogy—

saṁyoga—dvandva-compounds are co-ordinating.

samavāya—tatpuruṣa-compounds are subordinate.

tādātmya—bahuvrīhi-compounds are *anya-padārtha-pradhāna*.

See Brugmann, *Comparative Grammar*, Vol. II. p. 88.

32. *Kāla* can be a *samavāyi-kāraṇa* as e.g., of *kāla-ghaṭa-saṁyoga* where *saṁyoga* as a product is in *samavāya* relation with *kāla* as well as *ghaṭa*.

AN INDIAN VIEW OF 'PRESENT TIME'

In his recent works Prof. Whitehead has emphasized the importance of conceiving the present as a duration and not as an instant.¹ We propose to refer here to a striking parallel to this view in the history of Indian thought. It will be best to begin by translating into English, from an old Sanskrit work², a passage bearing upon the subject:

'In the matter (of the threefold division of Time into the past, present and future)—

OBJECTION—

Aphorism 39.—There is no present (time) since of a falling (body for instance), the time during which it has fallen and that during which it has yet to fall furnish a sufficient explanation.

Commentary.—When a fruit loosened from the stalk is nearing the ground, what is above (it, at any instant) is the path through which it has fallen and the time connected with it is past time; what is below is the path through which it has yet to fall and the time connected with it is future time. Now there is no third (part of the) path with reference to which present time (supposed to be implied in 'falls') might be understood. Hence there is no present time.

REPLY—

Aphorism 40.—Those two (i.e., past and future) also disappear if present (time) is not (admitted), they being dependent upon it.

Commentary.—Time is not indicated by space. How else then? It is indicated by action as, for example, 'falling'. When the action of falling ceases, that is past time: when the action is yet to be, that is future time. When action is apprehended as existing in an object, it is present time. If one does not think of the action of falling characterizing an object, whose cessation or future origination can one contemplate? Past time is in reference to past

¹ Cf. e.g., *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 64.

² *Nyāya Aphorisms* of Gautama, with Vātsyāyana's Commentary, II. i.

action; future time, to action that is yet to be. In both kinds of time, the object is without action; when (an object) is 'falling', it is connected with action. (Thus) present time refers to the object as related to action. And if that is not (admitted), the two other kinds of time depending upon it would themselves cease to be.

Again—

Aphorism 41.—Past and future are not mutually dependent.

Commentary.—If past and future could be conceived as dependent upon each other, we might agree to the repudiation of the present. (But) the future is not dependent on the past, nor the past on the future. Why (so)? Because it would be impossible to define from what standpoint it is past, how the future is dependent upon the past and from what standpoint it is future. The rejection of the present is (besides) opposed to the presuppositions of Grammar¹. One might think that just as 'short' and 'long', 'hill' and 'hollow', 'light' and 'shade' depend upon each other, 'past' and 'future' also might do. That is not (however) necessarily so, for there is no differentiating circumstance. As there are illustrations, so there are counter-illustrations also—thus 'colour' and 'touch', 'odour', and 'taste' are not mutually dependent; so also (may be) 'past' and 'future'. Mutual dependence, (we might, on the contrary, maintain) leads to the establishment of neither. For when one is not, the other also is not and both will thus cease to be. If the existence of the first is dependent upon the second, on what is the second (just then) dependent? If the existence of the second is dependent upon the first, on what is the first (just then) dependent? Thus when one is not, the other also is not; so both will disappear.

Present time is indicated also by the *being* of an object, e.g., the *being* of a substance, of a quality, of an action.² To one that does not recognize this (i.e., the indication of present time by *being*)—

Aphorism 42.—Nothing would be known, because there can be no perception in the absence of present time.

¹ I.e., there is no linguistic support for it.

² The word 'object' as here used should be understood in this wide sense and not merely as meaning a *concrete* thing.

Commentary.—Perception arises from contact of senses with objects. What is not at the time, i.e., the non-existent cannot come into relation with the senses. This (our opponent) does not admit that anything *is present*, (so that) the means of perception, the object of perception and perceptual knowledge—all become impossible. And if perception be impossible, there can be no inference or verbal testimony which have their bases in it. If all means of knowledge be cut off, nothing would be known.

Present time is (thus) indicated in two ways—first by the *being* of objects as for example in 'a substance is'; secondly, by a series of actions, as for example 'cooking' or 'cutting'. A series of actions may be (i) multiform and serving a single purpose, or (ii) repeated action. Multiform and serving a single purpose is the action of 'cooking', for instance, (which consists of) putting vessel on fire, pouring in of water, filling with rice, placing fuel, kindling fire, stirring with spoon, pouring out gruel and taking down (vessel). 'Cutting' is an instance of repeated action. A man is said to 'cut' when he frequently lifts up an axe and lays it, say, upon a log of wood. Both these, viz., what is cooked and what is cut, may be described as what is acted upon. Since in an object acted upon—

Aphorism 43.—There may be the state of having been acted upon and the state of going to be acted upon, a twofold apprehension (of present time results)

A series of actions not yet begun but intended to be, gives future time, e.g., 'he will cook'; the cessation of the series accompanied by its result gives past time, e.g., 'he has cooked' and a series of actions begun, gives 'present time', e.g., 'he cooks'. Here a completed (action) means (in the object) the state of *having been acted upon*; (an action) which is to come about, the state of *going to be acted upon* and (an action) which is going on, the state of *being acted upon*. Thus all the three kinds of time are involved in a series of actions, and are known by knowing the present, such as 'he cooks' or 'something is cooked'. Here the continuance of the series of actions is avowed; neither its non-commencement, nor its completion. (Thus) the present is known in two ways—as dissociated from the past and future and as associated (with them)—(the first), that which is indicated by the *being* of an

object as in 'a substance is'; (the second), that which, as in 'cooking' or 'cutting', expresses a continuing series of actions and involves the threefold time. Other forms of common usage where (the present tense) is meant to indicate nearness, etc. (to present time), should also be noted (in this connection)¹. Therefore present time does exist.'

Here is represented a controversy between two schools of thought—one, which denies the present and the other, which admits it. We are now concerned only with the latter. It is known as Nyāya and may be described as a realistic and pluralistic system. It separates substance from quality, universal from particular, etc., regarding each as an independent reality. So far as our present purpose is concerned, it recognizes, among other ultimate entities, absolute Time. The discussion here, however, is not in respect of it but relative or empirical time. The Nyāya does not admit the latter as such to be an objective fact and explains its notion as arising from the association of absolute Time with something else. The same absolute Time comes to be described as past, present and future through such association, as the same person might, for instance, be described as 'father', 'son', etc., from different points of view². While some Indian thinkers maintain that objects involved in action (*kāraṇas*) serve as the index of relative time³, the Nyāya maintains that it is action itself. To take the illustration given in the extract, a falling body may be said to involve a reference to three things—what falls, viz., the fruit here, the space through which it falls, and the action of falling. Of these, neither the space nor the fruit can be said to indicate time; for the space remains the same always and the fruit also at any two stages in the course of falling is in itself the same. They cannot thus be described as either 'past' or 'future'. It is only the action of falling that can so be described⁴. This view of action being the index of time, implies the conception of the present as a duration for, according to the system, all action must last for at least four

¹ E.g., 'I go' for 'I shall go'. Here again is an appeal to linguistic usage in support of present time. The use of 'I go' for 'I shall go' is secondary and a secondary use always implies the primary. See Vācaspati's Commentary, p. 284.

² See *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 253 (Benares Edition).

³ See Vācaspati's Commentary, p. 281.

⁴ Cf. *Nyāya-vārttika*, II. i. 40.

instants,¹ and there can be no instantaneous action. The duration of the present signified cannot accordingly be less than four instants but it may be more.

Now as regards the meaning which the system attaches to past and future. These are not significant without reference to a third factor. 'Before' and 'after' are meaningless unless they are referred to something different from either, viz., the present which, as we have seen, is known through action. Thus past and future also refer to action though only through the present, and they mean respectively the time when some action or other we have in view is over or is yet to be. If we now consider the object involved in action we find that it is characterized by action in what is described as the present, but not in what is described as either the past or future. Hence we often apply epithets suggestive of past and future to objects, but we do so only secondarily. For instance, we distinguish a 'fallen' fruit from the same in the state of 'going to fall'; though the fruit in itself is the same if we think of it apart from action. It is this secondary use of past and future with reference to objects that accounts for the misconception, alluded to above, that objects and not action are the index of time.

Objects not associated with action also may indicate time, but it can be *only* present time. This is what was described above as the present known through the *being* of objects. An object like a fruit, it is believed, arises from a certain concourse of atoms which continues only for a time. In other words produced objects come into relation with Time² and their *being* may therefore be a sign of it. There is however this important difference between time as thus indicated and the same as indicated by action. While both equally signify the present, the latter involves in addition a reference to past and future within itself. 'Cooking', for instance, comprehends various minor actions; and, at any stage some of them may have been over and others may have yet to make their appearance³. Thus though the whole series of actions when regarded as one, viz., 'cooking' indicates only present time, each member of

¹ See *Dinakarīya* on *Muktāvalī*, i. 46: *prathama-karmaṇaḥ kṣaṇa-catuṣṭayā-vasthāyinaḥ*. According to the atomism of the system, 'action' is supposed to operate through 'disjunction' and 'conjunction' each of which occupies two instants. See A. B. Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, pp. 190 and 223.

² Ultimate entities which are eternal are not in Time.

³ See *Nyāya-vārtika*, II. i. 43.

the series may give rise to the conception of the threefold time. The fire, for instance, may have been kindled; it may be in the process of being kindled or it may be going to be kindled. In the case of *being*, on the other hand, no such internal distinction is possible, and an object, so long as it *is*, signifies only present time.¹ This view also implies that the present is a duration; for an object, according to the system, should last for at least two instants² though, of course, it may last longer.

It will be seen, even from the few references which we have found necessary to make to the Nyāya philosophy, that there are several points in its conception of Nature (e.g., recognition of absolute Time) wherein it differs from modern science. Yet there is a clear resemblance between the two as regards the view they take of 'present time'. This view may be summarized as follows: The present is always a duration, though its breadth may vary and need not necessarily be the same wherever present time is apprehended.

¹ Commonly, no doubt, we talk of an object as *having been* or *going to be*; but there exists nothing then whose states these expressions may be taken to describe. (See Vācaspati's Com. p. 284.) For the Nyāya does not believe in the unity of Nature and, further, explains objects like the fruit as coming into existence *anew* and passing out of it *finally*.

² I.e., the moments of origination and abidance. The earliest instant when an object can perish is the third. Some among the followers of the Nyāya admit instantaneous objects as a mere theoretic possibility (compare e.g., *Tarka-saṁgraha-dīpikā*, Section 10. Bombay Sanskrit Series); but, generally speaking, it is recognized that objects, especially perceivable objects and therefore, all such as indicate present time, must last longer than an instant. See *Nyāya-mañjarī*, pp. 458 and 463.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND HEDONISM

Most of the Indian doctrines agree in defining the term 'value' as 'the object of desire' (*iṣṭa*);¹ but, as regards what that object is, there is a considerable divergence of opinion. Thus Uddyotakara says that while some think that *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* or *mokṣa* is the object desired, he himself considers it to be the attainment of pleasure (*sukha-prāpti*) or the avoidance of pain (*duḥkha-nivṛtti*)². That is, pleasure or the absence of pain is *sole* value according to him while, according to others, it may be that or something else like wealth (*artha*) or virtue (*dharma*). We have evidence to show that there were still others³ in ancient India, who denied that pleasure could be a value at all. But it should be stated that the opinion which has come to prevail is the one which Uddyotakara upholds⁴, viz., that what is desired is always pleasure or freedom from pain⁵. By implication, pain or the loss of pleasure is 'disvalue' (*dviṣṭa*). The Indian conception of value, as now prevalent, may accordingly appear to be fundamentally hedonistic, and the purpose of the present article is to find out whether it is really so.

There are two standpoints from which the question of hedonism may be considered, viz., whether it means that pleasure is, as a matter of fact, sought by man or whether it is also good and worthy to be sought by him. To take up the latter first for consideration.

(a) In the form in which we find it enunciated, the Indian view, does not signify that pleasure is worthy of being sought for, as stated there, it is merely *desired* and not also *desirable*. But we have not to depend upon the form of this statement alone to reach such a conclusion. There is also direct evidence to support it. So far from teaching that all pleasure is worthy of being sought by

¹ For an account of Prabhākara's doctrine of *Niyoga*, which rejects this definition, see the present writer's article in the *Madras Journal of Oriental Research*, 1945.

² *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 13 (Benares Ed.).

³ As e.g., Bharadvāja according to *Mahābhārata*, XII. 188.

⁴ See e.g., *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, p. 467 (Nirm. Sag. Ed.) and *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, viii.

⁵ For the sake of simplicity of treatment, we shall hereafter speak only of pleasure and not of the absence of pain also; but what is said of the one will apply equally to the other.

man, the pursuit of certain pleasures is here wholly disapproved. In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, for example, *preyas* which stands for common pleasure is sharply distinguished from *śreyas* or supreme bliss which marks the goal of life; and the former is discountenanced completely¹. The definition of 'value' as the object of desire thus becomes a generic one. It applies to all kinds of value, and not merely to that which is good or worthy to be sought. We cannot accordingly say that a thing is good because we desire it, for it may be desired and yet be not good. There are crude urges as well as rational desires; and the satisfaction of the latter alone is good. Two kinds of pleasure² thus come to be recognized, of which one alone deserves to be desired. Such a view may appear to make a qualitative distinction in pleasure; but it does not, for what serves to distinguish higher from lower pleasure, as understood here, is whether or not its pursuit is prompted by right philosophic knowledge (*vidyā*). 'Widely distinct and leading to different ends are these—ignorance and knowledge. I see thou seekest knowledge, O Naciketas, for worldly pleasures have not lured thee away.'³ The criterion of preferability in regard to pleasure is thus something other than its pleasantness, viz., whether the desire for it springs from right knowledge or, to put it somewhat differently, whether it is such as to help us forward in the attainment of the final goal of life. In itself, pleasure is qualitatively the same⁴.

The above view is based upon metaphysics, for the worth of pleasure is judged in it by reference to the knowledge of ultimate reality or to the supreme bliss to which it is believed to lead. There is another view that involves no such metaphysical presupposition. It is best illustrated by a stanza which is well known to students of Sanskrit literary criticism⁵. It says: 'Here is a per-

¹ I. ii. 1-3, 13; v. 12-13.

² The distinction between these two may be indicated by using for them different terms, like 'pleasure' and 'bliss' or 'happiness'; but we have generally preferred the use of 'pleasure' for both, in the belief that the context will show which is meant.

³ *Id.*, I. ii. 4.

⁴ That there can be no qualitative distinction in pleasure was known to Indians as early as the age of the Upaniṣads. See *Taitt. Up.* II. viii. and *Br. Up.* IV. iii. 32.

⁵ *Yadeva rocate mahyaṇi tadeva kurute priyā iti vetti |
na jānāti tat priyaṁ yat karoti sā ||*

—Bhoja's *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa* (v. 74).

son who thinks that he likes his beloved, because she does just what pleases him'; but he does not know, it adds, that there is a higher form of love in which 'whatever the beloved does is, by that very fact, felt as pleasant.' The lover's pleasure is lower in the former case, where the beloved is valued for her care of him than in the latter, where she is valued for her own sake. It means that two attitudes are possible in reference to an object: One is to regard it essentially in its relation to oneself; and the other, to shift one's interest entirely from oneself to the object in question so that the sense of one's individuality almost vanishes then. In the first, the object is valued but as a means, and the pleasure is lower; in the second, it is valued for itself, and the pleasure is higher. Here the criterion of judging the worth of pleasure is the nature of one's attitude towards the object in question, and is not directly based upon any metaphysical consideration¹.

(b) Thus we see that, whichever of the above views we take, the Indian conception of value does not mean that pleasure is always good and is worthy to be sought. The question we have now to consider is whether it is hedonistic in the other sense viz., whether, as a matter of psychological fact, it is always sought by men. To judge from the manner in which it is defined, the conception may appear to be hedonistic in this sense, but really it is not so². The reason for it, however, differs according to a difference in the systems of thought, and needs therefore to be set forth separately:

(1) According to some, pleasure is the only end desired by man, but what they actually mean by it is the supreme bliss of the ideal life (*mokṣa*)³, and not the pleasures which he commonly seeks. That is why the latter, they say, invariably fail to satisfy him permanently. They only arrest desire for the time being, but do not fulfil it. If man yet seeks them, it is due to the extreme

¹ The same is also the significance of Bhavabhūti's well-known stanza:

Na kim cid api kurvāṇaḥ saukhyai duḥkḥāny apohati |
tat tasya kim api dravyaṃ yo hi yasya priyo janaḥ ||

Uttara-rāma-carita (ii. 19; vi. 5).

'A person, whom we genuinely love, pleases us by his very presence, irrespective of anything he may or may not do'. Cf. Bhāṛavi's *Kirātārjunīya*, xi. 27-8.

² We are not considering here the Cārvāka doctrine which is avowedly egoistic and hedonistic.

³ Cf. *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*, i. 66-9.

vagueness of his conception of the ideal or to his ignorance of the means to its attainment¹. The pleasure that ordinarily serves as the aim is thus only an apparent good². According to this view, there is no difference in the ultimate motive behind the activities of different men, or the several activities of one and the same person. It is always absolute bliss, and all men alike aim at it³. What is meant by absolute bliss is that it should be altogether unmixed, and that there should be no lapse from it when it is once attained. Such a view may be a form of eudaemonism, but the question whether it is or is not hedonistic does not arise at all, for no pleasure, as it is commonly known and is meant in hedonism, satisfies these conditions.

(2) The above view admits that every desire is a desire for pleasure, and still maintains that it is not hedonism since the pleasure intended is absolute. There are other doctrines which, without reference to such pleasure⁴, arrive at the same conclusion. They also associate pleasure with all voluntary activity, but they explain its place in the value-situation in two different ways:

(i) To begin with pleasure is a value in the sense that it may be aimed at directly. Let us think, for example, of a person who, eagerly seeking some delicious food or drink, finds it and then partakes of it. Here the end reached, viz., satisfaction or pleasure, is the immediate purpose of the person's activity, and is therefore a value in the above sense of the term. It may seem that pleasure is here illegitimately separated from the thing which yields it, and that the resulting abstraction is represented as a value. This point is discussed in Indian works⁵; and the chief reason given for the separation is as follows: While pleasure as such is an object of universal desire the things in connection with which it arises

¹ Where it is not either of them, as in the case of a philosopher, it is the force of former habits (*saṁskāra*) that accounts for such seeking. Cf. *Paśvādibhiḥ ca aviśeṣāt*, occurring in Śaṁkara's preamble to his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*.

² The apparent good is not the same as 'disvalue' for the latter, being of the nature of pain, never even appears to be good as this does. This apparent value, it may be observed in passing, contains within itself the seeds of new advance, its inadequacy serving as an incentive to further and further progress.

³ Cf. *Maitreyī Brāhmaṇa* (*Br. Up.* II. iv. and IV. v).

⁴ It does not mean that these doctrines do not recognize *mokṣa* as the final ideal. The twofold distinction made here is within empirical values.

⁵ See e.g., Śābara's com. on Jaimini, VI. i. 1-3. n.

are never so. A thing, which satisfies one, may repel others. It may not satisfy even the same person at all times as, for example, food which gives satisfaction if one is hungry, but not otherwise. On account of this uncertainty, it is said, objects cannot be reckoned, alongside of pleasure, as values in themselves. To do so would be to adopt a relativistic view of values. But it should not therefore be concluded that pleasure is here sundered from its objective reference altogether. The need for an objective correlate is admitted, wherever the realization of value is concerned, what is denied is merely the association of *particular* things with it. That such is the case is clear, for instance, from the view held in these schools, viz., that, though pleasure may be directly aimed at, one cannot set about realizing it until a suitable means to it is determined upon.¹

(ii) But the place of pleasure in the value-situation is not always of the above type. In a section² of his Sūtra, Jaimini discusses the question as to who reaps the fruit when a sacrifice, like the *vaiśvānareṣṭi* commended in the Veda, is performed. This sacrifice is meant to secure the well-being of a male child, and is performed by the father soon after it is born. The agent here is the father, but he is not the recipient of the benefit (*phala*) accruing therefrom. The forms of the verb used in the context in the Veda, however, imply, according to Sanskrit usage, that it is he who should reap the fruit. Here is an apparent contradiction in the teaching of the Veda; and, in explaining it, Śābara, the commentator, states that in such activities the agent feels pleased at the thought that his son will be well off, and that that pleasure (*prīti*) is his reward³. But it is not the willed aim of the activity as in the previous case, and is not therefore the value sought⁴. The activity aims, on the other hand, directly at an objective end, viz., the child's welfare, which accordingly constitutes the value here. The father's pleasure is merely what ensues upon the attainment of that end, and is due to the consciousness that he has achieved what he set out to do. It is consequently a sign of value rather than a value itself.

¹ *Phalasya sāksāt kṛtisādhyatvābhāvāt: Vākyārtha-ratna* of Ahobala Sūri (Mysore Oriental Library Ed.), p. 60. Cf. in this connection the well-known statement that it is *iṣṭasādhana-tā-jñāna*, and not *phala-jñāna*, that is *pravartaka*.

² IV. iii. 38-9.

³ *Yat putrasya phalam ātmanah sā prītiḥ* |

⁴ Cf. Kumāra's *Tup-ṭikā* (p. 114): *Na ca akāmyamānaṁ phalam bhavati* |

We have taken a ritualistic example in order to indicate the authority for our statement that the place of pleasure in the value-situation, according to the present view, is not always the same. The principle of explanation underlying it, however, is quite general and applies equally to cases outside the sphere of ritual. We may take the instance of a mother devoting herself to the care of her child, which is exactly parallel to the above. Here also the value sought is for the child but the mother will have her own satisfaction, if the child's well-being is ensured. To judge from the discussion on the *sūtras* of Jaimini, referred to above, this objective end may be almost anything, including pleasure¹. It may, for instance, be wealth when it is acquired (say) for the sake of doing good to others. Here again the end sought is not one's own pleasure, though the act may bring satisfaction to oneself as its sequel.

Since pleasure is not thus the *sole* end sought and there may also be others, this view too is not hedonistic² in the common acceptance of that term³. How then are we to explain the statement found in the generality of Indian works that pleasure is the aim of all voluntary activity? The answer is that the statement does not apply to all values, but only to that which one seeks *for oneself*. Here naturally will arise the question, whether pleasure, though it may be one of the values sought, is the only value which one seeks for oneself. We cannot settle this point without discussing the precise significance of the term 'pleasure' (*sukha*) as used here. But it is not necessary to enter upon that discussion for the purpose of the present article, which is merely to find out whether the Indian conception of values is or is not hedonistic on the whole.

¹ It will be remembered that the point under consideration now is value in general, and not the higher only among the values. The latter will necessarily be fewer in number.

² It is sometimes pointed out that objective ends, like the good of the son in our example, are to be understood as eventually signifying the pleasure of the person or persons concerned. The Indian view of value may, in that case, become hedonistic; but it will not, even then, be *egoistic* hedonism.

³ Cf. *Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā* (VI. i. 1-3) where it is shown that, for an injunction to operate, the agent (*kartṛ*) need not be the enjoyer (*bhokṛ*). Cf. *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* (p. 483):

śāstradarśitan phalam anuṣṭhānakartari ity utsargaḥ |

EXTRA NOTES

1. If some pleasures are higher than others and therefore better than others, there must be something good besides pleasure to constitute the difference.

2. The ethical value of what I like is to be determined by, and does not determine, what is good or right. (ERE. on *Hedonism*).

3. Reason must control passion.

4. Working for *future* pleasure, i.e., identifying our present self with the future self. This is based on *ahantā*. Working for the good of a son (say), i.e., identifying our *interests* with those of the son. Here is *mamatā*. The second is, of course, far better than the first; but both are due to narrowness of view.

5. Desire is quieted in enjoyment. *Philosophy*, No. 21, p. 75; desire for the implicit good is implicit, pp. 74, 77; apparent good due to illusion, id. p. 75.

6. All special desires are refracted desires for the absolute good. *Mind*, 1912.

7. Indians seem to have been influenced by their doctrine of *mokṣa* in enunciating all value to be pleasure. Each man is an end and none merely a means.

8. Perry, pp. 71-2: In desiring it, he makes it a part of himself. Not only acts as self but also for self. The object of the desire is the self in some form *other* than its being the subject of that desire. The desire issues from the self and the desire returns to its source. It is a future state of the self that is desired. T. H. Green (1890), pp. 115, 118, 125, 148, 128, 85. Volition, according to McDougall (*Introduction to Social Psychology*), can be defined in terms of the self-regarding sentiment (p. 249):

9. Our good does not consist in external possessions. We must find the good within ourselves. *Philibus*, p. 12.

10. See *Philosophy*, No. 4, p. 530; No. 8, pp. 463 and 467; No. 12, p. 547; No. 16, p. 502.

11. The generally ascetic character of Indian philosophic teaching shows that it is not hedonism.

12. *Mamatā* or a relatively higher self: self-realization is thus twofold.

13. In Indian philosophy, 'pleasure is good' does not mean that abstract pleasure is good. Certainly there should be things

that please. But it is *something* for no particular thing is universally pleasant. *Candanetyādi* instanced by Śabara. Cf. Moore, p. 82.

14. Moore, pp. 85-96: Object and agent both necessary. Pleasure is consciousness and consciousness implies an agent.

15. *Vaiśvānareṣṭi*—Inclusive egoism, not pure. *Mamatā* and *ahantā*. Egoism and altruism. There is a higher ideal of *all-comprehensive* 'egoism'. Cf. Moore, p. 96.

DRK-DRŚYA-VIVEKA

Preliminary note: The following analysis of experience by the advaitin is based on the postulate of idealism that it is not legitimate to speak of anything as existing apart from reference to some centre of consciousness. That objects depend upon consciousness for their revelation is admitted by all. Here they are taken to depend upon it for their *being* as well.

(1) The cognitive situation is usually taken to involve a subject and an object. The advaitin substitutes for them *drk* and *drśya*, the former meaning the self or what reveals and the latter, what is revealed. The reason for this substitution is that the other division is not logically quite satisfactory. The subject includes not only *drk* but also *drśya*. It is really a complex of the self and the not-self. This is clear from statements like 'I know myself', where 'myself' refers to some thought or feeling or, as Hume said, 'some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure'. These perceptions, being observable, are *drśya* and necessarily point to some centre of consciousness beyond them.

(2) If *drk* is altogether different from *drśya*, it cannot be known by any other *drk* for then it would become a *drśya*. Can it know itself? According to many philosophers, both Indian and Western, it can; but the advaitin thinks it cannot. If it should know itself, it can be only in one of two ways: (i) One part of it should know another. That is, it should admit of internal division. But it is impossible to conceive of spirit as spatial and partible. (ii) It may know itself entirely, what is known being identically the same as what knows. This is equally inconceivable, for nothing can be both agent and patient in respect of the same act. The conclusion is that *drk* is not knowable. Yet it is given; so it should be self-given. That is, it is the condition or ground of all experience.

(3) It is impossible to think of the absence of *drk*—as having ceased to be or as not having yet come to be, for that thought itself would imply the presence of *drk*. Hence *drk*, in some sense, should be regarded as having neither beginning nor end, and therefore as eternal or timeless.

(4) We have seen that *drk* cannot have internal parts. It can not be externally related to other *drks*, for a similar reason, viz.,

that it is not possible to think of any dividing line between them. The only way in which we can distinguish between one *dr̥k* and another is by reference to their content or the objects they reveal. In themselves, they are indistinguishable. That is, *dr̥k* is one or, more strictly, not many.

(5) *Dr̥k*, being one and eternal, cannot be the same as what we usually mean by 'knowledge'. But the latter is not altogether different. Representing, as it does, a state of the 'subject', it partakes of its hybrid character, and includes within it the non-self, viz., *antaḥ-karaṇa* in one of its ever-shifting modes.

(6) To go back to the idealistic postulate. Objects may depend upon empirical knowledge for their revelation, but not for their being. It is empirical knowledge rather that depends upon objects for its emergence—at least sometimes, as in perception. So if they should depend for it upon consciousness, it must be only upon *dr̥k* in the above sense.

(7) Now we cannot place *dr̥k* and *dr̥śya* on the same ontological level, for while the one has independent being (for its being is its revelation), the other has only a dependent one. What then is the relation between the two? In the case of the 'rope-serpent' we have two things, which similarly belong to different orders of being. The rope, to speak from the empirical standpoint, has its own being, but the being of the 'serpent' is dependent upon it. We know here that the serpent is but an illusory appearance of the rope. On this analogy, the advaitin explains *dr̥śya* as only an appearance of *dr̥k*. But it is not non-entity, for it has its own being though it is finally sustained by, or rooted in, *dr̥k*, the ultimate Reality. Objects are; but they are not real ultimately. This shows that *dr̥k* is not only one and eternal but also that it is all-comprehensive, in the sense that there is nothing outside it.

(8) It may appear that such *dr̥k* is nothing but an empty generality because, in the end, it is abstracted from all objects of experience. It will be so, if we start from the assumption that the latter are concretely real. But to do so is to beg the whole question.

EXTRA NOTES

1. . *Anirovacanīya* does not imply either scepticism or dogmatism. It only means 'dependent being'.

2. The advaitin may ultimately deny the finite (*dṛśya*) but it is through denying it that he reaches the Infinite.

3. It is worth while pursuing another course to arrive at the result reached in this Note. Just as *dṛśya* points to *dṛk*, *dṛk*, it may be said, points to *dṛśya*. But then it is difficult to explain the relation between the two. See *Iṣṭa-siddhi*. In this case, remember we cannot say that *dṛk* points to no particular object but to objects in general; but such a general object is only a concept and not a reality.

4. *Ghaṭādi-sattā rajju-sarpādi-sattā bhinnā| yataḥ dvitīyasya vyavahāra-kāle bādhyatvam prathamasya tu na| tasmāt sattā trai-vidhyam||*

ABHĀVA

All judgments refer to reality, and negative judgments form no exception to this rule. This reality is indicated by the subject of the proposition, embodying the judgment in question. So much may be taken for granted. But this reference to reality is quite a general one. For the special meaning of a proposition, as it is commonly recognized, we have to look in the attribute. Superficially speaking, a negative judgment merely separates this attribute from the reality or object to which it refers, and it may therefore appear that the negative judgment is devoid of any such meaning. But when we reflect, we come to see that, over and above the separation or denial, it implies some positive attribute as characterizing the object in question, and that the denial is made on the ground that this characteristic, however vague our notion of it may be, is incompatible with the denied feature. This is what is meant by the positive implication of negative judgments. The judgment 'A is not B' is accordingly to be analysed into 'A is not B but C', or 'A is X which excludes B'. To state it more concretely, 'The rose is not blue' means that we know it to possess redness or some other colour, which excludes blueness. The sole clue to this positive characteristic is found in the context in which the judgment occurs, or in what is termed 'the interest of predication'.

This interpretation shows that the essential function of negative judgments, like that of positive ones, is to determine the nature of reality. But may we stop at that in our investigation of the bearing of negative judgments on reality? It seems that we cannot. This will become clear when we state what the upholders of this view say, viz., that negation is rooted in the fact of difference.¹ In our example, for instance, blueness and redness are different from each other. When they are viewed as merely different, the denial of the one does not imply the affirmation of the other. But the implication appears, and therefore negation becomes significant, when they change from being differentials to contraries or opposites by claiming to qualify the same object, viz., the rose, in precisely the same manner. This is how significant negation is said to originate from difference. But what is this 'difference'

¹ See Bosanquet's *Logic*, i. p. 272; *Essentials*, p. 129.

which is taken to be the basis of negation? Until we explain its nature, we cannot claim to have finally solved our problem, for it may involve some unwarranted assumption. The above explanation of negative judgments is so fashionable now that any attempt to criticize it is almost sure to create a prejudice in the minds of the hearers. But a student of Indian philosophy, when he finds it stated that negation is rooted in the fact of difference, cannot help asking whether it is, indeed, a fact; and, if so, whether it is a positive or negative fact.

It seems to be assumed here that difference is positive, since negation is stated to be based upon it. But to think of difference as something positive is by no means easy, for it at once raises questions which land us in insuperable difficulties. The discussion of the nature of difference occupies a very important place in Indian philosophy; and as in the case of the other problems discussed there, every possible view has been advocated by some school or other. To state very briefly the arguments of Indian thinkers touching this particular point. There can be two, and only two, ways of conceiving difference, if it is to be positive: (1) as an attribute qualifying the differents or (2) as identical with one of them. When we say that 'A is different from B', we may mean either (1) that the difference of B from A is a positive attribute characterizing B,¹ or (2) that it is nothing but B itself. In the first view, difference is admitted in addition to A and B; but in the second there are only A and B, and no difference apart from them. Now the latter view, viz., that difference is of the very nature of the differents is untenable for, while the notion of 'difference' is relative, that of the nature of a thing is not so. We can cognize or speak of A or B separately by itself, but not of 'difference of B' without distinctly calling to mind or explicitly mentioning that from which it differs, viz., A. Owing to this wide disparity between them in an important respect, they cannot be the same. As regards the former view, the question arises whether or not the difference in question, which is supposed to be an attribute of B, is itself different from it²; and such an inquiry clearly leads to infinite regress in the argument. So neither of the alternatives helps us in understanding the idea of difference being positive.

¹ *Pratīyonitvaṁ pañcamyarthah.*

² *Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvaḥ bheda-graha-pūrvakaḥ: Iṣṭa-siddhi, p. 3.*

Since the notion of difference as positive is thus unintelligible, some Indian thinkers have adopted the alternative to it, viz., that it is negative. According to them also, of course, the judgment 'The rose is not blue' denies blueness of the rose; but the denial does not, as in the previous view, suggest redness or any other colour. It only points to the non-existence of blueness in or its *absence* from the rose, as the corresponding positive judgment would signify its *presence*. It has to be pointed out here that, according to this view, negative facts are as much objects of knowledge as positive ones; or, to state the same otherwise, knowledge of absence is not absence of knowledge. That is, the present view explains negative judgments by postulating negative facts as part of objective reality. In thus taking absence as a datum of perception, it may appear to do violence to common sense. But there is this point in its favour, viz., that it explains negative judgments in a straightforward manner.¹ The other interpretation may preserve intact the common sense view that reality is positive, but it contradicts it in representing a negative judgment as virtually a positive one. If the one meddles with reality, the other does so with the judgment. Here the question will be asked whether there is no 'interest of predication' at all in this case. The answer is that there is such interest; it is in defining the standpoint from which the rose is viewed.² That is to say, the notion of absence conveyed is not vague or general (*tuccha*), but is quite determinate; and we become acquainted through it with a specific, though negative, aspect of the rose.³ But this is only one type of negative judgments. A second type of it should also be recognized in the present view, since difference itself is taken to be negative in it. Thus when we say 'The jar is not the cloth', it does not mean the absence of the cloth in the jar but merely that the two objects are different or, more strictly, the non-existence of the relation of identity between them. It is thus not a quality that is denied here, but a relation.⁴ As in

¹ There is difference in this type of judgments also. They are purely synthetic. *Atyantābhāva* presupposes *anyonyābhāva*. But both being *nitya*, the dependence is logical (*pratīti-mūlaka*).

² It has a determinate meaning. It is also a vehicle of knowledge. It gives new information.

³ *Itara-vyāvṛttir eva prayojanam.*

⁴ *Ghaṭa-tādātmya-vyāvṛttir ekatra / samavāya-sambandhāvachchinna nāilya vyāvṛttir anyatra.*

the previous type of judgments, the negation here also is significant inasmuch as the denial is quite specific¹.


Now we need not deny that negative judgments lead to the suggestion of positive attributes as maintained in the first view. Only the suggestion seems to be too remote to be regarded as the import of the judgment. Thus, to reach it, we have to pass from denial to difference, from difference to opposition and thence to selection of one of the opposites. Again, this meaning depends almost entirely upon the context; and it changes, as it is admitted, when the context changes. That is, the suggestion is not only remote but also vague. Besides, such suggestions are not confined to negative judgments; they are found in positive judgments also. Let us take the example 'Gold is gold'. It may mean the superiority of gold to the other metals, or the certainty of its tempting people or, if the context permits it, it may even convey the idea that good men are always good. The last meaning, it may be pointed out, has nothing to do with the actual words used. For these reasons, it seems to me that the so-called positive significance of negative judgments resembles what some Indian writers describe as *vyāṅgyārtha*, while classifying meanings, which is neither the primary nor the secondary sense but a tertiary one².

I do not suggest by this that the negative view of difference should be preferred to the positive one of the same. I have already indicated that there is really little to choose between the two views. My purpose in referring to it is to show that we may have to reject the notion of difference altogether, since it admits of no satisfactory explanation either as positive or negative, and conclude that it must therefore be not real but only an appearance of reality. If the notion of difference be thus dismissed, then both the previous interpretations which are based on its acceptance, in one form or the other, have to be given up. That is the well-known advaitic view; but as so much has been stated about that view already, it is not necessary to dwell on it further. I may make only one remark:

¹ The implication is that each judgment is to be interpreted separately. This is the view of radical pluralism, as the other is of those that take reality to be a systematic whole.

² Remember that *vyāṅgyārtha* may or may not be mediated by *lakṣyārtha*. In negative judgments, there seems to be a *lakṣyārtha* (denial, difference, redness) but not necessarily in positive ones. Negative suggestion is also possible.

Even in this view, negation is significant; and the significance is in affirming the reality with which ultimately we are in contact not only in one or some judgments but in all—the absolute reality which is *sarva-pratyaya-vedya*, as it is said.



181.4

EXTRA NOTES

1. Every Negative judgment has a positive implication. By this is meant that the denial is made on the ground that the object in question is known to possess another characteristic with which the denied feature is incompatible. Hence while negating something the negative judgment affirms another. The rose is not blue means that it is red. But we must note that all this is stated in reference to the predicative element. The subject or the *anuyogi* is, of course, always there and this also forms a reference to reality.

(a) S is not P because S is something which excludes P. P is a *possible* predicate.

2. 'S is not P'. The *not* belongs to the copula and not to the predicate, i.e., *prasajya-pratiṣedha* and not *paryudāsa*.

3. All judgments refer to reality and all are both synthetic and analytic. A negative judgment is predominantly synthetic because its main purpose is to express a difference and not an identity. Cf. in this connection *Muktāvalī*, p. 378. There is *abheda-sambandha* in *rājā-puruṣaḥ* but *bheda-sambandha* in *ghaṭo na paṭaḥ*.

4. Negative terms really stand for propositions. Contradiction is a matter of affirmation or denial, and affirmation or denial is the function of propositions alone. A term does not affirm or deny; it merely suggests something which may be affirmed or denied in a proposition.

5. It is necessary in dealing with negative judgments or the meaning of negative terms, we must distinguish between the explicit and the implicit meanings. The implicit meaning is not the meaning at all. *Yaś ca arthād artho na sa vācyārthaḥ*.

6. In Advaita, *abhāva-jñāna* points to Brahman as the ultimate reality like *bhāva-jñāna* (*Buddhistic Logic*, p. 390). It is however necessary to remember that it is *ghaṭa-pratīyogitatvopalatikā-bhāva* that is Brahman and not *ghaṭa-pratīyogitatvā-viśiṣṭābhāva*. The latter is different from Brahman.

7. Though all negative judgments have a positive implication, we prefer the negative form for its significance of exclusion (*BE*. p. 130). There is, of course, affirmation also (*BE*. p. 132). It also gives exhaustion (*BE*. p. 131).

8. It would be more correct to say that Negation presupposes suggestion than affirmation. (*BL*. p. 278).

9. All judgment has this in common, viz., interest (*BL.* p. 283). This helps to explain the advaitic position both as regards positive and negative judgments, for *vyavahāra* implies interest.

10. The unity of the judgment does not exclude systematic multiplicity within it. (*BL.* p. 284).

11. The meaning of every judgment is to be looked for in the attribute to which is attached the interest that guides the relations of the content used in judging (*BL.* p. 285).

12. Three items in negation—one determined by the sphere of interest, another which accounts for the denial and still another the *pratiyogi* denial. (*BL.* pp. 286-288. See also p. 279).

13. Negation is rooted in the fact of difference; but difference is not enough to warrant negation. Significant negation begins when positive differents claim the same place in the same system. (*BL.* p. 292).

14. It is *atyantābhāva* that is rooted in *anyonyābhava*. *Anyonyābhāva* or *bheda* must be regarded as *abhāva* or denied. To regard it as *bhāva* leads to difficulty of explanation of relation between *bheda* and *bhedin*.

15. It is no doubt open to say that no judgment, whether negative or positive need refer to reality in the metaphysical sense. In this case, we explain the significance of propositions on the basis of pure interest. That is, we adopt the pragmatic standpoint as in the *Vaiśiṣṭika* view. The interest of predication is all and there is no further implication.

Other schools do not give up this element of interest in interpreting judgments, but they hold that it is not the only one to be taken into consideration. (See *BL.* p. 283).

16. *Bhāva* and *abhāva* are both appearances. This negation in *abhāva* or even the negation of this *bhāva* in Brahman is different from absolute negation. The former is realized in thinking; the latter is reality itself in reference to which *everything* is denied. (Malkani, *Philosophy of the Self*, pp. 3-8).

17. *Tadanya* and *tadviruddha* are secondary meanings; *tadabhāva* alone is primary meaning of *nañ*. I.e., contradictory meaning comes first and then contrariety. See *Arthasaṃgraha*, p. 114.

18. *Piśācābhāva* is *anumeya* according to N.-V. *Piśāca-bheda* in doctrines recognizing *bheda* may be *pratyakṣa* if the *anuyogin* is *pratyakṣa*.

“THE PARADOX OF NEGATIVE JUDGMENT”

The discussion of this topic in the July (1933) number of the ‘Philosophical Review’ is admirable and, in spite of the proviso at the end that the treatment is not exhaustive, it leaves almost nothing to be desired, whether it be in point of clarity or in that of comprehensiveness. The reader feels certain that the truth lies somewhere in the direction pointed to in the discussion; but, as it often happens in such cases, the actual conclusion reached is somewhat disappointing. The object of this note is to suggest one or two additions in the hope that they may make the conclusion a little more acceptable. It will be best in doing so to follow the order in which Mr Ledger Wood considers the subject. The essential point here is that a negative judgment, like all other judgments, should have a reference to a reality beyond itself but that it is difficult to find a place for negative facts in it. Hence ‘either the negative judgment conflicts with reality or reality itself is absurdly conceived’. After stating the paradox in the form of this dilemma, Mr Wood mentions four attitudes which may be adopted towards it. They are:

- (1) The dilemma may be accepted as ultimate or as admitting of no solution. This sceptical attitude is rightly dismissed at once, for it really evades the problem instead of solving it one way or the other.
- (2) It may be denied that judgments have any reference to reality at all, and the paradox which is a consequence of assuming the existence of such a reference thereby vanishes. This, however, takes a purely formal view of logic and is entirely against the spirit in which that subject is now studied. On the epistemological side of the study, at least, the form of judgments cannot thus be isolated from their content.
- (3) The third attitude accepts negative facts, but refuses to admit that their introduction in any way contradicts the nature of reality. This is rejected as involving a drastic change in the conception of reality which is ordinarily regarded as exclusively positive. It may be difficult to refute this position, but it should be acknowledged at the same time that negative facts are nowhere revealed in

experience and that, if they were, they would *ipso facto*. become positive.

- (4) The last solution avers that negative judgments are really positive judgments in disguise. This attitude is considered under three sub-heads of which Mr Wood rejects the first two and himself bases his conclusion on the third:

(a) The negative judgment can, through obversion, be transformed into a positive one. The judgment 'A is not B' is equivalent to the affirmative judgment 'A is not-B'. But this is a fictitious change and the negative element still lurks in it. Only it is now shifted from the copula to the predicate. Such logical manipulations do not therefore meet the requirements of the case.

(b) Negative judgments are described here as really pseudo-negatives. Mr Wood, while recognizing this as a significant view, rejects it as not really an adequate account. It applies, according to him, only to propositions which are not truly negative. But something may be said in favour of this view. To begin with, it is taken for granted here that the negative proposition when positively interpreted signifies only otherness or difference. But there is no reason why all negative judgments should be interpreted in the same way; and we shall see that they may bear other meanings also. Even as regards the type of judgment represented by 'A is not B', Mr Wood offers certain criticisms. Now this judgment is interpreted as 'A is other than B' by those who take what may be called a positive view of negation; and since difference is an actual feature in reality, the application of the negative judgment to reality is validated. Now this is criticized here on two grounds. It is stated that the proposition in question is only a pseudo-negative and that as such its explanation really does not solve the difficulty in question. Mr Wood admits later that there is a negative element here which is not taken into account, and states that its significance is left out

unexplained. But it is difficult to see what that can be when the very object here is to deny such significance. The really negative judgments, he says, we find in cases like 'Snow is not black', 'A is not in the house' which cannot be explained positively in the same manner. To these, it seems, we must add one more to complete the types of negative propositions, viz. 'The sun is not shining'. Now it is quite possible to show that in these cases also, we have a positive explanation. Thus 'Snow is not black' indicates *opposition* which implies not only mutual exclusion but also contrariety.¹ In the next case, the proposition means either that *A has been* in the room or *will be* there later. In the last example, which we have added, the meaning is that the sun has set or will soon rise, in accordance with the context in which the statement is made. In other words, while 'A is not B' and 'Snow is not black' signify substantive relations, the other two propositions respectively signify temporal or spatial separateness. The time element and the space element are not mentioned in the former. That is to say, the relation implied there is constant, non-temporal and non-spatial—while in the latter two propositions, it is not so. Wherever this attitude is maintained, as in some Indian doctrines, all these types are explained thus and no type of negative judgments is neglected. But if appeal is made to common sense and the presence of the negative element is insisted upon, it does not appear difficult to relate it to the positive interpretation. And here the interpretation which Mr Wood suggests as the third alternative, and as his own solution of the problem, furnishes the necessary clue.

- (c) A negative judgment is here taken as equivalent to a complex of affirmative judgments. It is an affir-

¹ We may regard this differently as signifying otherness between snow and whatever is black.

mation about another affirmation. That is, 'A is not B' signifies that it is an error to consider A to be B; 'Snow is not black' means that it is a mistake to regard snow as black. Now to consider the second of these two propositions, it really has two implications—'that snow has some other colour' and 'that it is wrong to take it as black'. In the case of the other proposition, to see the double significance, it is necessary to reconsider the form. It seems that the correct form is not 'A is not B' but 'This is not B', or, if we like, we may express it as 'X is not B' where X stands for what is presented merely, without any further specification. Nobody who recognized A as such would express himself in the manner 'A is not B'. Now, in this form, the significance is first 'that this is A' and 'that it is an error to take it as B'. Similarly in the case of the last example also. In other words, what we suggest is that the truth lies in (b) and (c) taken together and that (b) is not wholly wrong, nor (c) wholly right. This way of explaining the negative elements, however, assumes that all negative judgments express one and the same attitude towards reality. It is obvious that 'A is not B', for example, may abolish doubt or serve as an answer to an interrogation. It is therefore necessary to widen the scope of the explanation so as to bring in these other attitudes also towards reality¹.

¹ Perhaps 'appearance' may be substituted for 'error' and made to stand for 'error' as well as doubt etc.

EXTRA NOTES

1. Read Demos's article *A Discussion of a certain type of Negative Proposition in Mind*, 1917.
2. Read Klein's article *Negation considered as a Statement of Difference in Identity in Mind*, 1911.
3. See Śālikanātha, pp. 120 ff. Perhaps *abhāva-pratīti* = *anuyogyānubhava* + *pratīyogī-smṛti*. If the two are not discriminated, we have error; otherwise *abhāva-jñāna*.

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
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